Phenomenology, music, nature by Livingston, John Robert
PHENOMENOLOGY, MUSIC; NATURE 
by 
John Robert Livingston, Honours B.A., M.E.S. 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Tasmania 
Hobart 
July, 1999 
DECLARATION 
This thesis contains no material which has been 
accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma 
in any university and contains no copy or paraphrase of 
material previously published or written by another 
person, except where due reference is made in the text. 
J.R. Livingston 
J.R. Livingston 
AUTHORITY OF ACCESS 
This thesis is not to be made available for loan or copying for two 
years following the date this statement was signed. Following 
that time the thesis may be made available for loan and limited 
copying in accordance with the Copyright Act, 1968. 
ABSTRACT 
If one takes the preservation of non-human species seriously, one must 
be prepared to ondertake a critical re-evaluation of many traditional, perhaps 
even sacred, metaphysical constructs concerning how we are in the world 
and the world in is in us - the questions central to ontology and 
epistemology respectively. In particular, the developing field of 
transpersonal ecology has assumed as basic that care and concern for Nature 
can only be fostered by a radical re-definition of our sense of place, and of the 
resourcist commodification of Nature whereby all living beings are defined 
solely in terms of their extrinsic, utilitarian, economic yield . Against 
resourcism, transpersonal ecology seeks to re-acquaint us with our 
embodiment in the world, a world where selves and beings-in-the-world are 
conceived as active processes which communicate in concrete contexts rather 
than as subjects and objects that cohere conceptually and abstractly. It is 
argued that such a metaphysical revision is necessary if we are to successfully 
pursue and realize the transpersonal ecological goal of Self-realization! or 
identification with others. 
The philosophical framework for such an endeavour is supplied by a 
detailed examination of the phenomenological nature of perception and 
cognition. Why phenomenology is of particular value is that it begins where 
transpersonal ecology leaves off, or what is basic to phenomenology is that 
the world already exists right there, palpable and vibrant, replete with 
significance and meaning in perceptual settings before its abstract 
conceptualization. At all times we are immersed in a meaningful exchange 
with others which is best understood as a series of dynamically evolving 
contexts or Gestalts. Whether we be engaged in conversation, moving 
quietly through a rainforest or embraced by a resonant soundscape, we are 
always experiencing a process-based identification with other phenomena, be 
they other people, other species or musical tones. Perceptually, they are 
fundamentally the same: they all emerge, evolve and dissolve as focal points 
which resolve onto the horizon in one seamless movement of Being. What 
is most important for transpersonal ecological purposes is that nothing, no 
species, no tonal cluster has importance in isolation, but only in 
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harmonizing, communing with others in a fluid, ephemeral perceptual 
Gestalt. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to phenomenologically describe the 
similarity that exists between the perception of music and of Nature. What is 
particularly stressed is that resourcism is deceitful in presenting non-
humans solely in terms of presumed essential characteristics of economic 
import, a view that grossly simplifies and distorts rich perceptual settings. It 
is maintained that selves do not encounter a dead, neutral universe 
inhabited by discrete, atomic objects. Rather, selves and beings-in-the-world 
act as interlocutors in situations wherein an existential invitation is 
proffered by an engaging presence and is accepted by an embodied self. The 
meaning and significance of this encounter is shown to exist as a "steadfast 
friendly" commitment to the creative expression and improvisitory play 
which is forever at work in the delineating of any situation. 
Music presents itself as an appropriate model for the elucidation of the 
transpersonal ecological approach in that, in its phenomenological presence, 
its real value rests with its immediate, situational, invitational aspect. As 
with the experience of Nature, the perception of significance relies on the 
capacity of a self to appreciate the temporary, evanescent disclosure of an 
other's being in its context. Though clearly operating within different time 
frames if one accepts an objective, linear conception of time, both species and 
tones may be seen to be of a similar phenomenological nature when an 
appreciation of their unfolding in virtual, existential time is acknowledged. 
The meaning of a particular tone in a symphony or an individual being in 
its setting requires the perceiver to adopt an at-tuned, anticipatory, listening 
stance which allows for the moment of disclosure to occur. At that 
epiphanous moment, past, present, and future fuse. The chord's or the 
species' name ceases to be relevant once the carnal, resonant being is fully 
appreciated within its historical, structured, sedimented context. And as the 
tone decays or the species melts into its place, the residue of the epiphanous 
contact remains as an appropriate, situationally grounded, commitment to 
the value of the experience, with a forward looking anticipation of renewal 
and re-acquaintance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, I was working as an ornithologist in the Tai Forest of Cote 
d'Ivoire, West Africa. Pursuing my usual rounds, I encountered a 
particularly dishevelled Narina Trogon, a not uncommon bird. The 
encounter would not have been particularly significant save for the fact that 
it set into motion a deep exploration of what I was really doing there, and 
what I was really accomplishing with regard to protecting the particular, 
palpable being right in front of me. It is easy to abstractly talk of species and 
habitat protection in a distanced and rational manner; but he was staring 
me right in the eye asking me what I was I going to do about his lot, in the 
sense both of his fate and of his intraspecific and interspecific brethren. 
In the course of much soul-searching, I acquired Warwick Fox's Toward a 
Transpersonal Ecology (1990), which rekindled the interest I had had in 
environmental ethics and aesthetics during my academic career, but had 
assumed I had left in the past, having nothing more to say about the matter. 
What impressed me about Fox's book was that it did not seek to establish 
normative axioms and didactically prescribe moral activity. Rather, it 
centered on the notions of "place" and "belonging" in the world and how 
our natural inclinations towards recapturing and fostering both might be 
realized through Arne Naess' conception of Self-realization!: "the this-
worldly realization of as expansive a sense of self as possible in a world in 
which selves and things-in-the-world are conceived as processes" (Fox, 1990, 
p.197). 
I had always harboured a deep resentment of resourcism, the 
commodification of non-human beings in the interests of human economic 
gain, yet had never located a convincing argument for its wholesale 
rejection. Traditional ethical and aesthetic arguments had always, to my 
mind, failed, as they almost invariably attempted to defeat the resourcist 
enterprise in a directly logical manner. I felt it was a mistake to engage 
resourcists in a philosophical game played according to their rules, on their 
own turf, so to speak. I found transpersonal ecology very refreshing, as it 
does not try to rationally convince, but merely to exhort participation in an 
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existential process of self-discovery leading to a more appropriate sense of 
worldly comportment. 
It occurred to me, however, that appreciation clearly involves the 
positive valuation of something, and that the transpersonal ecological 
approach might be given additional philosophical weight if it could be 
elucidated by appeal to a common everyday activity in which its 
underpinnings might be easily recognizable. 
What immediately struck me was that my two greatest loves, music and 
nature, bore an interesting similarity when I considered the way I 
approached and appreciated them. The more I looked into the analogy 
between the perception of music and the perception of Nature, the more 
excited I became. At first, there were two items that intrigued me: 1) almost 
everyone appreciates music in one form or another; and 2) music is 
ineffable, yet one does not require an explanation of its beauty and power, 
nor even a passing acquaintance with musical theory in order to find it 
meaningful and significant. In fact, I believed that the intrusion of 
theoretical discussions of musical meaning might even impede, perhaps 
preclude, appreciation. Pursuing the analogy in greater depth, a whole suite 
of similarities began to present themselves. Clearly, music really has import 
only in its direct, unmediated experience in a concrete situation. Moreover, 
it was clear that no single tone has any meaning in isolation as a discrete 
entity, but only in its interrelation with other tones in one whole melodic, 
harmonic, rhythmic, symphonic temporal thrust. And what this, in turn, 
suggested was that one does not listen to music in any linear fashion (i.e. to 
hear the final chord of a piece) and that one never identifies or ranks 
individual tones according to their potential aesthetic yield as musical 
resource. 
This, for me, sedimented my conviction in maintaining that there is an 
analogy between the perception of music and the perception of nature. It is 
what this dissertation is all about. In what follows, I appeal to 
phenomenological description to argue that nature can be perceived and re-
cognized against the backdrop of musical perception, understanding and 
appreciation. 
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1 TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY: 
THE ONTOLOGICAL SITUATION 
One of the most vexing and persistent problems associated with being a 
naturalist and defender of wild nature is that one is often called upon to 
label oneself to the satisfaction of one's audience. To be simply a naturalist is 
to divest oneself of serious academic or professional standing. One must 
pigeon-hole oneself as environmentalist, ecologist, indeed an "ologist" of 
any sort or, perhaps worse, as environmental philosopher, ecosopher, deep 
ecologist or transpersonal ecologist. This act of labelling, of self-
characterizing, by a naturalist is seen as needlessly constricting and 
potentially misleading, as one can rarely be assured that one's definition of a 
term meshes with someone else's. Since my experience of nature is so 
personal and subjective, I cannot validly assume that my viewpoint is fully 
shared by another. The very term "environmentalist" is, in fact, so 
explosive in its connotations that I can expect my self-definition to be 
equated immediately with concepts such as "radical" and "extremist" that 
are so prevalent in the media. Furthermore, though I may have quite 
reasonable and consistent metaphysical and ontological grounds for 
embracing a certain position, I may feel that their elucidation is so at risk of 
misinterpretation by my audience that I will shy away from attempting a 
full-blown exposition no matter how convincing it might be. In short, 
though inquiries into what I am doing, what I am all about, may be sincere 
or innocent enough, I will fear that there is a subtext to justify my outlook if 
it be anything beyond that of a simple naturalist. I will act defensively as I 
will feel that any term other than "naturalist" will entail the utilization of 
arguments that are couched in terms that I find distasteful or at least 
unequal to the task. I simply will not employ the "rational" 
mechanistic/reductionistic, resourcist language that is expected of 
"professional" environmentalists, ecologists or ecosophers if they are to be 
taken seriously. 
The main difficulty with characterizing oneself as a deep ecologist, say, is 
that though there may be a great deal of agreement about what constitutes 
the deep ecological sensibility generated over the last twenty-five years or so, 
it cannot be codified as a discipline in the traditional sense. It is a position 
that one arrives at, not through the laws of logic or inference, deduction or 
induction but through personal engagement in natural processes. 
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This having been said, there is still a striking convergence of opinion as 
to what constitutes an appropriate deep ecological perspective. Foremost is 
that traditional Western anthropocentric metaphysics is ill-equipped to deal 
handily with deep ecology's central exhortation: care and concern for nature 
based on ecological principles of inter-relatedness. Why traditional 
metaphysics cannot accept this fundamental imperative is that, at its core, it 
takes the bifurcation of reality as axiomatic. Whether one is a rationalist or 
empiricist, and hence either deduces or infers, respectively, the possibility of 
the external world, one must accept that there is an absolute ontological 
schism between subject and object, mind and body, man and nature. To 
accept that reality consists of the union of these polarities in a complex web 
of inter-relation is to deny the fundamental, self-evident truth embraced by 
the major players in traditional, rationalist philosophy: Descartes, Bacon, 
Leibniz and Kant. It is, in a very real sense, to commit philosophical heresy. 
Though all of the dichotomies itemised above are widely discussed in 
the deep ecological literature, the subject/object split has attracted the 
greatest degree of scrutiny as it provides the foundation for the one thing 
that all deep ecologists find objectionable: resourcism. This cornerstone of 
the dominant Western social paradigm is universally deemed ecologically 
inappropriate as it treats the entire non-human world as a mere collection 
of objects or commodities determined and defined solely in terms of their 
extrinsic, utility value to humans. Why this cultural reification of living, 
sentient beings is condemned as inappropriate, even offensive, usually 
follows from one of three lines of reasoning: 1) it is deemed ecologically 
unsound for the reason that all members of the ecosphere interact in 
dynamic, evolving contexts to form patterns that suggest an orderly, unified 
whole and, thus, have value in the whole. That is, Being is seen to consist of 
all organisms - individually, specifically and ecosystemically - operating in 
relation to others situationally, each belonging to the whole; 2) it is deemed 
ethically objectionable to assume such a "speciesist" stance, to prejudicially 
attach more weight to the interests of one's species against the interests of 
any number of individuals and species each with their own interests and 
concerns. That is, it is wrong, in some sense, for cost/benefit calculations of 
non-human utility value to assume a pre-eminent position in the realm of 
ethical decision-making ; and 3) it is deemed ontologically questionable as to 
whether or not an absolute distinction between subject and object, man and 
nature, can be maintained. From whichever angle one attacks resourcism, 
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then, there does seem to be agreement that it is of crucial importance to 
question the validity of the metaphysical system from which it stems. For it 
is quite possible that it may just be a culturally and historically relative 
"projection" or assumption that may not be defensible in any absolute sense. 
Though it may seem odd that so much of environmental philosophy is 
pre-occupied with metaphysical ruminations, rather than with 
technological fixes to remedy ecological ills, it may not be. For if one looks 
inwardly to confront one's positive valuation of wild nature, one is 
eventually faced with uncovering the reasons for a position so at odds with 
the rest of one's cultural inheritance. And since no belief, attitude, value, or 
assumption develops in a vacuum, one must, in order to be true to oneself, 
undertake a critical review of the philosophical underpinnings of such a 
bias. 
It is generally agreed by the majority of ecophilosophers that the starting-
point for such an undertaking is an examination of the way in which the 
self approaches Being. In traditional metaphysics the self, or more accurately 
a disembodied, alienated subject, inhabits a neutral, value-free realm and 
confronts reality as a world of discrete objects to be manipulated and 
controlled. And the epistemological justification for such an assumption is 
that objects exist as fully determinate prior to any intellectual synthetic act. 
All of nature is compartmentalized into things having eternal, universal 
essences, and in such a world there is a complete devaluation of the role of 
subjective experience. Individual conceptualizations of phenomena are, 
therefore, rejected as superfluous, even misguided. Moreover, in the 
absolute neglect of the role of subjective experience in the reification of non-
human phenomena, abstract concepts standing for items of experience are 
taken to be more real than the phenomena themselves. And as if this 
existential estrangement were not sufficient for establishing the dominance 
of humans over nature, one final abstraction is made imperative: every 
"object" must then be weighed against a standard of its utilitarian 
functioning. 
I think that it can be seen now why ecophilosophers expend so much 
energy in the deconstruction of Cartesian metaphysics. It is important to • 
recognize that metaphysics must not be viewed in isolation but as the 
background for one's epistemological, and normative positions. In 
informing us of how we fundamentally exist in the world, how we relate to 
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nature, it also implicitly tells us how we are to understand and evaluate our 
perceptions and thoughts. Traditionally, we have been made to mistrust 
and abandon any thought of actually being-in-the-world. We have been 
made to maintain a radical scepticism towards our basic encounter with the 
world and to assume that all that is real are abstract concepts that mediate 
our experience. There is no room for the illogical, even perverse 
supposition that unmediated experience in concrete situations is possible 
and desirable. 
Transpersonal Ecology, Self-realization! and Deep Ecology 
It may seem strange, then, that it is this very basic prelinguistic and 
precognitive experience of the world that many ecophilosophers take as the 
appropriate starting point for a review of our cultural estrangement from 
nature. It is hard to think of even one author who does not take the 
examination and description of our most fundamental experience of the 
world as the proper basis for establishing a more appropriate ecological 
approach based on concern and care for the non-human. In order to 
develop ecological consciousness we must first consider the inter-
relatedness of self and world. We must attempt what Arne Naess advocates 
as the norm of "Self-realization!" and which forms the basis for Warwick 
Fox's Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (1990). 
Though by no means an easy read, Fox's book must be considered 
mandatory reading for anyone interested in ecophilosophy in general and 
deep ecology in particular. For, in it, he provides an almost exhaustive 
bibliographical review of the genesis and evolution of environmental 
thought as well as the criticisms that have made certain avenues for 
exploration untenable. Though I cannot hope to do justice to the subtlety 
and persuasiveness of his thoroughgoing analysis, I would like to take some 
time to, at least, review his main reasons for rejecting the term "deep 
ecology" in favour of his own "transpersonal ecology". 
Let us begin by first asking what deep ecology is all about. According to 
what Fox characterizes as Naess' formal sense of deep ecology: 
... (it) is predicated upon the idea of asking progressively deeper 
questions about the ecological relationships of which we are a 
part. Naess holds that this deep ecological questioning process 
ultimately reveals bedrock or end-of-the-line assumptions, 
which he refers to as fundamentals, and that deep ecological 
views are derived from such fundamentals while shallow 
ecological views are not (Fox, 1990, p. 92). 
Science represents an example of this type of shallow ecological 
viewpoint because it presupposes as basic certain principles and 
assumptions which could be questioned at a deeper level; since it accepts 
quite abstract hypotheses as fundamental, it disqualifies itself from 
consideration as deeply philosophical. 
Interestingly though, science's failure to fulfil Naess' criteria also serves 
to underscore the shortcomings of the criteria itself, according to Fox. The 
main difficulty is that the formal requirement to ask certain deeper 
questions is only that: formal. It makes no substantial commitments 
imperative with the result that conclusions about value-priorities that are 
fundamental to the deep ecological position are not made logically 
necessary. Consequently, one need not accept the ecocentric conclusions that 
are supposed to follow from deep ecological questioning. As Fox (1990, p.95) 
puts it: 
The startling corollary to ...defining deep ecology in a purely 
formal way is that even an environmentally destructive view 
must be characterized as a deep ecological philosophy if it is 
derived from fundamentals. 
Though the foregoing argument is the most damaging to deep ecology in 
that it is logically possible to derive both ecocentric and anthropocentric 
views from fundamentals, Fox also reasons that there are two further, more 
practical reasons for rejecting the term. First, is that the term "deep ecology" 
is often criticized for being " ponderous", "pretentious", "smug", "self-
congratulatory", "holier-than-thou" and "pejorative". I will not attempt to 
elaborate Fox's discussion of the search for a less heavy-handed label. But 
suffice it to say that I agree with the term's detractors and believe that deep 
ecologists must bear some of the responsibility for the failure of the 
intended meaning to reach a wider audience. Secondly, it may be reasoned 
that just because one accepts Naess' popular formulation of deep ecology as 
it is set forth below, this, in and of itself, does not compel one to characterize 
oneself as a deep ecologist. That is, one can just as easily be an 
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ecophilosopher of a different bent and still adhere to Naess eight basic 
principles, which are: 
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman 
Life on earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic 
value, inherent value). These values are independent of the 
usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the 
realization of these values and are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and 
diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible 
with a substantial decrease of the human population. The 
flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is 
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect 
basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The 
resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the 
present. 
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life 
quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than 
adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There 
will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and 
great. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an 
obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the 
necessary changes (Devall and Sessions, 1985, p.70). 
The point here is not that these principles are poor, self-contradictory or 
lacking in breadth and vision - clearly they are acceptable to the majority, if 
not all ecophilosophers, if one peruses the literature. The point is that there 
is no contradiction in accepting the precepts while renouncing the deep 
ecological tag. Just as there was no necessity to deducing either an ecocentric 
or anthropocentric viewpoint from the formal sense of deep ecology, there 
is no necessity to inferring either a deep ecological or any other sort of 
ecophilosophical viewpoint from the popular sense of deep ecology. 
Nevertheless, though the first argument essentially logically negates the 
deep ecological argument by indicating that a contradictory conclusion can 
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be derived from the same set of premises, the second has no way near the 
same force. It is not to be taken as a strict, inductive argument from 
empirically-based premises. This is clear from the fact that Naess and 
Sessions emphasize that the premises are meant to be descriptive, not 
prescriptive: 
...(They) are intended to be expressed in a general, nontechnical 
way in order to be understood and acceptable to people coming 
from a wide variety of philosophical and religious 
backgrounds. This means that Naess and Sessions do not 
intend any particular philosophical significance to be attached 
to terms like intrinsic value and life (Fox, 1990, p.115). 
The point, then, is not to view the popular sense of deep ecology as a 
program for ecologically appropriate behavior. It is only to be seen as a 
general description of what, for deep ecologists, constitutes an ecocentric, 
rather than anthropocentric position. The fundamental criticism is only that 
such an outlook is not the exclusive purview of deep ecologists. Hence, it 
fails to capture what is distinctive about deep ecology within ecophilosophy 
and should, therefore, be jettisoned as a reason for labelling oneself a "deep 
ecologist". 
As we have seen, Warwick Fox's reasons for rejecting the "deep ecology" 
rubric is that it may be treated as alternately self-defeating, even self-
contradictory, pejorative, or, at the very least, lacking in disciplinary 
singularity. Yet, there is still one avenue open for exploring its continued 
usage: in its philosophical sense. In its clearest and most compelling form, 
Arne Naess' philosophical sense of deep ecology, known alternatively as 
Ecosophy T: 
...refers to the this-worldly realization of as expansive a sense of 
self as possible in a world in which selves and things-in-the-
world are conceived as processes. ...(and) involves the 
realization of a sense of self that extends beyond (or that is 
trans-) one's egoic, biographical, or personal sense of self... (Fox, 
1990, p.197). 
Though this may not appear to be, on a superficial level, a particularly 
novel or important reformulation of the deep ecological platform, it is. It is 
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thoroughly revolutionary if one cares to take the time to spell out its 
implications for traditional rationalist ontology, epistemology and ethics. In 
order to get the ball rolling, I think that it would be prudent to first review 
the argument that grounds Ecosophy T. Through premises where (N) equals 
"norm", and (H) equals "hypothesis", Naess' normative system unfolds 
thus: 
Ni: Self-realization! 
H1: The higher the Self-realization attained by anyone, the 
broader and deeper the identification with others. 
H2: The higher the level of Self-realization attained by anyone, 
the more its further increase depends upon the Self-realization 
of others. 
H3: Complete Self-realization of anyone depends on that of all. 
N2: Self-realization for all living beings! 
H4: Diversity of life increases Self-realization potentials. 
N3: Diversity of life! 
H5: Complexity of life increases Self-realization potentials. 
N4: Complexity! 
H6: Life resources of the Earth are limited. 
H7: Symbiosis maximizes Self-realization potentials under 
conditions of limited resources. 
N5: Symbiosis! (Fox, 1990, p.104). 
Let us first look at the ontological implications of Ecosophy T. By the very 
fact that Naess characterizes Self-realization! as a process, he implicitly 
denies the traditional polarization of subject and object which, as we have 
seen, is one of the cornerstones of anthropocentrism and resourcism. For 
Naess, there is no such absolute ontological schism; subject and object do 
not encounter each other in any determinate, pre-ordained fashion as 
discrete entities in a neutral, value-free realm. By contrast, for Naess, an 
embodied self moves away from a "narrow, atomistic, or particle-like 
conception of self" (Fox, 1990, p.215) to encounter a field of embracing 
things-in-the-world which are not "objects", but eventful processes. In 
animating the ontological relation as process-based, he clearly denies that 
subject and object operate as static totalities each with fully knowable 
essences. The traditionally constricted and delimited self is, consequently, 
permitted to transcend autobiographical boundaries, to freely encounter 
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Being in something other than in terms of its anthropocentric, utilitarian 
functioning. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it should be noticed that, for 
Naess, Self-realization! is to be treated as a norm of appropriate ecological 
behaviour and not as a moral imperative in the traditional sense in that it 
implies a reciprocal relation between rights and duties. The problem with 
traditional axiologically-based (values-based) arguments is that they are 
grounded by the assumption of a "narrow, atomistic, particle-like 
conception of self" behaving in accordance with moral precepts that are 
deductively valid. One's actions, consequently, do not so much flow from 
inclination as they do from the ability to acknowledge the logical necessity 
of an ethical syllogism. This is all very well and good for rational beings 
that can understand and obey abstract maxims. But what does this suggest 
for non-human beings that cannot do so? Clearly, a walrus or an oak cannot 
possibly countenance the logical force of the most elegant, formally 
reasoned moral argument, and cannot, therefore, be obligated to heed any 
assumed human "right". And just as they have no duties to us, so it can be 
said that we have no obligations corresponding to their "rights". 
How then are we to establish appropriate ecological behaviour in the 
absence of axiologically-based arguments? Naess' response is simple: make 
Self-realization! a basic, guiding principle of action achieved by nothing 
more than a leap of faith in the possibility of identification with other 
humans, with other species and with nature in general. Prior to any moral 
reasoning, one is able to accept as axiomatic that the self is not atomistic or 
particle-like, but as field-like and expansive. And if one accepts this sense of 
self "...then (assuming that one is not self-destructive) one will naturally 
(i.e., spontaneously) protect the natural (spontaneous) unfolding of this 
expansive self (the ecosphere, the cosmos) in all its aspects." (Fox, 1990, 
p.217). What Naess is claiming here is twofold. First, he is suggesting, quite 
rightly, that one is not always argued into accepting a given position, but 
that some things are taken as a given, "right off", in the absence of proof or 
rational demonstration. Hence, at times, we all operate according to a leap of 
faith. Secondly, if we accept Self-realization! as just this sort of fundamental 
good or truth, and that Self-realization! proceeds by means of identification 
with others, then by extension, the greater the degree of identification (to be 
read as a qualitative deepening and broadening of self) with countless other 
beings, the greater the amount of potential Self-realization! that is 
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actualized. Thus, it would seem to be clear that if one is not self-destructive, 
it simply makes sense to attempt to maximize Self-realization! potentials by 
maintaining the utmost degree of diversity and complexity in the world. 
And this may only be achievable if one attempts a more symbiotic, 
ecocentric relationship with non-human nature. I think it is possible to see 
now how Naess cleverly and convincingly side-steps the thorny moral 
debates associated with a strictly rationally-based environmental ethics; by 
not prescribing any particular course of action, but rather merely describing 
what seems to follow from the acceptance of a deceptively simple and 
straightforward axiom, he underscores the reasonableness of transpersonal 
ecology's central exhortation: care and concern for nature achieved through 
the process of Self-realization! 
What may not be sufficiently evident in the foregoing is to just what 
degree the cosmology that grounds transpersonal ecology differs from 
traditional metaphysics. It is not sufficient to simply claim that one is a 
transpersonal ecologist and that, therefore, one embraces an ecocentric 
cosmology rather than an anthropocentric, resourcist one. The difficulty lies 
in the full realization of what one's "leap of faith" commits one to, how one 
is to approach "reality". Let us first examine what is basic to traditional 
metaphysics: 1) subject/mind as thinking, unextended substance is 
completely distinct from, and superior to, object/matter, characterized as 
unthinking, extended substance; 2) knowledge of the world is derived solely 
from either logical laws of deduction - i.e. the world's possibility is entirely 
the result of the activity of a transcendent, constituting consciousness - or 
laws of induction - i.e. objects exist as fully determinate and are simply 
received causally by the subject; 3) in being bound by logical "laws", the 
subject is basically "passive" with regards to the "truth" and "meaning" of 
objective propositions; 4) the subject "recognizes" eternal truths in a neutral 
universe; 5) the subject's position in the world is one of cognitive and 
affective estrangement; and 6) the subject's activity in the world is 
constrained by adherence to abstract, prescriptive laws. 
The basics of a transpersonal ecological metaphysics, however, could not 
be more antithetical as: 1) subject and object do not exist as discrete, particle-
like monads, fully determinate and completely polarized; 2) knowledge of 
the world is fundamentally experiential; 3) the subject works with 
phenomena in concrete situations in order to elicit truth and me aning and 
attempts interpretation in a fully "active" way; 4) the subject "realizes" itself 
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and things-in-the-world as vibrant, evolving processes; 5) the subject's 
position in the world is one of engagement and identification; and 6) the 
subject's activity in the world is one of fully open-ended description. 
In short, transpersonal ecology is a lived philosophy. It entreats us to 
attend to our lived experience of the world and maintain an openness 
towards other beings so that they may resonate within us. It reasons that we 
can encounter non-human phenomena in a condition of freedom, liberated 
from rationalist impediments; that we do not require abstract proofs of the 
world's existence, and that we do not need to deal in moral "oughts" in 
order to behave in an ecologically appropriate manner. By means of a 
phenomenological description of our being-in-the-world, rather than 
ethical prescription, it seeks only to draw out our "natural" inclinations 
towards compliance and reciprocity. As a philosophy, its only resemblance 
to logically-grounded rationalism is the suggestion that if Self-realization! is 
a basic good - i.e. is intrinsically valuable - for selves, then perhaps, by 
extension, it is a good for things-in-the-world as long as both are conceived 
as processes. 
But, is there not a problem here? Does not the use of the term "intrinsic 
value" commit Naess to concluding that since intrinsic value exists that 
extrinsic value must exist as well and that, consequently, non-humans can 
be viewed in terms of their utilitarian, resourcist yield? Is he not implicitly 
committing the same fatal error that dogged his formal sense of deep 
ecology which was shown to yield both ecocentric and anthropocentric 
interpretations of appropriate ecological behaviour? As always, Naess' 
response is firm and trenchant: no. "Intrinsic value" is only to be used in 
"...an expressive, metaphorical, nontechnical, everyday sense" (Fox, 1990, 
p.222). It is simply a heuristic, linguistic means for capturing the positive 
valuation that people who accept transpersonal ecology attach to their 
experience of nature. It is not meant to encourage an axiological reading of 
Self-realization! or to stimulate the pursuit of something resembling an 
environmental ethics approach to Being. All Naess is claiming is that, by 
fostering the broadest sense of self, it is possible to identify with non-human 
phenomena, to establish contact with nature; and further, that, if that 
communion is realized, there is more often than not, a positive valuation 
attached to the experience of inter-relatedness. "Intrinsic value" does not 
inhere solely in either the self or the world, but in the wonder at the fact 
that there is a plurality of elements in the contact which is acknowledged to 
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be "beautiful" and "belong". Selves .and things-in-the-world have value 
because they exist as parts of a whole dynamic process of Self-realization! 
At the outset of this chapter, I outlined the reasons for my reluctance to 
refer to myself as anything other than a naturalist. But, having provided an 
introductory account of what constitutes a transpersonal ecological approach 
to nature, it should be clear that I do accept its philosophical underpinnings 
as straightforward and reasonable and the actualization of its methodology 
and aims as feasible. Put otherwise, I find that it fulfils the three basic 
requirements of a coherent metaphysical alternative to dualism as: 1) it 
explains why we should reject the polarization of subject and object in 
favour of a process-based conception of self and things-in-the-world; 2) it 
suggests how we may overcome our traditional rationalist alienation from 
nature by attempting Self-realization, identification with the non-human; 
and 3) it describes what its practice in concrete experience may yield: a 
thoroughly non-anthropocentric, ecocentric worldview which is far more 
ecologically sound, tolerant and embracing. 
The greatest strength of transpersonal ecology, as opposed to deep ecology, 
ecophilosophy and ecosophy is that its very tag does not suggest some 
vague, impractical, arcane pursuit. It is what it says it is: "transpersonal" and 
"ecological". That it is "transpersonal" can be evinced by its rejection of a 
conception of reality where reality is seen as consisting of discrete, atomistic, 
particle-like entities operating in some distant, dead, neutral realm 
according to immutable organizational and causal laws. For transpersonal 
ecologists the world is here and now, palpable and animated by a plurality of 
inter-related, embodied, ecological beings, or more exactly "processes", 
striving for Self-realization! in a whole dynamic, evolving thrust. To some, 
this might seem to be just a re-statement of the definition of ecology and 
that, consequently, the use of the term "ecology" following "transpersonal" 
might be construed as being tautological. This, however, cannot be 
maintained, in my view. The difficulty in interpretation probably lies in our 
traditional alienation from nature physically, emotionally and spiritually. 
We still have a great deal of difficulty with the biological side of our being, 
still view ourselves as purely cultural artifacts. We, thus, still maintain a 
split between our rational/psychological/ethical side and our ecological side 
which is yet to be fully realized. Hence, there is a need to "ecologize" our 
psychological nature by moving beyond our biographical, egoistic 
boundaries by means of Self-realization! This non-humans do without 
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questioning the possibility of transcendence towards other beings. They 
already "belong", and, thus, do not need to effect a remedial transpersonal 
psychological shift. 
The interesting corollary to "ecologizing" psychology is that the 
"ecological" dimension of transpersonal ecology implicitly contains an 
impetus to "psychologize" ecology as well. The distinction resides in the fact 
that whereas the process of "ecologizing" psychology aims to remind us of 
our actual status as ecological, and potentially truly transpersonal beings 
through the practice of Self-realization!, the process of "psychologizing" 
ecology aims to remind us that Self-realization! is not a uniquely human 
pursuit, but something to which all living beings aspire. This can be seen if 
we accept (again, the leap of faith) that all organisms possess a "telos", or in 
Spinozan terms a "conatus", which is the in-born striving to realize the 
potentialities of the self. Hence, it is in some sense wrong for humans to 
seek their own Self-realization! while thwarting its pursuit by non-humans. 
It is also imperative to bear in mind that since evolutionary processes have 
no end point, there is no achievement of an ultimate, "pure" essence, in 
either humans or non-humans. It is, therefore, wrong, as well, to assume 
that a non-human "telos" determines it to fulfil a fixed destiny that arranges 
and ranks it against an Aristotelian "ladder of perfection". A "telos" is only 
a striving towards Self-realization! If we accept the transpersonal ecological 
goal of Self-realization! as a norm of worldly behavior, then we cannot 
consistently accept the possibility of non-humans' attaining their ultimate 
essence as "resource". 
In both the cases of "ecologizing" psychology and "psychologizing" 
ecology, the overall intention is to put us back in the world, to re-acquaint 
us with co-existence and to dispel any illusions we may have about the 
hegemony of the human purpose. The striving to achieve both is truly a 
movement toward a transpersonal ecology. 
The greatest difficulty associated with transpersonal ecology, though, is 
that, as a fundamentally descriptive philosophy, it cannot compel anyone to 
undertake its practice. In a sense, it can be viewed as a program for activity 
which is already accepted and attempted by the "converted". Most defenders 
of wild nature already have, at least, a naive transpersonal orientation 
towards the world which they do not have to discover or recapture - it is 
something that has always been there. The project, then, is to make the 
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transpersonal ideal palatable to those who truly hold the reins in the arena 
of environmental decision-making. It would seem to be the case that you 
have to table a program of activity which appeals to an everyday mode of 
experience and behaviour which is suggestive of a transpersonal 
orientation. 
Identification 
Naess and Fox suggest identification. Identification can be a very difficult 
term in philosophy. It is usually employed to establish logical equivalence. 
Its most common usage is in its role as a copula cementing the connection 
between subject and predicate: a bachelor is an unmarried man. The 
establishment of a priori, analytic judgments or "self-evident" truths would 
hardly seem to be their intention, however. This would seem clear in that 
the whole transpersonal process is a moving outwards of the self in 
experiential situations which are open-ended and contingent, 
unencumbered by questions of logical necessity. The way that I interpret 
Fox, "identification" is a "taking in", an "ingestion" of phenomena that 
permits "otherness" to permeate our Being and, thus, to make a difference 
with regards to our transpersonal behaviour. It may be seen along the lines 
of an unwavering empathy that may become so engrained that the concerns 
and interests of others become one's own, but never to the point of an 
absolute dissolution of the distinction between oneself and others. It is in no 
way to be considered as a means to achieving psychosis. 
Fox's sense of identification has a tripartite division: personal, ontological 
and cosmological. The first is relatively easy to grasp as it deals in issues 
which are commonly understood: we have a personally based identification 
with our family, our friends and, perhaps, more abstract groupings such as 
our football club, church congregation or suburb. In contrast to the other 
two forms of identification, the personally based is predicated on a 
committed, often tacitly assumed, specific relationship with a particular 
person or entity or entities with whom or with which we share certain 
experiences, a common worldview or purpose. "We experience these 
entities as part of "us", as part of our identity. An assault upon their 
integrity is an assault upon our integrity" (Fox, 1990, p.250). The difficulty 
with such narrow identifications for transpersonal ecology, however, is that 
they may only represent instances of an inherited affiliation or be fleetingly 
significant. There is, then, the potential for their quick dissolution in the 
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event of changing circumstances which negate the original bond or at least 
render it inconsequential. Moreover, it can be argued that personally based 
identifications, particularly of the more abstract variety, maintain an 
exclusivity which effectively debars "outsiders" from the realm of moral 
consideration. One only need to consider the cases of sexism, racism or 
speciesism to recognize a potential for the abuse of affective ties. If the 
determination of identification with others is contingent upon them 
fulfilling certain minimal requirements such as the possession of a penis, 
white skin or bipedalism, I think it is possible to see how the lack of such 
"relevant" features may have rather unpalatable ethical consequences. Even 
such a seemingly superficial identification as the support of a particular 
soccer club can lead to the murder of those "wearing the wrong colours". 
Given the unnecessarily limited scope of personally based identifications, 
Fox suggests that ontologically based identifications are more revelatory of 
what constitutes transpersonal ecology. Though difficult to characterize, 
they refer "to experiences of commonality with all that is that are brought 
about through deep-seated realization of the fact that things are" (Fox, 1990, 
p.250). Compared with personally based identification which, as we saw 
above, is circumscribed by a shared experience of the world with specific 
others in specific contexts, ontologically based identification is far more 
open-ended. It is truly trans-personal in so far as it is grounded in an 
experience of Being that is best characterized as a sense of wonder at the fact 
that myriad forms exist at all, that they stand out from an amorphous 
horizon in all their particularity, that there is "something" and not 
"nothing". It is the naturalist's thrust into Being, the open-ended trust in 
Being "being there" if the proper, respectful gesture of compliance and 
commonality is acknowledged and observed. 
What happens, though, if you lack this transpersonal orientation towards 
the world? What if you do not feel the force of ontologically based 
identifications and view the whole project as thoroughly impracticable? In 
short, if those who determine the fate of nature seek a "program of activity" 
for establishing ontologically based identifications, what can you possibly 
say? The short answer is that the transpersonal attitude is not something 
that one can easily cultivate. Though it may seem to be a cop-out, it is only 
something that can be attempted experientially in concrete situations 
through a willed opening of the self to the possibility of an encounter with 
Being in its innumerable varieties; and even then it may not meet with 
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unqualified success. The fact that it is difficult, though, should in no way be 
taken to mean that its achievement is impossible or undesirable. If one 
needs a specific example of its realization, then perhaps the model of the 
naturalist's experience would seem to be as good as any. For naturalists 
achieve something like an ontological identification with Being in the 
absence of a recipe for transpersonal contact. The possibility of achieving 
ontologically based identification would seem to reside in simply 
temporarily suspending belief in commonsensical justifications and 
"proofs"; in simply making a leap of faith that contact is possible, 
communion may be realized. One only needs to 'maintain an initial 
openness which brackets received ontological biases. The only stipulation 
comes in the form of an admonition from Fox (1990, p.251): 
For those who cannot see any logical connection between deep-
seated realization of the fact that things are and the experience 
of deep-seated commonality with - and thus respect for - all that 
is, I can only reiterate that these remarks cannot and should not 
be analyzed through a logical lens. 
As for the last of Fox's characterizations of identification, the 
cosmologically based, I will suggest that it may be seen as vague (in that it 
deals in images of reality that totalize, sum up Being) and, perhaps as 
superfluous (in that, in reifying Being it presupposes prior ontological 
identifications with individual beings). Perhaps, then, it may be jettisoned 
as a necessary means for achieving transpersonal Self-realization! Fox states 
that it "...refers to experiences of commonality with all that is that are 
brought about through deep-seated realization of the fact that we and all 
other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality" (Fox, 1990, p.252). To 
use Fox's central metaphor for cosmologically based identification, we, and 
all other existents are leaves of a single tree which is taken to be symbolic of 
evolutionary history. The image itself is good in that it portrays all 
individuals as striving for self-realization in a shared, inter-related and 
inter-dependent evolving web of commonality. Moreover, it underscores 
the importance of fostering care for the tree in its entirety: no twig or branch 
can be removed without there being a negative impact on the tree as a 
whole. 
My personal difficulty with cosmologically based identifications is not 
that they take any particular image (leaves on a tree, drops in the ocean, 
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whatever) as the basis for identification, but that identification with Being 
itself, rather than with its pictorial representation is, arguably, a more 
practical and realizable means towards achieving true transpersonality. As I 
will argue in greater detail shortly, one of the great difficulties with any 
cosmology or mythology is that, in giving an account of how the universe is 
organized and why we should take our cue for appropriate behavior from 
that explanation, we abstract away from Being. Instead of encountering 
living phenomena through ontologically based identifications, we 
encounter symbols, concepts and representations and not the very palpable 
living beings themselves. It may be overstating the case, but there does seem 
to me to be the potential for cosmologically based identifications 
maintaining the very dualism of self and other, mind and matter that 
transpersonal ecology strives to overcome. To implicitly suggest that 
identification should be with symbols and not phenomena is to locate care 
and concern, natural "value" within human consciousness - something 
which I would think would be anathema to a transpersonal sensibility. 
As an overall framework for pursuing environmental philosophizing, I 
would agree that images of inter-relatedness can have an effective, 
motivating role to play. It is only when they attain a pre-eminent 
epistemological status that they can be potentially misleading and even 
counter-productive. In agreement with Fox though, I maintain that 
cosmologically based identifications are preferable to ontologically based 
identification for their openendness: all beings are seen to be interrelated in 
one seamless whole, Being itself. 
No matter how you schematize the porches of identification, I would 
think it clear that it is central to transpersonal ecology's call to realize, in a 
this-worldly sense, as expansive a sense of self as possible in a world in 
which selves and things-in-the-world are conceived as processes. If one can 
move beyond an atomistic, particle-like conception of self, move beyond 
one's egoic, biographical, or personal sense of self by means of identification 
with others, it may be possible to reject dualism/resourcism once and for all 
and to foster ecocentric care and concern for the non-human. All that is 
required is the initial openness towards, and compliance with our planetary 
co-existents, a process which Fox very neatly refers to as "steadfast 
friendliness" (1990, p.256). 
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As I stated above, transpersonal ecology represents a very novel and 
convincing means for finding our way back into the world. Nevertheless I 
think it prudent to recognize that Fox titles his work Toward a 
Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for 
Environmentalism. As a new way of approaching Being within a very 
recent branch of psychology/philosophy, it is clear that it represents only an 
introduction to an original avenue for deep ecological speculation, for lack 
of a better phrase. I mention this for the important reason that I take Fox's 
work as foundational for the ontological edifice that I intend to erect in the 
remainder of this chapter. This is not to say that I disagree in any way with 
his overall worldvieW. Rather, it is only to emphasize that his ruminations 
are presupposed in my attempt to elucidate the philosophical implications 
that may be educed from transpersonal ecology. Which is another way of 
saying that whereas he finishes off with an exhortation to attempt 
identification in order to promote transpersonal inter-relation and care, I 
will argue that it is already there, but only under so many layers of 
conceptual obfuscation. In short, his conclusion is my beginning. 
Transpersonal Ecology and Phenomenology 
Where I differ from Fox is in my assumption that there are philosophical 
grounds for justifying the transpersonal approach. I do believe that it is 
possible to mount a coherent, consistent belief-system which contains the 
necessary elements of ontology, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics and yet 
which is faithful to the transpersonal enterprise. The philosophical model 
that I will utilize in order to argue my point of view is commonly known 
under the feared, reviled and grossly misunderstood rubric of 
"phenomenology". I must admit that when I, as someone trained in 
traditional philosophy, first encountered the term, I found it daunting and 
inaccessible. My reaction to it was that, since its metaphysical grounding was 
so alien and its language so abstruse and seemingly arcane, it was easy to 
dismiss as inconsequential. Importantly, though, I could not quite erase 
every last vestige of its initial impact: perhaps, one of if its greatest strengths 
as a philosophy. It gradually dawned on me that I was beginning, albeit in a 
very rudimentary fashion, to question the putative self-evidence of 
rationalist claims about the dualistic structure of "reality". But how could I 
possibly raise doubts about the verity of a Descartes, a Kant, a Locke? Surely 
to do so would invite the attention and wrath of a modern-day "Spanish 
Inquisition"? After I stopped running, as Dylan Thomas might have put it, I 
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began to realize that phenomenologists, or more accurately at that time, 
existentialists (like Sartre, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard) were telling me 
something about my own questioning process. I was not asking the type of 
questions that Naess would take as "fundamental". I was not going back 
into the ground of "metaphysics", not inquiring about the logical necessity 
of dualism - something which I had always assumed to be "true", "valid" 
and "indubitable". Yet, when I did undertake the task of "asking basic 
questions" - surely the role of anybody studying philosophy? - I was duly 
chided for my hubris. But this is not to suggest that there was anything 
unique about my case. Sadly, it is symptomatic of an all-pervasive, 
monolithic intractability that is rampant in reactionary philosophy 
departments. You do not subject the writings of the "giants" to superficial 
"existential" analysis. Moreover, it is nothing new. A quick perusal of any 
texts in philosophy over the last 300 years should demonstrate, almost 
without exception, that there is an unwillingness bordering on a 
pathological resistance since Descartes to undertake a critical review of the 
metaphysical, ontological and epistemological assumptions that ground 
rationalism; to even entertain the possibility that dualism might not be the 
final word on the relation of self to world. 
There is a reason for my injecting what might appear to be a tangential 
diatribe above: it is intended to emphasize the adamant opposition that 
phenomenology receives from a traditional philosophical audience due to 
its perceived "extremist", "heretical" stance on the nature of Being and our 
relation to it. Against the backdrop of traditional metaphysical inquiry, it 
certainly is. Moreover, like "deep ecology", its very tag is often criticized for 
being "ponderous", "pretentious", "smug", "self-congratulatory", "holier-
than-thou" and "pejorative"; but this in no way detracts from its viability as 
a means for opening to a world which is diametrically opposed to rationalist 
dualism. As the practitioners of both deep ecology and phenomenology 
would agree, the self-characterization means nothing: it is only a name. The 
approach towards Being, the transpersonal attitude that the term serves to 
represent is all that matters. What, then, is phenomenology and how might 
it serve as a practicable model for achieving transpersonal ecology? A brief, 
but excellent description is provided by J.H. van den Berg (1972, p.77): 
Phenomenology is a method; it could be called an attitude. The 
method is a way of observing, new in science; new, for instance, 
in psychology, not at all new in general life. On the contrary, 
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the phenomenologist wants to observe in the way that one 
usually observes. He has an unshakable faith in the everyday 
observation of objects, of the body, of the people around him 
and of time, because the answers to stated questions are based 
on the results of this sort of observation. On the other hand, he 
distrusts theoretical and objective observations, observations at 
a closer inspection, the kind of observations made by the 
physicist. He distrusts standard opinions, quickly formed 
opinions like projection, conversion, transference and 
mythicizing. He is convinced that this kind of opinion 
mystifies reality with an easy, but incorrect, and as a rule 
obscure, theory. He wishes to hold back his opinion (for he, too, 
has to express one) until later and listen (italics mine) to what 
the incidents, the phenomena, tell him. His science is called 
phenomenology. His story tries to be the interpretation of what 
he observes: hears, sees, smells and feels. 
Let us unpack this characterization and attempt to interpret it within a 
transpersonal framework. First, I think it can be maintained that 
phenomenology and transpersonal ecology share an ontological approach to 
Being which presupposes that the world is already "there" as an immediate, 
palpable, engaging presence prior to any abstract, constituting act of 
cognition. Pre-reflectively, pre-linguistically, pre-egologically we bodily 
inhabit a world of dynamic, evolving contexts. The attitude that is common 
to both may be described as open-ended wonder at the incredible fact that 
there is something and not nothing, that things are, right there! 
Secondly, both philosophies embrace a methodology for returning to the 
world of experience which is predicated on the active deconstruction of 
traditional, rationalist metaphysics which insists that we are never directly 
in contact with phenomena but only concepts or impressions that mediate 
our experience of the world. They entreat their audiences to encounter 
phenomena as they present themselves and not through a dualistic lens 
which polarizes self and world. They ask a subject to temporarily shelve his 
explanatory theories of how contact between self and world is possible so 
that Being may appear in its infinite and resplendent forms. In order to 
achieve this one must, first of all, suspend belief in the 
mechanistic/reductionistic scientific view of the world that treats all 
phenomena, including selves, as nothing more than discrete, atomistic 
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particles that logically cohere in understanding rather than inter-relate in 
the world. In both phenomenology and transpersonal ecology, selves and 
things-in-the-world are to be reinterpreted as dynamic processes that co-exist 
in a world of commonality, contact and communion. Why not? Why 
should one assume that reality is binary and logical? Why should one accept 
necessary, self-evident, "truths" about the world as more "real" than the 
direct experience of phenomena? Why should one favour an abstraction, 
an obscure theory of reality which often seems to contradict, or at least over-
simplify the perceptual evidence at hand? There really doesn't seem to be 
an answer. It all depends on your metaphysical leap of faith. 
If you are willing to attempt a metaphysical shift, however, transpersonal 
ecology and phenomenology, respectively, suggest the following remedial 
methodologies for returning to the phenomenal world: 1) attempt Self-
realization!, the active, disciplined extending and broadening of the self 
which transcends egoistic, biographical boundaries by means of 
identification with others in an ever-expanding spiral of curiosity, wonder 
and concern. Allow your shell of self-interest to become permeable, let the 
concerns and interests of others interpenetrate, merge with your own! 
Extend a hand and discover significance! Accept the proffered invitation 
and reap the experiential reward!; 2) attempt the phenomenological 
reduction which is, basically, the active bracketing of culturally-received 
preconceptions about the nature of self and world so that Being may appear 
in and of itself. Attempt to insinuate yourself into the world, to work with 
given phenomena in order to elicit meanings and evoke significance. 
Attempt open-ended descriptions in the absence of theoretical frames of 
reference and explanations and in full knowledge that any articulation of 
the experience will never capture its essence, will never exhaust its 
meaning. Since one only encounters temporary Gestalts, momentary 
groupings of phenomena and not abstractions which are universally, 
eternally true at this basic pre-reflective, perceptual level, there is always the 
possibility for further exploration and re-interpretation, hermeneutic 
retrieval and up-dating. Just be alert to the threat of existential alienation 
which ensues from the process of making conceptualizations "indubitable", 
and of making appropriate behaviour "mandatory". 
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Phenomenological Experience: Some Basic Features 
Much more will be made of the analogy between phenomenology and 
transpersonal ecology and the phenomenological reduction as well in due 
course. But, for now, I would like to return to my exposition of 
phenomenology and this strange concept of pre-personal, pre-reflective 
bodily understanding. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in coming to terms 
with phenomenology is that it is so basic to all experiences of Being that we 
cannot countenance, even feel, the subtlety and all-pervasiveness of its 
movement. It is, after all, as van den Berg put it above, a description of the 
way in which one usually observes. Yet, its very familiarity makes it very 
difficult to describe. To put it in perspective, let us ask two very basic 
ro° questions which are infinitely complex to most minds: what is time?; what 
is space? One usually finds that, in attempting an explanation of either, one 
becomes hopelessly flustered. You know what they are, but in the very 
attempt to come to terms with them, you find them slipping away, 
becoming increasingly inaccessible and indeterminate. But you know what 
they are. What on earth is going on here? The main difficulty is that our 
bodies so completely inhabit space and time that we cannot achieve the 
distance required to adequately define them. Yet, at the same time, we have 
no trouble living the answer to questions about the nature of space and 
time. We move through both with our bodies with absolute ease up to the 
point that we undertake reflection about the body's possibility of achieving 
such movement. This is due to the fact that the body is already completely 
engaged in an activity which is moving towards completion before it 
conceives of the possibility of achieving the act. In fact the intrusion of a 
self-conscious contemplation of the nature of the relation between a 
constituting consciousness and a remote object in the world as the basis for 
an act's completion would probably thwart the realization of the event. This 
may sound silly (it is), but this is what the acceptance of dualism logically 
commits us to. Since subject and object, mind and matter are utterly 
polarized, we must provide an abstract account of how two completely 
different substances can interact. If, however, one accepts the 
phenomenological conception of embodiment, that the body is already 
attuned to Being, already engaged in realizing an intention to do 
something, is, in fact "already there" at the end of its task pre-reflectively, 
space and time are no longer problematic. It simply is not necessary to 
mount the logical explanation of the relation of subject and object in space 
and time to justify the possibility of an event's taking place. An act is 
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possible because the body is already doing it in-the-world without rational 
instruction. Consider the example of a man looking desperately for an 
ashtray (Kohak, 1978, p.11): 
After a few puffs, the subject looks anxiously for a place to 
deposit his ashes. There are no ashtrays. The subject casts about, 
settles on a seashell or a nut dish, and, with a mixture of 
anxiety and relief, knocks off the ash. He did not "find" an 
ashtray "in the objective world"; there was none there to be 
found. Rather, he constituted an ashtray in his act. 
Common sense, in ordinary reports, passes over this and, instead of 
reporting, interprets the experience as an encounter with an object out there 
in the world. Consider further Neil Evernden's reflection on Kohak (1985, 
p.58): 
Notice that common sense finds a world of objects because it 
overlooks the act of consciousness and concentrates on an 
interpretation of what is experienced. Hence the thing 
identified always seems more central and more real than the 
act itself - the act remains effectively invisible, for it is not 
noticed. But to be ignorant of the act is to miss the very context 
of meaning for the object. Remember, the smoker's ashtray was 
not there until it was required. Yet the ashtray he believes he 
found was not imaginary, either; it exists where it functions, in 
his experience. 
At root, phenomenology is the description of how the body, p re-
reflectively, achieves this possibility while holding logical explanation in 
abeyance. As J.H. van den Berg (1972, p.75) captures it: 
to arrive at an explanation of pre-reflective matters... one has to 
abandon the usual way of thinking. Instead of propounding a 
reflective and, as is illustrated by the history of thought, always 
slightly strange, artificial and therefore not quite satisfactory, 
theory on the stated problems, one has to make the problem 
speak for itself. 
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Put otherwise, phenomenology has two fundamental aims: 1) to remind 
its potential practitioner that the self that inhabits the realm of common 
sense or science that stands apart from experience and confronts the world 
as a domain of objects to be rationally grasped and controlled is not yet 
capable of the pre-personal, perceptual approach to Being that 
phenomenology demands as a commitment to perceptual engagement; and 
2) to suggest that our bodies are already attuned to Being (as was assumed in 
the above argument concerning the body's ability to negotiate space and 
time prereflectively), yet we are "forgetful" of Being, out of touch with its 
underlying sources and grounds. We need, therefore, to provide an account 
of this innate embodiment; we need phenomenological description and not 
second-order scientific explanation of our being-in-the-world. 
I do not think it is an exaggeration to suggest that the phenomenologist is 
"obsessed" with the concrete. He is fascinated with the objects that surround 
him, but not in the same way that the scientist would be as he has a radically 
different attitude towards the "object". The object is not something that 
possesses an immutable, fully determinate nature. And contact with it is not 
assumed to reside in the possibility of its understanding by a transcendent 
consciousness. For the phenomenologist, the object is undeniably there, but 
as a potential field for eventful, creative exploration. And since it is already 
there prior to any questions concerning that possibility, the 
phenomenologist does not need to explain his existential positioning 
according to abstract reasoning that reinforces absolute ontological schisms 
and, therefore, anthropocentrism. His ontological "theory" is the polar 
opposite to the one that is presupposed in scientific inquiry. His "theory" 
begins and ends with that phenomenon there. 
On the surface it may seem insane that it is possible to espouse an 
ontological theory that is grounded in nothing more than simple faith in 
"being there". Surely, something that is pre-reflective and pre-cognitive 
could be dismissed out of hand as absolutely ineffable, and, therefore, 
untenable? It is, in a sense. But only if you presuppose the necessary truth of 
dualism and abstract cognition. If you can bracket the prejudices of such a 
conceptualization of reality and temporarily concede the possibility of bodily 
understanding of "being there", the phenomenological attitude may not 
appear so ludicrous. Van den Berg (1972, p.76), for example, argues that 
there are some among us who regularly and non-freakishly undertake its 
practice: 
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Objects have something to say to us - this is common 
knowledge among poets and painters. Therefore, poets and 
painters are born phenomenologists. Or rather, we are all born 
phenomenologists; the poets and painters among us, however, 
are capable of conveying their views to others, a procedure also 
attempted laboriously, by the professional phenomenologist. 
We all understand the language of objects. [But] we live in an 
adjusted world, in a self-evident one... [if we grant the 
possibility of phenomenological description of the bodily 
understanding of "being there"] the swimmer enters the world 
because the water is proving to him in a thousand ways that it 
is prepared to receive his body. The child digs into the sand 
because the sand cries out to it: dig! This is the way we move 
into a house. We see the rooms the way they will be furnished 
later: there the corner to sit in, there the bed for the child, there 
the warmth in winter, there the coolness in the summer. 
There: domesticity. The house is habitable. 
This is all so apparently clear and "normal" that it would hardly seem 
necessary for phenomenology to defend its rejection of dualism on any 
level. Yet, the very tenacity of rationalist metaphysics is such that 
phenomenology must provide a philosophically rigorous methodology and 
justification for returning to the everyday experience of the world. 
Unfortunately, however, since that experience is so elusive and its 
description so bound up with traditional dualistic interpretations of the 
relation of subject and object, phenomenology must employ "daunting" and 
seemingly "inaccessible" language in order to effectively capture its radical 
departure from mainstream metaphysics. In the remainder of this chapter, 
consequently, I will attempt to elucidate what I take to be the key themes in 
phenomenology, particularly as they are presented in the works of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. 
In the Preface to his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
provides an introduction to the nature of phenomenology (1962, p.vii): 
Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all 
problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence 
of perception, or the essence of consciousness, for example_ But 
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phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences back 
into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an 
understanding of man and the world from any starting point 
other than that of their "facticity". It is a transcendental 
philosophy which places in abeyance the assertions arising out 
of the natural attitude, the better to understand them; but it is 
also a philosophy for which the world is "already there" before 
reflection begins - as an inalienable presence; and all its efforts 
are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive 
contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a 
philosophical status. It is the search for a philosophy which 
shall be a "rigorous science", but it also offers an account of 
space, time and the world as we "live" them. It tries to give a 
direct description of our experience as it is, without taking 
account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations 
which the scientist, historian or the sociologist may be able to 
provide. 
Perhaps the most important thing to be garnered from this quote is that 
phenomenology, at root, is a protest on behalf of a non-dualistic approach to 
Being. Like transpersonal ecology, its central ontological assumption is that 
we are rooted in, enjoy a primitive, innate contact with, Being prior to any 
abstract justification of that relation: this is our "facticity" or "thrownness", 
our inherence or involvement in any particular situation. Subject and 
object, then, are not two completely distinct substances whose interaction 
requires abstract explanation and justification. Since we, "subjects" and 
"objects" alike, already exist as things-in-the-world, we do not need to 
provide a causal account, or rational demonstration for the possibility of the 
transcendence of the subject towards the world. In fact, the only 
transcendence that is required is the transcendence of the worn-out, 
traditional conceptualizations of "subject" and "object" which make the 
possibility of transcendence problematic. 
Where phenomenology again resembles transpersonal ecology is in its 
thorough questioning of science's need to conceive of the self as a 
disembodied, atomistic, particle-like monad standing opposed to a barren, 
tasteless, soundless universe of causally organized matter. Surely it is 
possible to acknowledge that we, scientists included, may already be bodily 
engaged in a world of significance and wonder right here and right now. Is it 
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not just possible that the putative need to abstract away from the 
experiential world, to assume concepts to be more real than phenomena 
themselves might represent a case of what Alfred , North Whitehead refers 
to as the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness"? (Whitehead, 1938, p.66). In 
short, does science really need to so devalue the nature and role of subjects 
and objects in conceiving of them as discrete, neutral particles moving 
indifferently towards each other according to abstract causal laws? Consider 
Merleau-Ponty's view (1962, pps. viii-ix): 
I am not the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal 
agencies which determine my bodily or psychological make-up. 
I cannot conceive of myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a 
mere object of biological, psychological or sociological 
investigation. I cannot shut myself up within the realm of 
science. All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific 
knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or 
from some experience of the world without which the symbols 
of science would be meaningless. The whole universe of 
science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if 
we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive 
at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin 
by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which 
science is the second-order expression... Scientific points of 
view, according to which my existence is a moment of the 
world's, are always both naive and at the same time dishonest, 
because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, 
the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through 
which from the outset a world forms itself around me and 
begins to exist for me. To return to things themselves is to 
return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which 
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every 
scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-
language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in 
which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a 
river is. 
The central problem with scientific or empirical conceptions of the 
subject/object relation is that they assume that discrete, fully determinate 
objects already exist in the world without some form of subjective input. 
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The subject's role, then, is only that of a passive receptacle receiving pre-
determined "facts" about the world. Since "objects" already possess an 
absolute nature or essence prior to their existence, there is no need for 
subjective interpretation of immediately given phenomena. The subject's 
conception of any object, then, is simply the outcome of external forces in 
the world which link sensations of the object independently of any 
subjective activity. Yet, if this is true, where is the "subject"? If the "subject" 
is nothing more than a detached, neutral spectator, an "anybody" simply 
receiving sense-data, what could possibly be meant by "subjectivity" which 
implies the existence of a centre of agency, an individual positioned towards 
the •world? Is it not possible that science/empiricism implicitly succeeds only 
in making the subject illusory, redundant or even self-contradictory and, in 
having done so, rendering the need for a dualistic hypothesis questionable, 
or even untenable? It would seem that if science wants to maintain the 
subjective side of the dialectic, it must be presupposed that there is a 
particular subject with a particular perspective on the world. The very 
essence of subjectivity is that there is someone making a selection, a 
decision, continually attempting to come to terms with the world within an 
individual framework of understanding. 
But whereas the central difficulty with empiricism is that, in making the 
world so fully objective, it makes that world uninhabitable for subjects, its 
dualistic counterpart, idealism/rationalism/intellectualism also fails but for 
the reason that it over-emphasizes the subjective side of the dialectic. The 
clearest statement of rationalism, certainly the most often cited, is found in 
Descartes. As anyone with even a passing acquaintance with the history of 
ideas well knows, Descartes' philosophy represents an attempt to establish 
one absolutely certain, indubitable "truth" about the world from which all 
ontological and epistemological truths may be deduced. In order to arrive at 
absolute certainty, he employed a program of radical scepticism, of 
methodically doubting everything from the existence of the external world 
to the "truths" of mathematics. His observations of the external world could 
not yield "clear and distinct ideas" for the simple fact that objects, including 
his own body, represented examples of "unthinking, extended" matter of 
which his mind, being of an entirely different "thinking, unextended" 
substance could have no thought. How could two absolutely different 
substances possibly interact? They could not, given his definitional 
polarization of the two substances. The only thing about which he could 
possibly be certain, however, was that he existed. It was obvious to him that 
30 
whenever he thought, it was clear that he existed. "I think, therefore I am" 
was certain every time he thought it and, thus, became the cornerstone of 
his metaphysics. The experience of the world, then, ceased to be so 
problematic as long as its existence was made immanent in a self-conscious 
act of apprehending it. The world's existence became entirely a question of 
its possible reconstitution by a transcendent self-consciousness. 
I fully acknowledge that my characterizations of the two dominant strains of 
dualism, empiricism and rationalism, are but thumb-nail sketches and that 
there is a plethora of subtle and convincing arguments for accepting either 
approach. My reason for not delving further into the debate is twofold:' 
the arguments are so complex that their development would unnecessarily 
distract from the over-all thesis at hand; and 2) both theories are so well 
known that they are amenable to a quick review of their metaphysical 
foundations. All I have sought to do is to underscore the weight that both 
theories attach to the subject side and object side of dualism and, 
consequently, what this means for conceptualizations of the self/world 
dichotomy. It can be reasoned that the emphasis that empiricism puts on 
objectivity results in the loss of the subject; since the subject is essentially a 
passive receptacle causally receiving pre-determined facts about the world, 
personal points of view are marginalized to the point of non-existence. And 
yet while rationalism attempts to offset this imbalance by emphasizing the 
active role of the subject in establishing the world's possibility through self-
conscious acts of constitution, it does this so successfully that the result is 
the loss of the world. It would seem then that radical dualism forces us onto 
the horns of a dilemma: we can either accept that everything takes place in 
the objective world and, hence, that there is no perceiving subject, or we can 
reject 'the materialistic objectivism of empiricism in favour of a pure 
interiority, a Cogito whose sole existence is to think" (Madison, 1981, p.19). 
Nevertheless, there is a route around this apparently insurmountable 
impasse: and that is to reject dualism altogether. Though seemingly 
impossible, such a move is philosophically justifiable. Logic only requires 
that if you accept the premises and the conclusion does not contradict the 
premises, then you must accept the conclusion. If the conclusion is logically 
necessary, is entailed by the premises, you cannot accept an opposite 
conclusion without contradicton. There is nothing logically wrong, 
however, with rejecting premises and conclusion alike. To use a rather 
banal analogy: if you engage in a game of chess, you must play by the rules; 
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• yet there is nothing wrong with deciding not to play. That is your 
prerogative. 
Phenomenology exercises this prerogative by means of the 
phenomenological reduction which brackets the traditional perceptual 
prejudices of dualism. Instead of accepting as basic, as dualists do, an already 
abstract presupposition of the ontological bifurcation of reality, we are asked 
to return to the perceptually rich world of phenomena, to the pre-linguistic, 
pre-cognitive experience of being-in-the-world. Though admittedly very 
difficult to do, given the absolute authority of dualism that is apparent in 
our very attempt to conceive of, or articulate our basic encounter with the 
world, it is not impossible. The justification for the attempt of the 
phenomenological reduction is that neither wholly subjective nor objective 
accounts can justify their initial ontological/epistemological bias. There 
simply is not the pre-cognitive, perceptual evidence adequate to claim that 
the world is composed of items of experience that are already "factual" prior 
to experience or that subsequently attain certainty upon their transcendental 
reconstitution in consciousness. Our fundamental experience of the world 
reveals the world as strange and paradoxical and not, therefore, completely 
transparent to understanding. If it were utterly intelligible, then we would 
never experience the tension that sometimes exists between phenomena 
and our representations of those phenomena. The point I am attempting to 
make is that we inhabit a very rich perceptual realm prior to its cognition 
which becomes problematic only if we assume the basic truth of dualistic 
hypotheses. The fact that the world at times appears so complex, so resistant 
to its easy schematizing, is that it is "right there" in perceptual experience 
before we deduce or infer its possibility: 
It does not await our judgement before incorporating the most 
surprising phenomena, or before rejecting the most plausible 
figments of our imagination. Perception is not a science of the 
world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; 
it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is 
presupposed by them. The world is not an object such that I 
have in my possession the law of its making; it is the natural 
setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit 
perceptions. Truth does not "inhabit" only the "inner man", or 
more accurately, there is no inner man, man is in the world, 
and only in the world does he know himself. When I return to 
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myself from an excursion into the realm of dogmatic common 
sense or of science, I find, not a source of intrinsic truth, but a 
subject destined to the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; pps. x-xi). 
What Merleau-Ponty is suggesting is that what purely subjective or 
objective accounts overlook is that their very grounding is parasitic on the 
relationbetween subject and the world that is always revealed in primordial 
perceptual experience. In fact, the only way that rationalism, for example, 
can justifiably claim that representations cohere in understanding, and 
further that they have "validity rather than existence", is that they make 
reference to a lived, perceptual world. As he puts it :"The world is precisely 
that thing of which we form a representation, not as men or empirical 
subjects, but in so far as we are all one light and participate in the One 
without destroying its unity" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.xii). To maintain an 
idealist coition between things and the thought of those things (especially 
when those things are relegated to a plane of fully determinate, 
reductionistic existence - a mode of existence different in kind from 
subjective existence if one accepts the Cartesian view) is, therefore, difficult 
at the perceptual level. There simply is not anything in perceptual 
experience that can justify the polarization of subject and object. This is 
what the attempt of the phenomenological reduction intends to reveal: 
(that) because we are through and through compounded of 
relationships with the world that for us the only way to become 
aware of the fact is to suspend the resultant activity, to refuse it 
our complicity (italics mine).., to put it "out of play". Not 
because we reject the certainties of common sense and a natural 
attitude to things - they are, on the contrary, the constant theme 
of philosophy - but because, being the presupposed basis of any 
thought, they are taken for granted, and go unnoticed, and 
because in order to arouse them and bring them to view, we 
have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them... 
Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity 
of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the 
forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens 
the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus 
brings them to our notice... (it is not the rationalist conception 
which) makes use of our relation to the world, which is the 
motive force of the transcendental deduction, and makes the 
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world immanent in the subject, instead of being filled with 
wonder at it and conceiving the subject as a process of 
transcendence towards the world. All the misunderstandings 
(concerning the interpretation of the phenomenological 
reduction to the perceptual world)... have arisen from the fact 
that in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we 
must break with our familiar acceptance of it and, also, from 
the fact that from this break we can learn nothing but the 
unmotivated upsurge of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
pps.xiii-xiv). 
What is common to any dualistic interpretation of reality is, then, that, in 
so favouring an utterly subjective or objective account, it overlooks the very 
ontological grounding of the subject/object relation: experience of the 
world. This is what the phenomenological reduction aims to reacquaint us 
with: the intentional threads that link us to the world. Though a truism, 
consciousness must be consciousness of something. Not even as solipsistic a 
philosophy as that of Descartes can possibly maintain an absolutely pure 
interiority. What -thought could you possibly have if it did not make 
reference to something other than the self? Arguably, the most important 
facet of Merleau-Ponty's metaphysics is his discussion of the logic of 
situations which keys on the pre-eminent status of the relationship 
between "self and "world". For Merleau-Ponty, our existence is best 
understood as a constant involvement in circumstances. In every concrete 
situation, we are faced with circumstances to which we must relate and for 
which we must attempt to work out some sort of principle for activity. And 
it is crucial to acknowledge that our relation to the world is not a relation to 
a pre-determined set of "facts". The world is to be seen as nothing more 
than a significant field for creative exploration, something which invites 
our open-ended participation in the joint generation of meaning. The world 
is not some distant realm lurking behind concepts to which we must make 
blind reference in the hope that it is there. Rather, the world is the setting 
for our all our explicit activity. It is not given to us so much as we are given 
to it. 
To every situation, there is what might initially appear to be a clear-cut 
division of subject and object, but which is more accurately characterized as 
activity and passivity. "Subject" and "object" have traditionally been the 
simple means for elucidating this dialectical movement; yet they are only 
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heuristic, linguistic concepts for explaining the elusive process of meaning 
generation. Sam Mallin (1979, p.10) has done as good a job as anyone in 
attempting to shed light on this very basic, yet so slippery pre-cognitive 
ontology of situations: 
The agent is faced with sets of indeterminate and ambiguous 
elements that demand attention but which he can never finally 
determine or control and a vague and uncertain awareness of 
his capacities to handle the situation. His purpose is to 
articulate and clarify it to the maximum. But this struggle to 
understand the situation is equally the attempt to work out a 
principle of action that will both organize its diverse elements 
and establish his role in respect to them. It is a principle that 
comes into being only in the action itself, never verbally or self-
consciously, and reappears whenever it is required in similar 
situations. 
If it is not already obvious, I would like to stress how radical a departure 
the ontology of situations is from the dualistic understanding of reality. 
That there is a basic structure to the world that resists our full determination 
of its meaning - its significance as an eventful field for exploration is given 
in its perceptible patterning - is assured in its activity. Yet our activity is also 
ensured in that we must develop ways of interpreting phenomena so as to 
make them at least partially determinate. But since this is all revealed in a 
whole temporal movement of the dialectic, we can never claim the absolute 
activity or passivity that justifies the rigid polarization of subject and object. 
To put it otherwise, what both idealism/rationalism and 
realism/empiricism fail to recognize is that what is now the active pole in a 
situation quickly becomes the passive pole in a whole existential rhythm. 
The former's obsession with the absolute activity of subject is deficient in 
that, if there were nothing beyond our subjectivity, there would be no 
struggle to organize our resistant environment; and if we suppose, as the 
latter does, that we are only passive towards the world, that every truth is 
immediately given independently of any subjective input, then we would 
not experience the frustration at the thwarting of our intentions and 
purposes; indeed, we could not entertain a position at odds with the world's, 
could not have any intentions of our own. "There is, then, a dialectic 
between the two sides of a situation. In order to understand or experience 
one side, one must take the other into consideration: the subject's concerns 
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only become available if they are triggered or secured by the setting and the 
setting can appear and be conspicuous only in so far as it resists these 
concerns" (Mallin, 1979, p.12). 
Perhaps what it is about Merleau-Ponty's philosophy that holds so much 
appeal for transpersonal ecologists is that phenomenology permits the 
world to enjoy the subjecthood that has always been considered the 
exclusive purview of humans. His description of being-in-the-world is so 
appealing, not just because it suggests that we are forever bodily engaged in 
concrete situations wherein we must structure our experience, but that we 
must do so in . conjunction with the world's purposes and intentions. As 
Merleau-Ponty constantly reminds us, we can get nowhere without the 
world, cannot reduce the world to something immanent in consciousness; 
rather we must recognize its "opacity and transcendence" (1962, p.xvi). The 
Logos of the world - the foundational intentionality that connects self and 
world and is manifest in contextual encounters - is never a unilateral 
process, but a flexible communication between an engaging other and a 
responsive self. Yet, there is a proviso: we must allow the other its 
"otherness", must never arrogantly assume that we can have full cognitive 
possession of it. Though the world is always there as an inalienable 
presence, its transcendence is made clear in its resistance to its full determin-
ation and reification. As Merleau-Ponty often puts it, the indubitability of 
the world does not translate into the indubitability of the thought of it. 
In order to get to the heart of what Merleau-Ponty means by the world's 
"opacity and transcendence", it might prove beneficial to approach 
perceptual experience within the framework of Gestalt psychology. If one 
brackets objective accounts for a moment and allows the world to reveal 
itself, I think it can be maintained that "objects" are not nearly as 
determinate as science would have it. One perceives the object slipping 
away, becoming less focal and indeterminate as it recedes back into Being, 
retreats to the horizon. Yet the whole situation is so rich in perceptual detail 
that another Gestalt, a focus against a horizon, quickly forms seemingly in 
and of itself. Is this merely a momentary lapse in the subjective control of 
the situation, an instance of inattentiveness, or might it indicate that the 
other is re-establishing its active, participatory role in the dialectical 
movement of the encounter? Recalling that there is no so such thing as a 
foolish question in philosophy, is there really anything else intrinsic to the 
specific perceptual context that could account for the contingency of the 
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"object's" status? Is it not just possible that the subject's inability to group 
given perceptual phenomena adequately, to fully delineate an "object", is 
not so much the result of a subjective defect as it is the world's 
transcendence becoming apparent? Is there anything basically wrong with 
viewing the focus-horizon-focus-horizon rhythm as the natural 
manifestation of the dialectical movement of existential experience? 
If your response is in the negative and you view this enterprise as so 
much ontological rubbish, then I suggest that you consider one final 
question: is this account any more ludicrous than maintaining that reality is 
the product of'the point-by-point intellection of discrete, fully determinate 
monads that only acquire true existence in a self-conscious, constituting act 
by a transcendent consciousness? Where is the evidence in perception for 
the valid deduction of the rightness and appropriateness of the inductive 
method itself? To my mind, this particular criticism would seem to make 
dualistic accounts as ontologically indefensible as phenomenology is 
supposed to be Even worse, perhaps, if you consider that science cannot 
account for our basic experience of the world while, by contrast, 
phenomenology can account for the way in which objects begin to take 
shape in experience. 
An argument that Merleau-Ponty sets up against himself is that the 
difficulties his critics have with his characterization of the pre-personal, pre-
cognitive perceptual realm is that is so "conversational". His descriptions of 
the most basic contextual encounters are. always framed in terms of 
proffered invitations from phenomena to work out meaning and forge 
significance, but pre-linguistically. But how on earth can you have meaning 
without concepts that abstract away from the immediate encounter? Is 
Merleau-Ponty simply employing some metaphysical sleight-of-hand? 
Perhaps the best way of answering this is that he does not have any 
profound difficulty with the application of concepts to phenomena - they 
are, after all, imperative for cognition and transpersonal communication. 
- What, however, he does find difficult to maintain is that essence precedes 
existence, and that one can, therefore, have complete cognitive possession of 
an object simply by receiving its properties: to the point even that the object 
"X" has no "thingness" beyond a catalogue of perceptible qualities 
corresponding to subjective sensations. As he states it (1962, p. 319): "The 
unity of the thing beyond all of its fixed properties is not a substratum, a 
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vacant X, a subject in which properties inhere, but that unique accent which 
is to be found in each on&of them, that unique manner of existing of which 
they are the second order expression." 
What, in particular, Merleau-Ponty finds "dishonest" about science - and 
this cannot be over-stressed - is that it always, already has a strategy in place 
for characterizing any situation as a situation of a distinct type which may be 
subsumed under a generalization. It perhaps may not be the case that science 
is deliberately, self-consciously attempting to dupe us, but it most certainly , is 
the case that it does assume that the world is already replete with discrete 
objects that can be known through the computation of fact one + fact two + 
fact three and so on. For Merleau-Ponty this is "dishonest" as it simply is not 
a faithful characterization of our most basic perceptual encounters with 
Being. As he very nicely and simply puts it: what science overlooks in 
perceptual experience is that "richness and clarity are in inverse proportion 
to each other..." (1962, p.318). Science is, consequently, guilty of grossly over-
simplifying and distorting what is in fact a very rich perceptual field. It 
overlooks that, in the very "projection" of properties, by means of concepts 
onto the "object", the object has already been reduced and determined in the 
very act of making it "objective". The object, then, is not an open-ended 
phenomenological grouping, as Merleau-Ponty would see it, but a structure 
that is pre-supposed cognitively and abstractly and then claimed as derived 
from experience. In short, science has gotten it wrong: essence does not 
precede existence and cognitive patterning cannot be assumed to precede 
perception. 
There is a question to be raised, however: can phenomenology account 
for how such an ontological position could have arisen? What Merleau-
Ponty would argue is that the scientist does not actually perceive in any 
manner different in kind from that of the phenomenologist. Both are 
engaged in a dynamic, evolving context that unfolds through a series of 
temporary Gestalts. What is now focal undulates onto the horizon in a 
seamless existential rhythm to be replaced by another Gestalt. Where the 
scientist errs is in negating the virtual rhythm of the situation by both 
taking only the most salient features of the encounter and then, having 
formed an "appropriate" concept for the fixated focus, now an object, places 
that concept in a timeless transcendent, noumenal realm. The abstraction is 
then taken to be more real than the context wherein it was acquired; 
moreover, it is then assumed to have universal, neutral application to any 
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future contexts resembling the initial situation. This having been achieved, 
every last vestige of the intentional threads connecting us to the world are 
erased from memory. And what is more, the fully determined object may 
then be culled as resource in an air of indifference. The scientist is, then, able 
to justify and even make imperative the development of that resource as he 
views its full determination as coming from the world,, rather than himself. 
He, thus, fully abjures himself from the responsibility that would come 
from the acknowledgement of himself as the actual source of the object's 
fixation. 
Where Merleau-Ponty's ontology so radically diverges from the scientific 
worldview is in its reversal of the essence/existence sequence. What he 
makes abundantly clear is that the pre-personal, perceptual world exists 
right there before the determination of the essence of any thing: existence 
precedes essence. The task of the perceiving subject is, consequently, to work 
with the phenomena that summon him and invite his situational 
participation in the joint working out of the significance of the contact. And 
what might seem startling, given that we are talking about the pre-
cognitive, pre-conceptual world, is that the language that is most 
appropriate to the dynamic setting always seems to be in terms of an on-
going conversation between engaging other and embodied self. Against the 
unilateral imposition of abstract concepts that effectively makes Being mute 
for the scientist, Merleau-Ponty always characterizes the situational 
encounter as one wherein phenomena summon us, speak to us. Instead of 
the thing being a vacant X that is assumed, but not truly known to exist 
behind the properties that a subject perceives, the thing is seen to be an 
equal, participatory interlocutor in the working out of the meaning of the 
situation. As Merleau-Ponty views it (1962, p.xx): 
The phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit 
expression of a pre-existing being [one that already possesses an 
immutable essence] but the laying down of being. Philosophy is 
not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of 
bringing truth into being. One may well ask how this creation 
is possible, and if it does not recapture in things a pre-existing 
Reason. The answer is that the only pre-existing Logos is the 
world itself, and that the philosophy which brings it into 
visible existence does not begin by being possible; it is actual or 
real like the world of which it is .a part, and no explanatory 
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hypothesis is clearer than the act whereby we take up this 
unfinished world in an effort to complete and conceive it. 
Rationality is not a problem. There is no unknown quality 
which has to be determined by deduction, or, beginning with it, 
demonstrated inductively. We witness every minute the 
miracle of related experiences, and yet nobody knows better 
than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves 
this network of relationships. The world and reason are not 
problematical. 
That language, and therefore the employment of abstract concepts may 
seem, initially, to be forcing us away from direct experience and into some 
universal, noumenal realm of truth is not problematic for Merleau-Ponty. 
Though it may seem devious or at least inconsistent to claim that 
phenomenology can get away with this movement while science cannot is 
best understood by appeal to Merleau-Ponty's process-based ontology of 
situations. As we may recall, the dynamic, evolving context is best 
understood as an existential, rhythmic waxing and waning of focal points 
against a horizon. But whereas science attempts to enframe what is now 
focal, to gather together the most blatant aspects of the Gestalt in order to 
create an abstraction that is universally, necessarily true independently of 
any concrete context, the phenomenologist seeks only to articulate what is 
now only a significant, yet ephemeral, grouping of perceived phenomena in 
virtual (non-objective, lived) time. 
What Merleau-Ponty's detractors fail to recognize is that, though his 
notion of structuring - sedimentation seems to bear a resemblance to 
abstract, objective cognition - what he is describing is an equal participation 
between self and world in the process of the articulation, laying down of 
Being, bringing truth into Being. In contrast to the scientist's distanced, 
neutral stare which seeks to reduce and quantify matter, the epistemic stance 
associated with phenomenology is that of wonder, attentiveness and 
curiosity: he wants to listen to what significant, animated beings are telling 
him. The conversational setting, then, is known to be fully open-ended and 
the possibilities for new approaches to, and perspectives of, any context 
inexhaustible. The self reaches out towards the world which seems so 
ineffable, and yet so familiar, in order to sediment an approach appropriate 
to the given situation. But though the process of sedimentation aims at 
developing an approach that may be recalled in contexts of a similar nature 
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so that the other may be approached more adequately, less tentatively the 
next time, the self is always fully aware that the context is an on-going, 
evolving process of temporary Gestalts. The self knows that the 
inexhaustibility and ambiguity of the situation will continue in the future, 
even though it has been made specific as a situation of a certain type, with a 
distinct flavour, and that, consequently, the self must accommodate the new 
aspects of the situation by altering his sedimented structure. In future 
situations of a similar nature, he will discern the failure of his se dimented 
structure to adequately capture the new circumstances, but will be afforded 
the opportunity of modifying the structure so as to make it more 
appropriate to the renewal of acquaintance. He must improvise on the 
previously established meaning in order to maintain meaning and 
rejuvenate the significance of the encounter. If the schemata is to retain 
meaning in the future, "if this skeleton is to live, it will have to acquire 
flesh and blood" (van den Berg, 1972, p.82.). 
Within a Gestalt paradigm, sedimented structures, like scientific 
abstractions, do admit of a plurality of instantiations in contexts resembling 
that of their initial generation, yet they are far more flexible and 
improvisatory. For although both attempt to make a present focus 
determinate, sedimentation always takes place in the realization that any 
focal point is located on a horizon of possible future encounters and that, 
consequently, any interpretation of the moment must be tempered by that 
fact. The structure, then, must always be re-cast so as to never become 
separable from its evolving, focal source. Where a case may be made for 
scientific conceptualizations being inauthentic is that they belittle the 
importance of this temporal, hermeneutic up-dating. The scientific project is 
to make the original focus universally, eternally true; it, therefore, dismisses 
as inconsequential the horizonal possibility of further determination and 
articulation in future settings. This is what allows the scientist to "enjoy" 
such a neutral, objective stance towards the world: in order to fully explain 
any situation, all he has to do is to recollect and then apply the standard, 
received interpretation, now a full-blown concept, to the "object" that stands 
opposite to him and amenable to his manipulation. 
The difficulty, however, as the phenomenologist understands it, is that a 
scientific concept, stripped from its meaningful inherence in concrete 
situations, becomes vitiated, hollow. To paraphrase a constant theme in 
Merleau-Ponty, such concepts are inauthentic because they have become 
41 
fixated at the level of their primary sedimentation. Attached for all time to 
what is assumed to be a fixed, determinate object, but which is, in fact, only a 
temporary, situational focus, they lose the meaning that can only be 
provided by the spontaneous activity of an improvising subject. The 
scientific obsession with establishing cognitive correspondence between a 
fixed object and its concept and in making that agreement eternal, as far as 
phenomenologists are concerned, only results in fixated concepts becoming 
increasingly meaningless since, with each successive use, they are removed 
from the only source that can make them meaningful: the concrete context. 
As most people have observed at some point: the more you repeat a word, 
the more meaningless it becomes with each successive use. It does really 
seem to retreat to the horizon, to re-establish its otherness by concealing 
itself from the gaze "as blank and pitiless as the sun". 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the ontological 
underpinnings of dualism and its attendant resourcism and 
anthropocentrism. The fundamental assumption has been that the world is 
not some distant, neutral realm replete with fully determinate monadic 
essences whose existence is reduced to a question of its possible 
determination by a transcendent constituting consciousness. By contrast, the 
world, it was reasoned, was considered to be alive, diverse, complex and 
animated by significant, vibrant beings right there! But, by the same token, it 
was argued that, though Being is an engaging presence whose existence is 
indubitable, we cannot translate this indubitability into the indubitability of 
our thoughts about it. All we can do is attempt to delineate its temporarily 
focal movements to some degree before it retreats to the horizon, asserts its 
opacity and transcendence, its subjective activity. 
The over-all framework for pursuing a more environmentally-
appropriate ontology than that which is traditionally derived from 
rationalism and empiricism was provided by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy. It was argued that the only way to overcome dualistic 
assumptions was to re-examine the "natural attitude", to suspend our 
recognition of "things" that we take for granted. Reflection was, therefore, 
re-drawn as penetration into the world rather than as retreat into the unity 
of consciousness as the world's basis. The mood or epistemic stance 
associated with the relaxation of the natural attitude so as to regard it was 
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suggested to be that of wonder and curiosity. For wonder slackens the 
intentional threads bonding us to the world (the Logos of Being), thus 
bringing them to attention. With such an attitude, the world reveals itself as 
strange and paradoxical - certainly not a distanced idea thoroughly 
transparent to reason, and, therefore, wholly self-consistent and self-
contained. The reason why our thoughts can never fully delineate the world 
and exhaust its meaning and significance is that the world is continually in 
flux; contexts emerge and dissolve before their full determination. So we are 
always perceptual beginners, and, thus, can never take anything for granted. 
All we can do is to creatively articulate a present context before it retreats 
— back into Being. 
The reason that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology was seized on as the 
best means for elucidating transpersonal ecology, ecocentric care and 
concern, was that his description of facticity, of the primordial situation 
could not be a more thorough rejection of dualism. Against the hegemony 
of science, he summons the primacy of lived experience. The 
phenomenological reduction, consequently, endears itself to the 
transpersonal search for a damaging rebuttal of dualism and its attendant 
resourcism. And further, what was argued is that transpersonal care exists 
before its epistemological proof and moral justification. 
I thought that a review of the essentials of the transpersonal experience 
might just show to what degree they mesh with Merleau-Ponty's 
ruminations. As we recall, transpersonal ecology refers to the "this-worldly 
realization of as expansive a sense of self as possible in a world in which 
selves and things-in-the-world are conceived as processes". From Merleau-
Ponty, it is clear that the first condition "this-worldly" is not just met, but 
insisted upon by the very nature of his description of bodily engagement in 
Being; the transpersonal dimension exists pre-personally through the 
experiential body in immediate, concrete situations. Further, the self is not a 
monadic Cartesian ego. The self points toward the world and, through 
perception, attempts to elicit the essence of its relationship with the Other. 
The self, in its bodily intentionality, must maintain an openness towards, an 
intimate observation of (not in the sense of sight, but in the sense of proper 
conduct), an awareness of, and alertness towards Being, if communication is 
to be achieved. The role of the self is to: establish patterns and relationships; 
forge meaningful contexts; maintain a humility in the face of the other with 
regards to the inexhaustibility of the situation (which amounts to both the 
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engaging quality and transcendence of the other); and foster care and 
concern while accepting an answerability in the process of meaning-
generation. 
The final condition laid down by transpersonal ecology, that "things-in-
the-world must be conceived as processes", too, was dealt with. This is a 
crucial, issue because the very grounding of dualism is that subject and object 
interact as static, universal ideas. But, by contrast, for transpersonal 
purposes, the fluidity of Being must be observed if the appropriate attitude 
of answerability, care and concern is to be fostered. Again, this was not 
problematic for Merleau-Ponty. For the movement of self, attending the 
authentic attitude, is not scientific: neither linear, progressive, hierarchical 
nor the transcendence of personal-interpersonal life. It is but an opening, 
extending and deepening of the self through Self-realization! And it is 
known from the very first moment of the sedimentation of an approach to 
Being that any meaning generated in the ever-horizonal context is always 
open to further articulation and improvisation; hence, there is no possibility 
of meaning become fixated as it is in scientific conceptualization. 
Consequently, things-in-the-world and their symbiotic cognitive patternings 
are never static, but forever eventful. There may be hope yet for the 
eradication, or at least erosion, of the arrogant hegemony of the resourcist 
enterprise. 
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2 TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY: 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SITUATION 
The primary intention of Chapter One was to acquaint the reader with the 
basics of Transpersonal Ecology and to indicate how those basics are perhaps 
given their strongest philosophical grounding in phenomenology. Against 
traditional rational objective philosophy, it was maintained that an 
appropriate ecocentric metaphysic is arguably best achieved by a self 
realizing itself through a progressive broadening and deepening of self in a 
world in which selves and things-in-the-world are conceived as processes. 
By means of a description of how the phenomenological red -UCtion re-
acquaints us with the preobjective, prelinguistic, precognitive realm at the 
most basic perceptual level, we were introduced to the bodily contact we 
always have with Being in situations that are already meaningfully 
structured prior to any cognitive thematization of that engagement on the 
part of the self. 
What however was not dealt with in sufficient depth was how a self can 
possibly have a meaningful exchange with others at the most immediate, 
prelinguistic level of bodily perception. The very important question that 
remains to be answered, then, is how communion, and more important at 
•this juncture, communication, is possible between a participatory self and an 
engaging other. The difficulty resides in the fact that, by whatever phrase 
you characterize the perceptual level of experience - as contact with the 
world as a "meaning environment", or as a "relational totality of 
experience" (Jones, 1989, p.76) - such experience is prelinguistic and 
therefore inexpressible. How then can one maintain that a fundamentally 
mute, or perhaps gestural, situation is already replete with significance 
when that significance is ineffable? The immediate reply would seem to be 
that there exists some subjective Kantian "synthesis of the manifold of 
representations" which acts as a filter determining our cognitive delineation 
of the setting which is then articulated in language. Though such a thesis is 
plausible, it is not necessary to mount such an account. It is possible to 
provide a phenomenological approach that details how significance in 
concrete contexts is perceived and is then translated into linguistic 
expression without the positing of a transcendent subject, a subject that Kant 
makes imperative for the purposes of his argumentation. 
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It is the purpose of this chapter to more fully flesh out the basics of the 
phenbmenological experience of the world in order to maintain that one 
does not need to argue in any objective rationalist manner to account for the 
translation of mute experience into a fully blown interpretation/linguistic 
expression of that experience. The major assumption is that all authentic - 
nomination, expression, whether written, spoken, mute or gestural, is a 
creative, improvisatory aesthetic act occasioned by the perception of 
significance in, the acknowledged value of the engagement with, Being. The 
substantive body of the chapter will, consequently, be taken up with an 
examination of how phenomenological description is fundamentally an 
authentic poetic thrust into the nature of Being and beings-in-The-world. 
The justification for such an undertaking is that poetic nomination reflects 
the revelatory power of Being at the moment of consummation of 
participating self and engaging other, when Being is allowed to presence 
itself, to resonate in its infinite modes of expression, and is respectfully 
permitted its opacity and transcendence. 
The very strength of poetic expression as a means for capturing the 
significance of the world as a "meaning environment" would appear to be 
two-fold; for, on the one hand it may be seen as a philosophically significant 
alternative to dualism in that it does not conceive of the world as an 
assemblage of distinct objects with predetermined essences and, on the other 
hand, does not employ words inappropriate to a context on any utilitarian 
grounds, in order to, say, evoke emotions, for example. It simply attempts to 
capture the mood or flavour of a present context and, as such, is 
phenomenologically authentic. It nominates Being, shapes the world and 
we experience the truth of this expression. It summons Being and focuses 
our attention on the over-arching Logos or structure of engaging Being and 
participating self entwined in the primordial situation. Ultimately, poetry 
elucidates the transpersonal ecological call for respectful heedfulness by 
showing how self and world are always mutually engaged as equal 
interlocutors in the establishment of meaning. For by its very nature, it 
illustrates that authentic articulation involves a listening stance on the part 
of the self, a responsible opening of the self to Being's proffering of a 
revelatory gift. 
The true import of poetic, creative expression in the context of the 
present chapter and indeed the entire remainder of the thesis, as it will be 
reasoned, is that it presents one particular model (the other being that of 
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music, as will be seen in Chapter Four) for attempting and achieving the 
transpersonal ecological goal of Self-realization! 
Before launching into the project of this chapter, however, I want to 
introduce one more item into this situating preamble. What absolutely 
needs to be expressed is that it is the major contention of this dissertation 
that not only is the transpersonal ecological attitude grounded in an 
epistemology and ontology which is steadfastly non-dualistic, but that it may 
be best characterized as thoroughly aesthetic. What, moreover, will be 
assumed is that at the heart of phenomenological description, the terms 
, -invitation and response can be seen to be of inestimable value ii ;: the  
explication of how ontology, epistemology, ethics, and perhaps most 
important, aesthetics are all rooted in prepersonal primordial contact with 
Being. Though seemingly odd, idiosyncratic terms, "invitation" and 
"response" are to be seen as important re-interpretations of the traditional 
conceptions of subject and object. And rather than acting as discrete objects 
forever fixed, fully delineated and polarized by linguistic convention, they 
will be presented as fluid frames of reference, "processes" as transpersonal 
ecologists employ the term to characterize Self-realization!. As such, they 
will be considered to be but moments in the dialectical movement of Being 
which do not really exist save abstractly. It will also be reasoned that they co-
evolve contextually, continually renew and rejuvenate their joint context 
and are not, therefore, separable (as dualists insist). 
Beginning with a brief hermeneutic return to the ontological findings of 
Chapter One, the chapter will then proceed to cast such findings within a 
broader metaphysical context which will focus on the relationship between 
ontology and epistemology, and, thus, to a detailed consideration of how 
mute perceptual acknowledgements of significance form the basis for 
"higher" order cognitive expressions in language; in short, how creative 
articulations are epiphytic on the epiphanous. Throughout, moreover, the 
contrast between the phenomenological countenance of the significance of 
Being and the scientific objectification of Nature will be highlighted. 
Moving phenomenologically, what will be argued is that, at the most 
basic moment of prepersonal, precognitive engagement with Being, all 
authentic nomination begins from an epiphanous revelation of Being in 
which the intentional threads linking us to the world are made evident in 
an aesthetic acknowledgement of Being, a moment in which a hand is 
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extended, an existential invitation is proffered and accepted. The moment is 
thereby consummated and an indissoluble situational bond achieved, 
established and sedimented for all time. And what might be seen as most 
interesting is that the communication/communion generated at the 
moment of union between invitation and response is shot through with an 
answerability which is usually considered to be the most genuine and 
binding of moral accountability in traditional ethical theory. This present 
interpretation of the term, however, is in no way to be aligned with such a 
literal way of thinking. What I mean to suggest is that the positive 
valuation of a meaningful discourse between embodied self and engaging 
other carries with it an implicit, tacit agreement on the nature of -the 
comportment associated with the communion that is always forward 
looking towards renewal and rejuvenation. Answer-ability is not to be 
equated with a pathological retreat into a forced obligation to adhere to 
abstract ethical rules, but with a "steadfast friendliness", a voluntary, 
mutual agreement to forever deepen the relationship when the situation is 
appropriate and consensual. There is nothing truly extraordinary about this. 
It is unquestionably a stance that grounds every normal interaction between 
self and world if one truly wants to belong. 
It is the purpose of this chapter, then, to explore the relation that obtains 
between prepersonal engagement with Being and beings-in-the-world, the 
attitude or comportment associated with the phenomenological observance 
of such an ontological perspective, the creative expression of that 
interrelation and, finally, the positive valuation that one may attach to the 
sense of belonging that is animated and reinforced by renewed situational 
encounters. 
Science and the Nature of Being 
The central difficulty that phenomenologists have with science is that, 
rather than grounding its fundamental ontological and epistemological 
position on basic perceptual experience, it, perhaps naively or 
unintentionally, already abstracts away from lived experience when it 
attempts to justify its initial metaphysical bias. This is particularly 
problematic in that no matter how sophisticated one's synthetic, totalizing 
abilities might be, there really does not seem to be any convincing argument 
for such a theoretical, abstract approach save by appeal to a more basic, 
immediate perceptual encounter wherein beings-in-the-world have 
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revealed themselves as already meaningful. Why this is philosophically 
self-destructive is that it involves circular reasoning. Put simply, the main 
deficiency of empirical science is that it already has a strategy in place for 
subsuming facts under a generalization in the absence of an account for its 
overall "meaning horizon" and then goes even further to claim that its 
meaning horizon is derived from the computation of those very facts. Yet 
for those facts to have had any significance in the first place, there had to be 
some tacit assumption/conceptualization of a generally meaningful pattern 
of interrelation which could justify their effective, theoretical synthesis. 
Empirical science is, therefore, rendered self-defeating by its failure to heed 
or.2, of the basic tenets of logic: one cannot maintain that one's conclusion is 
entailed by the argument when that conclusion has been operative from the 
start. In other words, one cannot consistently maintain the inductive 
validity of one's argument when one is, at the same time, operating within 
a philosophical framework that is implicitly deductive. For one's inductive 
generalization to carry weight, one must have already possessed a 
preliminary conception of what one's methodology might yield, a Janus-
faced methodology that is at once inductive and deductive. 
In his book, Reading the Book of Nature (1989), Edwin Jones argues that 
the difficulty that empirical science has with the inductive/deductive 
distinction rests with its failure to come to terms with a crucial distinction 
lying at the heart of ontological speculation. Following Heidegger, his 
ontological schema emphasizes that the conundrum facing empirical 
science may be resolved by a reconsideration of the distinction between "the 
being of entities in their significance" and the "world as a relational totality" 
(p.64). As will become more clear in the next section, empirical science's 
central deficiency is that it overlooks the significance, the "worldhood" of 
individual beings as they present themselves to an embodied self. The main 
argument is that a self that is not contextually situated cannot countenance 
the existence of the world as a meaning horizon and cannot, therefore, break 
free from the tendency to neutralize and totalize the experience of particular 
beings - which is why the scientist may often experience a tension between 
his inductive methodology and his worldview. 
A difficulty central to ontological speculation arises when one attempts to 
seriously come to terms with the notions of world or nature in general in 
contrast to the individual beings which comprise that world. The objective 
scientific world or "nature" is traditionally "conceived as isolated. from 
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specifically human concerns; it is independent of human will, pre-
established, and inexorable" (Jones, 1989, p.66). As such, then, it cannot be 
perceived as a whole phenomenon. It is only through an effective, totalizing 
synthesis of particular, individual phenomena that a world can take shape 
around us. Yet, as we saw above, this begs the question: how can one posit 
such a vacant viewpoint which justifies the synthesis when we lack a prior 
unifying image of an all-encompassing phenomenon, a world? 
Heidegger's response to this dilemma was to distinguish two senses of 
the term "world" - one ontic and the other ontological - which are 
commonplace in scientific discourse (Jones, 1989, pp. 67-74). In the ftest 
sense, the on tic world is that "world" which stands as the conglomeration of 
individual entities each which their own specific, objectively given 
properties. Such a viewpoint assumes that it is proper to adopt an utterly 
dispassionate, neutral view of entities so that the world so constituted may 
appear in and of itself, in the absence of subjective concerns which might 
otherwise colour and distort present phenomena. Within this ontic 
conception of the world, then, it is made clear that, ideally, the observer 
should not participate, but merely let phenomena in isolation yield their 
essential, objective characteristics. Even with the advent of quantum physics 
and the uncertainty principle, such an attitude still prevails in the scientific 
community. 
By contrast, the ontological world refers to Being in its broadest sense. In 
its ontological sense, then, "world" is the ultimate background against 
which all specific ontical systems particularize themselves. All ontic 
conceptions delineate a world in which discrete entities cohere in a 
relational totality. Any ontic existent will, consequently, be inspected within 
its appropriate context with regards to its specific relational functioning with 
other existents of a like nature. Yet, at the same time, all such existents still 
have actual being in the ontological sense; all partake of a world beyond 
their specific ontical meaning horizon. They, therefore, do not exist merely 
as symbolic functions operating in a circumscribed relational totality, but 
really and truly exist in the ontological sense. Ontic characterizations are 
deficient, then, in that they disregard the primary ontological status of the 
particular existent. The logical morass in which empirical science finds 
itself, as it was stated above, stems directly from the conflation of the ontic 
and ontological senses of "world". One simply cannot operate within an 
ontical framework and then claim that one's findings confer ontological 
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status. From the outset, one must have an ontological conception, a sense of 
what the world or Being is like before ontic entities can be subsumed under 
a generalization, can function within a relational totality. 
This oversight has serious epistemological consequences for empirical 
science. As we have see, the scientific method proceeds by first inspecting 
individual entities for their objective properties, trusting that certain objects 
-of a similar nature may be inductively joined together to form greater 
Complexes or events, to eventually create a world. Being logically-
empirically derived, the projected synthesis is taken to justify an hypothesis 
which-can then be falsified or verified, with the ultimate result that tiie 
nature of the original entities can be deduced from the hypothesis. Though 
it is assumed that the method is "neutral" and that, therefore, it 
acknowledges the real, ontological being of individual entities, such an 
acknowledgement is only a desultory, propitiatory gesture. This can be 
evinced by the fact that, even prior to the hypothesis, the putative 
ontological entities have already been logically constructed as "in-
themselves". This is no mere sleight-of-hand, but constitutes an 
"epistemological crisis" (Jones, 1989, p. 71). 
This transcends the mere conflation of the ontic and ontological as it 
utterly collapses the distinction between epistemology and ontology. It 
makes the world- utterly transparent to a transcendental constituting 
consciousness. It peremptorily transforms worldly beings into dependent 
objects. Moreover, it violates the whole purpose of positing hypotheses in 
that, in common with all ontic conceptions, entities are to be approached as 
components existing within a prescribed relational totality, a context, and 
not as ontological absolutes. Within an epistemological context, ontic 
findings are meant only to yield doxa (belief), not episteme (certainty). 
Curiously, this epistemological crisis was anticipated, to some degree, as 
early as Galileo: 
...his own commitment to experimental methods, and thus to 
inspection, prevented him from adequately interpreting the ground 
of his achievements. Because the structuring principles of physical 
nature could not themselves be first discovered by experimental 
means, but rather were required from the start in order for those 
methods to work, he quite honestly posited them as assumptions and 
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deferred dealing with the impossibility of attaining their own 
verification a posteriori that is, experimentally (Jones, 1989, p. 72). 
Heidegger referred to this mode of access to the world as "circumspection" 
due to the way in which entities disclose themselves, not just as "they look 
in themselves, but rather in their significance, that is, as related to other 
items in the complex and the complex as a whole" (Jones, 1989, P.  73). The 
value of circumspection to empirical scientists should be clear as it does not 
conflate the ontic and ontological senses of "world", or collapse the 
distinction between Being and meaning. Rather, in being an admittedly 
prescientific attitude, it makes no claim to yielding episteme, but what 
Husserl called the "doxic certainty of the typical style of the natural world as 
it emerges within the life-world horizon" (1989, p. 73). Heidegger, however, 
did not limit circumspection to the ontical world, but felt that the 
experiential access to the world available through circumspection was "a 
genuine and original openness to a relational totality in its ontological 
character that he called 'significance' "(1989, p.73). 
Circumspection is important to Heidegger, then, in that, not only does it 
provide ontological access to the world of scientific understanding, but the 
"life-world.., the worlding of the world" (what Merleau-Ponty calls the 
Logos of the primordial situation, as we shall see presently). Moreover, it 
also allows for a second distinction between the ontic and ontological 
worlds. In the second formulation of the ontic world, the word "world" does 
not just refer to entities made present to inspection, nor even to their 
synthetic totality. Rather, "world" is recast as a world already pregnant with 
sense, already structured as a "meaning environment" in which entities 
present themselves as significant beings "to be dealt with". Following 
Heidegger's reasoning, it should come as no surprise to discover that the 
final conception of world, "world" in its second ontological sense refers to 
the ultimate horizon of the life-world, the "worldhood" of the world. It is 
the source or ground of all the existential possibilities for experience open to 
us as humans, the relationality totality of all our involvements - affective, 
perceptual, cognitive, moral, aesthetic, practical - and, in the final outcome, 
is deeply personal, familiar, that by which we encounter significance and 
conduct ourselves appropriately. 
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The Logos of Being 
As was seen in Chapter One, one can get nowhere with Merleau-Ponty's 
ontology and epistemology without a thorough grasp of his notion of 
situation. , At root, Merleau-Ponty employs the term in the everyday, 
expressive, non-technical sense we all understand: involvement in 
circumstances which demand our attention and activity. Faced with 
ambiguous, indeterminate, perhaps even paradoxical elements in a novel 
situation, an agent must attempt to develop some principle of action which 
is appropriate to the setting. Moreover, "it is a principle of action that comes 
into being, only in the action itself, never verbally or self-consciously, arid 
reappears whenever it is required in similar situations" (Mallin, 1979, p.11). 
For a child, appropriate activity keys on the very simple practice of either 
manipulating or avoiding those things that are present in the specific 
setting. Yet, for the adult who also faces the same array of invitations or 
obstacles, the meaning of the situation is significantly different as he 
"...attempts to obscure and deny it by interpreting nature as consisting of 
nonsituational entities or things-in-themselves" (Mallin, 1979, p.11). 
Constrained by conceptual frameworks, the adult must make a concerted 
effort to bracket such abstract superstructures in order to rediscover the 
primacy of perceptual engagement in immediate experience. 
The point to be gleaned from this is not that there is a radical difference 
between the activity of the child and the activity of the adult, but that only 
certain features of the situation will be selected as relevant to the situated 
individual. The compulsion to activity in certain settings therefore seems to 
be rooted in the fact we always have concerns which may be triggered, not by 
third-person facts or neutral states of affairs, but by the figural salience of the 
situation. In short, there will always be situations that have "...undeniable 
relevance for me and already contain 'lines of force,' meanings or patterns" 
(Mallin, 1979, p. 12). But, and it cannot be over-stated, patterns of 
significance do not stem solely from the subject or object side of the 
situation, but only in the eventful context itself. To echo the findings of 
Chapter One, the situation cannot be understood in subjective idealist terms 
as, if there were nothing beyond subjectivity, we would never encounter a 
resistant environment; nor can it be understood in any realist fashion, as 
the only way that the world can appear is through its opposition to our 
individual, subjective interests and intentions. 
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To reject the bifurcation of the situation into an object-side and subject-
side is not to suggest that there are no meaningful structures contained in 
the situation however: the argument against such dichotomies is simply 
that we rely too heavily on psychological accounts and "...objective-scientific 
criteria as the only acceptable norms for establishing the validity of 
meanings" (Jones, 1989, p.4). Paradoxically, though, when one brackets such 
abstract objective-scientific modes of analysis, we are nonetheless faced, 
prelinguistically and preconceptually, with a situation that contains 
structures that are undeniably present and relevant to our concerns as long 
as we maintain an openness to the situation's meaningful unfolding. As 
Edwin Joris - (1989, pp.4-5) captures it: 
The importance of such structures is, perhaps, worth stressing, for 
they are what render phenomenological description something other 
than impressionistic. Indeed, the precedence that description takes 
over argumentation in the phenomenologist's methodology is based 
on the insight that human life is animated by structures that are 
imbued with significance, that are "pregnant with sens" as Merleau-
Ponty says, but that nevertheless are neither logically nor 
linguistically shaped; their significance is "prepropositional." As such, 
they are not deduced, but rather uncovered, or "disclosed," by 
whatever descriptive means the phenomenologist commands. Here, 
as with any explication, the "proof" lies in our "seeing" the sense of 
what is laid out. In any given case phenomenological description 
may go wrong. But then, too, it may subsequently be made right, 
precisely because it is directed toward and indeed restrained by, such 
inherently meaningful structures - as, for example, Husserl's "eidetic 
structures," Merleau-Ponty's "gestalten," and Heidegger's 
"existential," or even, in the case of an aesthetic critic, a "work of art." 
It cannot be overstated that Merleau-Ponty's delineation of the 
significant situation should never be interpreted in terms of a 
transcendental relation between a subject and object, but always in terms of 
his descriptions of embodiment which perhaps, though authors such as 
Sam Mallin (1979, p. 32) would object to this, are best understood in terms of 
Gestalt theory. Though it is difficult to do, given our conceptual/linguistic 
traditions, "subject" and "object" are best to be viewed as a self- 
transcendence towards a worldly presence in a situation which is already 
meaningfully structured precognitively at the perceptual level. Yet, the 
54 
situation is meaningful only to the degree that the outwardly moving self 
attempts the meeting in the full recognition that the other's being involves, 
not just an invitation to engagement, but an "otherness", an opacity and 
transcendence, that must be respectfully acknowledged; there is, then, a 
temporality, a rhythm to the situation, culminating in a splitting off, an 
ecart, from the encounter as the other reaffirms its otherness and retreats 
into concealment, undulates from present focus to the horizon. This is 
essential to the dialectical movement of the situation, the fundamental 
Logos which reveals itself as a series of Gestalts which, ultimately, once set 
into a motion as a dynamic, dialectical process of continual becoming, ek-
stase, will traly make situations equally participatory and conversational. 
What lies at the heart of the perceptual situation is a group of structures 
that constitutes the subject's facticity or thrownness and establishes the 
indissoluble union of subjectivity and otherness. Such "thrown" structures 
as light-dark, large-small, soft-hard and rough-smooth are neither given to 
a subject, nor do they constitute his existence; rather they "have Being 
'running through them' or are necessarily open to otherness" (Mallin, 1979, 
p.34). Grounding self-transcendence towards the world, they are always in 
contact with otherness "...to the extent that any new structure that is created 
in the future is, simultaneously and correlatively, both an articulation of 
these thrown capacities and an articulation of the world and otherness" 
(Mallin, 1979, p. 34). 
At root, such structures, then, are always "for-another" and have relative 
degrees of generality or specificity. What this means is that, as a subject 
forges new specific structures, they will conform to the more general 
thrown structures inherent in the situation. The delineation of a future 
setting, then, will be circumscribed by the primordial Logos of the situation, 
will be determined to be a instance of a structure which always partakes of a 
more general, fundamental structure rooted in Being. There is, 
consequently, no such thing as an absolutely "free" structure, no matter 
how seemingly revolutionary the articulation of a novel situation: Creative 
expressions always stand in relation to thrown structures as species to 
genera. In contact with otherness, then, any specific structure will partake of 
a more generalized form already prefigured by the Logos of Being. In every 
situation, therefore: 
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...the otherness of a particular field is able to as Merleau-Pon.ty says 
demand, solicit, contact or motivate exactly the structures most 
appropriate to it and which give the subject the maximum possible 
grasp of this field...the field itself sorts out the most general structures 
and then works through their hierarchies until the most specific 
structuration to which the subject is open at that moment is selected 
and concretized (Mallin, 1979, p. 35). 
What is of crucial importance here is that structures are never purely 
subjective nor totally independent of otherness. This is most forcefully 
evident in M-c..-rleau-Ponty's theory of horizons. All potential structures exist 
horizonally and are sedimented by the more general structures that ground 
each and every present situation. Thus, whether a potential structure is 
concretized or not, it is never empty. It always exists as an open-ended 
invitation to articulation proffered by the "other" by the very Logos of the 
situation. Reality, for the most part, is not limited to the concretization of 
focal entities, and the sedimentation of their meanings, as science would 
have it, but is, in the main, openended, ambiguous and indeterminate. 
Furthermore, as it was seen in Chapter One, no matter how narrowly and 
specifically we delineate, fix or structure a present focal entity, the 
openendedness of the situation will always maintain an inexhaustability 
which affords the opportunity for creative re-interpretation of sedimented 
structures in every potential structure of a similar general nature lying on 
the future horizon. Moreover, it must be stressed that, at this most 
fundamental level, the situation is only "operationally intentional," not 
"thetically intentional." Since thetic intentionality makes definite claims or 
judgments about objects, it belongs to the cognitive realm, rather than 
preobjective, precognitive realm of primordial perception. Though parasitic 
on the operational intentionality inherent in the perceptual situation: 
Idealism (like objective thought) passes by the side of true (veritable) 
intentionality which belongs to (est a) its object rather than posits it. 
Since belonging to (etre a) is the subject-side of being-in-the-world 
(etre au monde), operative intentionality's essential characteristic is to 
be outside of itself through its inherence in otherness. This is why 
Merleau-Ponty says '(operative intentionality) renders the first (thetic 
intentionality) possible and is what Heidegger calls transcendence' 
(Mallin, 1979, p. 38). 
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• Another misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the situation 
can be seen in the attempt of his critics to maintain that his use of 
intentionality is seriously flawed. Their reasoning is that, since intentions 
are ontologically grounded in concrete situations, intentionality and the 
intentional object must be "real" existents. This, however, clearly only 
serves to exposes the bias of those who presuppose an objective 
understanding of things as existing in themselves, of those who maintain 
an analytic attitude towards Being, a prejudice of the world as existing in-
itself. As we saw above, however, the criticism misses the mark as it fails to 
heed that objective cognition represents a sublimation of the preobjective 
relation of the 6ubject to the world. As Sam Mallin puts it: 
we can hardly say that the situational relation or its object-side exists 
in this naive physical, causal, or objective fashion. Rather, it is real in 
the same sense that we might say being-in-the-world is real or that 
our thrown inherence in otherness is real. We have seen that the 
situation has the primordial ontological status of having the reality of 
Being and not that of beings (1979, P.  39). 
Merleau-Ponty's critics are, therefore, guilty of failing to acknowledge the 
ontological difference between Being and beings, the distinction, 
respectively, between the ontological world as a relational totality and the 
ontic world of beings, to reiterate Heidegger's schema outlined earlier. The 
intentional object should never be confused with the physical object; nor 
should intentionality ever be understood as anything but the ek-stase of 
embodied self and engaging other in concrete situations. 
The cluster of concepts central to Merleau-Ponty's theory of situations 
Merleau-Ponty says that his entire phenomenology is meant to be a 
reduction to the lived and preobjective realm wherein primordial contact is 
disclosed. The necessity of undertaking the reduction is to "bracket" all of 
the presuppositions we have concerning our relation to Being and its 
understanding. His central difficulty with science, in particular, is that it 
"forgets" that all of its second-order, abstract conceptualizations make 
reference to, are indeed parasitic upon, the more basic perceptions that a 
subject has at the preobjective level in the primordial situation. As a result 
of this "forgetfulness", science takes objects to be more real than the 
perceptions which ground and sustain them; which make them truly 
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meaningful at the level of cognition. The purpose of the reduction, then, is,. 
as we have seen, to recapture and describe the sens (meaning) arising from 
the intentionality existing between embodied self, the body subject, and the 
engaging other which is inherent in the Logos of the world. The subject is 
not a disembodied, distanced, isolated ego that stands in opposition to the 
world as objective reason would have it, is not a subject that occupies a 
quantifiable space in d definite location, but a body that exists" as a system 
of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenological 'place' defined 
by its task and situation. My body is wherever there is something to be 
done" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 250). 
What, moreover, is revealed in the primordial situation is that the 
other is not encountered as a mere component in a system of discrete, 
atomistic objects, each with determinate, eternal essences, as but a single 
datum that coheres with other data in understanding, but as an 
interlocutor, an equal participant in the determination of the sens of the 
context. It is impossible to improve on Merleau-Ponty's own words: 
Prior to and independently of other people, the thing achieves that 
miracle of expression: an inner reality which reveals itself externally, 
a significance which descends into the world and begins its existence 
there, and which can be fully understood only when the eyes seek it 
in its own location. Thus the thing is correlative to my body and, in 
• more general terms, to my existence, of which my body is merely the 
stabilized structure. It is constituted in the hold which my body takes 
upon it; it is not first of all a meaning for the understanding, but a 
structure accessible to inspection by the body, and if we try to describe 
the real as it appears to us in perceptual experience, we find it overlaid 
with anthropological predicates (1962, p. 320). 
The Logos of Being establishes the primordial contact between a thrown 
subject destined to the world wherein the other is encountered in its full 
palpable presence, its visibility and unconcealedness. The 
phenomenological reduction, then, reveals the other, not as thing that is 
cognitively posited as having factuality through the possession of a group of 
fully determinate properties, but as a presence that has facticity, resonance as 
an engaging interlocutor. The other, then, is not an in-itself as idealists 
maintain, but as the correlative of an embodied subject as a conversational 
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partner is, paradoxically, an in-itself-for-us. Again, Merleau-Ponty's own 
words cannot be improved upon: 
... every perception is a communication or a communion, the taking 
up or completion by us of some extraneous intention or, on the other 
hand, the complete expression outside ourselves of our perceptual 
powers and a coition, so to speak, of our body with things. The fact 
that this may not have been realized earlier is due to the fact that any 
coming to awareness of the perceptual world was hampered by the 
prejudices arising from objective thinking. The function of the latter 
is to reduce-U phenomena which bear witness to the union of subject 
and world, putting in their place the clear idea of the object as in itself 
and of the subject as pure consciousness. It therefore severs the links 
which unite the thing and the embodied subject, leaving only sensible 
qualities to make up our world (to the exclusion of the modes of 
appearance which we have described), and preferably visual qualities, 
because these give the impression of being autonomous, and because 
they are less directly linked to our body and present us with an object 
rather than introducing Us into an atmosphere (1962, p. 320). 
What the phenomenological reduction, or as it may also be characterized, 
"(a) letting go... an archaeology of the subject" (Madison, 1981, p. 63), 
ultimately yields, then, is a consciousness which always finds itself already 
at work in the world. The primordial "fact", or more appropriately, "value-
fact" (in that it is perceptually significant, not cognitively neutral) is that 
there is a simultaneity of perceiving subject and perceived world. 
Subjectivity is the project of the world and the world is the logic of the 
world at the heart of the subject. The relation between the subject and the 
world is not a "conceived" relationship, but an ontological one; it is not a 
relationship of knowing, but a relationship of being. 
As we saw earlier in the chapter, Merleau-Ponty utterly rejects realism, 
in fact even assumes that "it has been dealt the death blow" (Kwant, 1963, p. 
65), on the grounds that it entails, at its core, self-contradiction. Science 
forgets that entities are not ontologically basic, but are derived from a 
conception of the whole which is given to us preobjectively through the 
Logos of Being. "We experience first the whole, and from this we proceed, 
by means of an analysis, to the elements. We then assume that these 
elements are prior and that they enable us to reconstruct the whole (Kwant, 
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1963, P.  66). The tenacity of realism is such, though, that even some Gestalt 
psychologists assume that the world can appear to us objectively, 
independently of any subjective input. They, thus, overlook the fact that 
subject and world always imply each other. The subject is nothing more 
than the project of the world, and the world is the living, invitational space 
for the subject. The subject can no more be isolated from the world than a 
focus can be separated from its horizon in a Gestalt. Meaning can only, and 
does only, emerge from their on-going conversational engagement. 
Central to the understanding of the Logos of situations is that at all 
times the intentionality obtaining between subject and world forms an all 
encompassing Gestalt. Since we are openness to the world and the world is 
open to us because we are access to the world, since self-experience and 
experience of the world are inseparable, "...it is a contradiction to experience 
the world and, at the same time, to abstract from access to the world which 
we ourselves are" (Kwant, 1963, p. 68). As openness is one of the most 
important concepts in existential, as opposed to psychological 
phenomenology, it is imperative to elucidate what it is and what it is not: 
When Merleau-Ponty says that we have an 'openness to being which 
is perceptual faith,' he means that not only that our thrown regions 
enable us to experience Being as it is, but that Being itself compels us 
to experience it. The subject's essential power to disclose Being is 
frequently taken in the idealist sense that our transcendental' 
capabilities can be activated at will or are entirely due to a projection 
by the subject. But we have seen that this view is mistaken, for in 
being open the subject is also 'not closable.' With the first 
vision,.. .there is initiation,. ..the opening of a dimension that can 
never again be closed.' The subject cannot escape or stop the 
'demands,' interrogation,"saturation,' and 'penetration' of Being. 
He must always be in a situation and every situation has otherness. 
'There is always something before him, a being to be deciphered, an 
omnitudo realitatis' (Mallin, 1979, p. 61). 
Openness, then, is a stance that is never closable. Due to his thrownness, 
facticity, the subject is forever an affective, libidinal vector directed towards 
significance, the other that is resolutely, carnally right there. Through self-
transcendence, the subject opens to the world as an invitation or question. 
And correlatively, the world presences itself as an acceptance, as a reply. In 
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simply being there as something and not nothing, the other engages as a 
resonance. As Kwant captures it: 
The world always presents itself either as a reply to the question 
which we are and, consequently, as meaningful, or as a failure to reply 
and, consequently, as meaningless. It is wholly inconceivable that we 
would first know the things in themselves, pure objectivity, and that 
we would experience them as a reply only in the second place. At 
their very first appearance things already assume the character of a 
reply (1963, p. 68). 
It is often objected that this description of primordial contact may be 
taken as an example of extreme subjectivism, even solipsism (Kwant, 1963, 
p. 69). The reasoning is that: a) the way in which openness is characterized, 
the other is made to respond to the question asked of it, yet does not reveal 
what it is in itself; and b) even if the other is deemed to have otherness, to 
be an in-itself at least to some extent, such a concession is merely 
perfunctory, since, as Merleau-Ponty's ontology claims, the other is an in-
itself-for-us. In response to both charges, Merleau-Ponty would argue that 
it is based on a serious misunderstanding of the concept of openness. 
Though, as a subject, I am absolutely particular, the Logos of the world, 
preobjectively, structurally determines me to be absolutely universal. 
Through the phenomenological reduction, I encounter myself, not as an 
eidos with predetermined properties, but as a thrown structure, a body-
subject whose identity constellates through the process of self- 
transcendence towards the world in concrete situations. As he puts it: 
In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of 
a being orientated or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and 
thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject as ek-
stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the 
subject and the world. The world is inseparable from the subject, but 
from a subject that is nothing but a project of the world, and the 
subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the 
subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the 
world remains 'subjective' since its texture and articulations are 
traced out by the subject's movement of transcendence (1962, p. 430). 
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Put otherwise, the essence of a subject is best treated as a process of 
continual becoming (ek-stase) wherein the subject only comes to know 
himself as a question in the reply which he comes to know as the world. 
The question is revealed in the answer supplied by the other. The other, 
then, is resolutely an "otherness" through which I acquire the sens of 
myself, is truly an in-itself-for-me; and by the same token, I am nothing but 
a resonance for its opening. 
That the world is not a subjective projection is also given further weight 
by the fact that, not only is there not nothing, but something, but that the 
world separates itself from Being in general, presences itself as a figure 
against its ontological ground, forms a Gestalt. In order to achieve its 
appearing, its opening, the other must solicit, invoke the subject's innate 
powers of articulation to creatively, faithfully express the other in its 
present focal emergence. It cannot be over-stated, however, that the focus is 
not to be rigidly cognized, made fully determinate as an object possessing a 
limited range of essential properties. Focal points are not to be understood 
in any objective, analytic manner as a linear series of discrete, indivisible 
now-points, but as an experiential series of "fields of presence" (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p. 415) in which every present contains the past and future, and 
every perception blends with or resolves into another. Every present, then, 
is essentially a moment of revelation or disclosure in the whole ek-stase 
inherent in the dialectic interpenetration of self and other. 
Though they will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Four, the 
concepts of protension and retension should be mentioned here. Every 
present, as we have seen, contains structures sedimented in the past as 
retensions. Moreover, although it might be tempting to claim that, since 
the future may only be viewed as a wide-open field of potential structures, 
and is, consequently, essentially empty, this cannot be maintained as it 
contains pro tensions or "lines of intentionality which trace out in advance 
at least the style of what is to come" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 416). In the 
present, Merleau-Ponty says: 
I do not so much perceive objects as reckon with an environment; I 
seek support in my tools, and am at my task rather than confronting 
it.. .They do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field 
itself, so to speak, which draws along in its•wake its own horizon of 
retentions, and bites into the future with its protensions. I do not pass 
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through a series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve 
and which, placed end to end, make a line (1962, p. 416). 
With this schematization of time in hand, we are now in a position to 
come to terms with the notion of inexhaustability. As we have seen, the 
"field of presence" does not consist of totally discrete things-in-themselves, 
for every object is imbedded in an irremovable background and, thus, is 
tightly interwoven with every other entity in the field as an existing or 
potential Gestalt. Temporality, however, makes this situation far more 
complex. In that subject and world are intentionally bound to each other in 
every concrete situation,-but that the situation is forever in flux due to the 
ek-stase of time, it is crucial that, when the other presences itself at peak 
focal moments in order to articulate itself against the background of 
sedimented retentions, the subject make the attempt to creatively express 
the moment of contact to the greatest extent possible. In order to break free 
from the shackles of inherited meanings sedimented in the past which, if 
used, can only serve to stagnate the meaning of the contact in their facile, 
automatic repetition, the subject must rejuvenate the significance of the 
encounter which has been altered through the ek-stase of time by means of 
authentic language that is appropriate to the current setting before it 
resolves to the horizon as a field of future protensions. Given the ek-stase of 
time, and, hence, the dialectical rhythm of situations, there is a necessary 
splitting off, ecart, of the object as the present Gestalt resolves onto the 
horizon as the next Gestalt crystallizes, and gains ascendance. The sens of 
every Gestalt, then, is, by its nature, inexhaustible, yet requires the creative 
input of the improvising subject if it is to retain significance in the present. 
Meaning and significance are, therefore, to be seen as contingent upon the 
appearing of the other and its creative articulation by the subject in every 
setting. Sens can only arise through the equal participation of subject and 
other in its institution. 
The Logos of Expression 
In his paper, "Merleau-Ponty and the Voice of the Earth" (1988), David 
Abram very nicely and succinctly provides the required substantive link 
between the Logos of Being and the Logos of expression. Following my 
sketch of Merleau-Ponty's ontology of situations above, he writes that 
perception is an "...inherently creative, participatory activity - a sort of 
conversation carried on underneath our spoken discourse, between the 
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living body and its world" (1988, P.  101). Every situation, then, is permeated 
by a "...silent or prereflective perception (which) unfolds as a reciprocal 
exchange between the body and the world.. .(and which, though essentially 
open-ended and indeterminate) is nevertheless highly articulate, already 
informed by a profound logos" (1988, p. 116). Thus, though it might be 
assumed that language occurs only at the level of objective cognition, such a 
view would be mistaken as "...(it) is born of our carnal participation in a 
world that already speaks - to us at the most immediate level of sensory 
experience" (1988, p. 117). Thus, though linguists, in common with all 
scientists, assume that the relation of subject and world has its 
transcendental analogue in-the analytical relation of word and concept, they 
are forgetful of the fact that thought and speech are parasitic upon a 
conversation already underway at the preobjective, perceptual level, are 
oblivious to the "...gestural, carnal resonance that informs even our most 
rarefied discourse (Abram, 1988, p. 117). 
To again cite Abram, the relation between the Logos of Being and the 
Logos of expression, as it is revealed in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
investigations, may be encapsulated in the following way: 
1) The event of perception, experientially considered, is an inherently 
interactive, participatory event, a reciprocal interplay between the 
perceiver and the perceived. 2) Perceived things are encountered by 
the perceiving body as animate, living powers that actively draw us 
into relation. Our spontaneous, preconceptual experience yields no 
evidence for a dualistic division between animate and "inanirnate" 
phenomena, only for relative distinctions between diverse forms of 
animateness. 3) The perceptual reciprocity between our sensing bodies 
and the animate, expressive landscape both engenders and supports 
our more conscious, linguistic reciprocity with others. The complex 
interchange that we call "language" is rooted in the non-verbal 
exchange already going on between our flesh and the flesh of the 
world. 4) Human languages, then, are informed not only by the 
structures of the human body and the human community, but by the 
evocative shapes and patterns of the more-than-human terrain. 
Experientially considered, language is no more the special property of 
the human organism than it is an expression of the animate earth 
that enfolds us (1996, pp. 89-90). 
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Clearly however, though we are inextricably linked to the world 
perceptually and preobjectively, we do possess other modes for approaching 
the world: affectively, cognitively, morally, practically and the like. It is the 
intention of this section to examine the connection Merleau-Ponty makes 
between perception and cognition through the elucidation of his 
description of how the silence of the perceptual realm is miraculously 
transformed into articulate speech, how mute, yet significant gestures 
emerge from the silence of primordial contact into the affective soundings 
of conversational engagement. 
At the outset of chapter -Six of Phenomenology of Perception, entitled 
"The Body as Expression and Speech," Merleau-Ponty iterates that the role 
of the body-subject is to appropriate the centres of meaning occurring in an 
immediate situation through the process of self-transcendence; and 
nowhere is this more evident , than in linguistic practice. In turning his 
attention to the phenomenon of language, and in attempting to show its 
significance as bodily expression of a particular kind, his stated aim is to 
overcome, once and for all, the classical dichotomy between subject and 
object, between idealism and empiricism (1962, p. 174). 
The empirical theory of language argues that the connection of words 
into sentences is a natural process governed by psychical laws of association. 
The basic assumption is that words are not produced by a speaking subject, 
and that we only possess "verbal images," the traces left in us by words 
spoken or heard. Due to the laws of neurological mechanics, an external 
auditory stimulus triggers a process of association in us wherein the 
stimulus is attached to its appropriate verbal image" eventually resulting in 
the articulation of a word. "There is (then) no speaker (but merely) a flow of 
words set into motion independently of any intention to speak... speech is 
not an action and does not show up the internal possibilities of the subject: 
man can speak as the electric lamp can become incandescent" (1962, p. 175). 
The intellectual theory of language, though it does not deny the 
existence of a subject, is deficient in that it conceives the subject as solely a 
thinking subject replete with concepts and categories prior to speaking. 
Thus, although there is a subject, there is no speaking subject, for the 
proper life of the subject, his thinking existence, precedes speech and is 
independent of it. This, in principle then, means that the mere possession 
of a clear and distinct idea will always result in its immaculate performance 
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in speech. The speaking subject, then, is merely a chimera, thought having 
already been completed by the thinking subject. 
The difficulty that Merleau-Ponty has with both theories, then, is that 
they are equally at a loss to supply an account of speaking other than in 
terms of involuntary action. The word, however, is not just a passive shell 
waiting to be supplied with content by a transcendental ego or causally 
determined by external stimuli. He argues that: 
If speech presupposed thought, if talking were primarily a matter of 
-4- • meeting the object through a cognitive intention or through -a- - 
representation, we could not understand why thought tends towards 
expression as towards its completion, why the most familiar thing 
appears indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its name, why 
the thinking subject himself is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts 
so long as he has not formulated them for himself.. .a thought limited 
to existing for itself, independently of the constraints of speech and 
communication, would no sooner appear than it would sink Into the 
unconscious, which means that it would not exist even for itself 
(1962, p. 177). 
With regards to thought and speech, then, there appears to be a division 
between the two as the thought is assumed to be universal and unchanging 
while language is deemed to be historical and evolutionary. It is thought 
that their interrelation is arbitrary, contingent. Intellectualism takes it one 
step further by claiming that word is only a symbol established by 
convention and not by any necessary connection obtaining between 
thought and expression. -Taken further, this means that thought exists prior 
to its expression and, therefore, has an existence independent of language. 
The fact that the same thoughts may be articulated in a myriad of different 
languages is held to lend credence to this assumption. Yet, it would seem 
that we often appeal to another language, not to translate a current thought, 
but to express the thought in the only way it can be articulated. Aware that 
certain thoughts are really and truly not accessible in our native tongue, we 
appeal to another. We simply cannot "think" the expression in any other 
way: thought and expression are, consequently, absolutely inseparable. 
Attending to our experience, we know that this is true. We do not first 
possess a complete thought and then go in search of the words appropriate 
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to its expression. By contrast, thought seeks the words necessary for its 
fruition in the way a work of art seeks an audience to fulfil its 
communicative telos or the other seeks a subject for its articulation in the 
primordial situation. In each case, there is an operative intentionality 
already at work which provides the grounds for the thetic, neutral 
intentionality occurring at the level of cognition. To knOw something is to 
express it. To the degree that our expression is vague so will our thought 
remain. The argument can be presented thus: 
Anyone who is accustomed to teaching knows this from his own 
-, experience. As long as he is unable to explain his thoughts very- • 
clearly, there is something lacking in his understanding of the 
problems involved. It happens also rather frequently that a thought 
assumes form precisely because it is verbally explained, so that the 
lecturer himself arrives at a clearer understanding precisely through 
his verbal expression (Kwant, 1963, p. 51). 
As Merleau-Ponty states it: "the denomination of objects does not follow 
upon recognition; it is itself recognition" (1962, p. 177). This can be clearly 
evinced in the case of learning by children. Children do not first possess a 
clear and distinct concept which they apply to things through some self-
conscious synthetic act. Rather, like poets, they bring truth into being 
through the act of speaking; by nominating Being, the thing is miraculously 
animated: "The word, far from being the mere sign of objects and meanings, 
inhabits things and is the vehicle of meanings. Thus speech, in the speaker, 
does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it. A fortiori must 
it be recognized that the listener receives thought from speech itself" (1962, 
p. 178). 
Even if this much may be conceded, though, an idealist or realist might 
argue, it is still the subject who embues his own words and sentences with 
meaning; hence, there is still the problem of inter-subjective 
communication. Might it not be the case, then, that in hearing the words of 
another, there might be a causal connection between external stimuli and 
internal meanings which is transcendentally deciphered? Predictably, 
Merleau-Ponty replies in the negative. For the objection to work, it would 
have to be maintained that the subject already possesses a clear and distinct 
idea which can be stimulated by another's speech as, if he did not, there 
could not be anything for the incoming stimulus to trigger and only 
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misunderstanding could result. This is patently absurd for the reason that, if 
it were true, we would already know everything in advance and would not, 
indeed could not, ever learn anything.- Hi S reasoning is that: 
...we have the power to understand over and above what we may 
have spontaneously thought. People can speak to us only a language 
which we already understand, each word of a difficult text awakens in 
us thoughts which were ours beforehand, but these meanings 
sometimes combine to form new thought which recasts them all, and 
we are transported to the heart of the matter, we find the source. Here 
,there is nothing comparable to the solution of a problem, where .we 
discover an unknown quantity through its relationship with known 
ones. For the problem can only be solved if it is determinate, that is, if 
the cross-checking of the data provides the unknown quantity with 
one or more definite values (1962, p. 178). 
In short, what Merleau-Ponty is arguing here is that, though we always 
possess a stockpile of sedimented structures, meanings that have been 
culturally and historically fabricated and then acquired, we are always, by 
our very nature, predisposed to understanding variations on those 
meanings as they are creatively improvised upon, broadened and deepened, 
through the novel expressions of authors and philosophers. By some sort of 
process of identification with the author (in the sense of like-feeling, and 
not, therefore, abstractly and cognitively), we reach thoughts that we did not 
previously have. Through exposure to their writings, we gradually 
insinuate ourselves into their manner of thinking, into their modes of 
presencing which finally culminates in understanding. The thought then is 
most assuredly in the expression. If we simply accepted words as having 
lexical definition, transcendental correspondence to concepts which must be 
deciphered for comprehension, we would never successfully attain a grasp 
of another's thinking. Moreover, it is not just the case that we become 
acquainted with a new thought because known words and their known 
meanings are connected in a new fashion. It is not like erecting a building 
out of the remains of another building that has been razed. Rather, every 
articulation is unique in that it is summoned by a situation that has not and 
cannot `exist again in precisely the same form. Knowing this is to know why 
and how articulations are authentic, appropriate to their immediate context. 
As Remy C. Kwant views it: 
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At first sight, it may seem strange that the meaning of language lies 
contained in the language itself. The improbable character, however, 
of this assertion is considerably lessened, if we pay attention to the 
other forms of expression used by the human body. Dancing is a form 
of expression, yet no one would dream of distinguishing the meaning 
of the dance from the dance movements. Likewise, we know very 
well that the meaning of a painting cannot be divorced from canvas 
and colors or the meaning of music from the sounds. In general, the 
meaning of an expression finds existence in the material itself of the 
expression. Why would the situation be different with respect to 
verbalexpression - words? (1963, p. 52). 
It should come as no surprise that, in keeping with his ontology of 
situations, Merleau-Ponty must reject any dualistic presumption of words 
existing independently of thought. A word is not a "sign" that makes 
reference to some extrinsic content, but is thought itself. The relationship 
between thought and word is not, therefore, something which is 
transcendentally established, but emerges immanently; hence, a word does 
not fix meaning, btit is meaning itself. To illustrate this, he employs a 
musical analogy: 
The musical meaning of a sonata is inseparable from the sounds 
which are its vehicle; before we have heard it no analysis enables us 
to anticipate it; once the performance is over, we shall, in our 
intellectual analyses of the music, be unable to do anything but carry 
ourselves back to the moment of experiencing it (1962, p. 182). 
Just as the tones are not "signs" of the sonata, but are the sonata itself 
meaningfully unfolding, words are not the "signs" of thought, but is 
thought meaningfully expressing itself. In the case of both linguistic and 
musical expression, then, there is no vehicle or medium required to 
translate some noumenal idea lying behind the experience into a form in 
which it can be understood as meaningful. The tones are the music's 
meaning and the words are the linguistic expression's meaning. 
Furthermore, the attitude associated with both the linguistic and the 
musical experience is not one of appropriating or annexing some cognitive 
content, but of establishing contact with the immediate presence, whether it 
be music or an interlocutor. At the heart of both experiential situations 
there lies invitation and response, question and answer. The movement of 
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self-transcendence towards the other undertaken by the subject is not aimed 
at the acquisition of some abstract reward, but is essentially a trial of 
encounter, in both the sense of an attempt and an ordeal. 
Phenomenologically, it is but an instance of primordial contact fpetween 
embodied self and engaging other. Though only speaking about language, 
the following quote from Merleau-Ponty can be extended to also embrace 
music: 
As soon as man uses language to establish a living relation with 
himself or with his fellows, language is no longer an instrument, no 
longer a means; it is a manifestation, a revelation of intimate being.— 
and of the psychic link which unites us to the world and our fellow 
men (1962, p. 196). 
To truly come to grips with just how radical a departure Merleau-Ponty's 
ontology and epistemology in general, and theory of language in particular 
is from traditional metaphysics and linguistic theory, I will close this 
section with some concluding remarks that fulfil his aim stated earlier: to 
leave the traditional subject-object dichotomy behind us, once and for all. 
The central difficulty, for dualists, idealists especially, is that they tend to be 
preoccupied with issues of entailment, with questions of the necessity , or 
falsifiability of conclusions reached through syllogistic reasoning. The 
obsession with literal meanings and with laws concerning the validity and 
permissibility of propositions, however, needlessly simplifies and distorts 
their view of language. They simply cannot countenance that, in the vast 
majority of verbal exchanges, there are metalinguistic forces at work 
creating a field of significance, an atmosphere that transcends the literal 
meanings exchanged in conversation. What their linguistic theories 
prevent them from perceiving is that: 
There is.. .a taking up of others' thought through speech, a reflection 
in others, an ability to think according to others which enriches our 
own thoughts. Here the meaning of words must finally be induced by 
the words themselves, or more exactly, their conceptual meaning 
must be formed by a kind of deduction from a gestural meaning, 
which is immanent in speech (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 179). 
Though it may be belabouring a point, I think that it cannot be over-stated to 
just what degree immanent or implicit meaning pervades expression and 
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militates against its transcendental codification as literal and explicit, and as 
permissible or impermissible. The objectively rational, scientific view of 
expression maintains that: 
expression is most complete when it points unequivocally to events, 
to states of objects, to ideas or relations, for, in those instances, 
expression leaves nothing more to be desired, contains nothing which 
it does not reveal, and thus sweeps us toward the object which it 
designates. (Yet) in dialogue, narrative, plays on words, trust, promise, 
prayer, eloquence, literature, we possess second-order language in 
which we do not speak of objects and ideas except to reach someone 
(italics mine)... (objective, analytic thinking denies this as it) attaches 
clear and precise significations to fixed signs. It fixes a certain number 
of transparent relations and, to represent them, it establishes symbols 
which in themselves are meaningless and can therefore never say 
more than they mean conventionally. Having thus protected itself 
from the shifts in meaning that create error, objective reason is in 
principle assured at any moment of being able to justify its claims by 
appealing to its initial definitions (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, pp. 3-4). 
This distinction between the ready-made nature of objective expression and 
authentic articulation can be evinced by the approach we take to the 
writings of an author we have not encountered before. In reading, for 
example, Joyce, Nabokov or Faulkner for the first time, we do not assume a 
transcendental, interpretive stance wherein we attempt to decipher the 
work's meaning. The words on the page are not the imperfect husks of an 
array of transcendental clear and distinct ideas as rationalism would have it, 
but an invitational field. As such, the meaning of a book is given, in the 
first instance, not so much by its ideas as by: 
...systematic and unexpected variation of the modes of language, of 
narrative, or of existing literary forms. This accent, this particular 
modulation of speech - if the expression is successful - is assimilated 
little by little by the reader, and it gives him access to a thought to 
which he was until then indifferent or even opposed (Merleau-Ponty, 
1973, p. xiii). 
Expression in literature, then, is not the transmission of a priori certainties 
or empirical data, but is an evocative invitation. Through some form of 
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mimesis, we insinuate ourselves into, and share the particular gestural 
significance and all-embracing world of the novel. We feel, bodily, the 
author's style of thinking; our lives intertwine in a present situation which 
suddenly takes on anticipation, develops a historicity. Moreover; the process 
is not just limited to the reader's approach, but to the author's own act of 
creation. The author does not stand by idly paring his fingernails while 
admiring his handiwork as does Joyce's God. Rather, as a midwife, a 
medium, he brings truth into being by means of a vocabulary that he may 
have had no idea he possessed. The beauty of language, according to 
Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 10), is that its meaning does not require the 
transcendent-fusion of referent with reference as the scientific view would 
have it, but seamlessly and invisibly transports us towards the meaning of 
another subject's thoughts. There is nothing extraordinary about this as we 
encounter it all the time in conversation. Gestures, smiles, hesitations 
create an atmosphere, a mood which transcends the simple linguistic 
analysis of what information was imparted and how it was received. This 
seems to be obvious in that often, even most of the time, the initial 
expression cannot be reproduced verbatim, yet the meaning is retained. The 
beauty of language, again, lies in its capacity to pass unnoticed. 
The Paradox of Creativity 
Just as the phenomenological reduction reveals the Logos of the 
ontological situation, so, too, does it disclose the Logos of the 
epistemological situation, the primordial source of meaning and expression. 
In radical opposition to traditional epistemological theorizing which 
attempts to explicate how we can transform a confusing world of muddled, 
indistinct and ambiguous sense-data into a world of closed significations, 
phenomenology views the descent into the prepersonal, precognitive realm 
as profoundly liberating. For it is the only way to escape the cliched, banal, 
jargonistic, stultifying world of closed signfications. The reduction to the 
originating source of meaning, the Logos of the situation, has the effect of 
liberating words from their stagnant morass, of reactivating the creative 
impulse behind their initial authentic nomination, and, thus of renewing 
their significance. The movement of self-transcendence towards the world 
in the primordial situation is absolutely bound up with this renewal of 
meaning and significance through authentic self-expression. As Merleau-
Ponty puts it: "In its live and creative state, language is the gesture of 
renewal and recovery which unites me with myself and others" (1973, p. 17). 
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In that communication has this intersubjective, reciprocal character, 
moreover, it is clear that there is not, cannot be, an isolated, monadic 
Cartesian ego indifferently affixing referents to references, as the very nature 
of speech presupposes a commonality of intentionalities and meanings 
which require openness and self-transcendence. We also notice that, when 
speaking with another, the intention to express is "empty in the sense that it 
is not committed to specific words, but organizes around itself - polarizes - 
available meanings, both incarnating itself in them and at the same time 
modifying them" (Bannan, 1971, p. 83). 
There is a most interesting corollary to the inseparability of self and other 
in the linguistic delineation of the situation: if one accepts the Cartesian 
view, then the pure "I" must posit an object of its own fabrication before 
itself. But, if we "take embodiment as a given then the thoughts that arise in 
speech may be attributed sometimes to oneself and at other times to others" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 18). In fact, the equal participation of self and other 
in, and the perceptual integration of, the situation is such that: 
speaking and listening, action and perception, are quite distinct 
operations for me only when I reflect upon them.. .When I am 
actually speaking I do not first figure the movements involved. My 
whole bodily system concentrates on finding and saying the word, in 
the same way that my hand moves toward what is offered to 
me.. .When speaking or listening, I project myself into the other 
person, I introduce him into my own self (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 18). 
Language, then, is not a prison wherein we must scramble to find the word 
appropriate for the expression of a discrete thought as there is no such 
existential split. Such a split only comes after the fact in the theoretical 
analysis of what has already been wrought in conversation. One cannot 
have a pure thought independently of its linguistic performance. As F. 
Joseph Smith (1979, p. 85) asks: "Do words really just lie about in a mental 
dictionary waiting for us to use them to match our thoughts?" It would not 
seem so. I do not first have an auditory perception which is then translated 
into thought. Rather, I am invited into an engaging situation so equally 
participatory, that I cannot tell what issues from me and what comes from 
my interlocutor. Activity and passivity are, thus, indissolubly fused. Both 
speaker and listener share a passivity in that they share sedimented 
structures, inherited meaning structures; yet, by the same token, they are 
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actively engaged in improvising a common modality. Moreover, in the 
institution of new meanings through the revitalization of sedimented 
meanings, there is also a thrust toward anticipated reinterpretations upon 
renewed contact in the future. 
Central to expression, then, is that it has a temporal dimension - it 
reinterprets meanings sedimented in the past in an improvisational present 
in which the anticipation of a further reworking lies on the open-ended 
future horizon - and is, clearly, a profoundly creative and authentic activity. 
apression does not move in solitude, delineating objects and events point-
by-point as scientific intellection would claim. Each facet of the eventful 
situation is created, conjured into existence through the engaged 
cooperation of self and other. We are not truly communicating if we treat 
words as empty vessels requiring cognitive ballast, as mere linguistic tools 
which have utility rather than significance; and we are not communicating 
if we assume that there is such a thing as completed expression. True speech 
animates objects; it moves by sketching differentiations, not by establishing 
representations, forging and fixing correspondences. 
What is so distasteful about the latter enterprise is that scientific 
conceptualization so absolutely deterinines a meaning, so imperiously 
sediments an experience in the attempt to establish the universal validity of 
a proposition or hypothesis, that the existential communion with others 
which language facilitates is brought to a close. The world's luminosity 
vanishes at the flick of a switch. Rather than having a playful, 
intersubjective field for participatory improvisations on meaning and 
significance, we are left with a disjunctive assemblage of neutral facts and 
stagnated meanings. Severed from their roots in the primordial Logos 
which sustains meaning by inviting creative improvisation, objective 
conceptualizations become vitiated and inauthentic through their 
monotonous repetition in, and indifferent application to, a myriad of 
settings. In assuming the validity and necessity of scientific propositions, we 
effectively debar significance and value from the eventful, participatory 
situation. As we reach for an apple, we do not reach for an object in need of 
representation, but move intentionally towards a centre of value. This 
requires no second-order explanation or definition. 
There is always a Gestalt of language. In the living present, there is 
always ontological revelation and concealment, disclosure and closure 
which is reflected at the cognitive, linguistic level as that which is expressed 
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and unexpressed. Since the present focus - revelation, disclosure or 
expression - always retreats to the horizon of concealment and non-
expression through the ek-stase of time, there is always an open field of 
potential articulations, improvisational meanings; there is always work to 
do. This, perhaps more than any other issue, establishes the aesthetic nature 
of articulation and expression. Expression is temporary, but contains past 
and future. Hence, it behooves the articulating subject to re-animate 
sedimented meanings through creative, aesthetic expression at the instant 
of revelation. In the linguistic situation, the subject, in a sense, is put on the 
spot the way a jazz musician is made to improvise on sedimerite d harmonic 
structures unfoldihg through the ek-stase of musical time. Afforded the 
opportunity to engage the significant other, the musician makes the leap of 
self-transcendence in one single, integrated aesthetic act. Consequently, it 
must be seen that every present contains a dimension of response and 
answer-ability which is at once both moral and aesthetic. Every authentic 
present signification, therefore, takes place under an umbrella of moral and 
aesthetic value already prefigured into the concrete context. The reactivation 
of the initial sedimenting event is, therefore, clearly ethically and 
aesthetically value-laden. If it were not, we would not experience the 
compulsion to respond to the invitational beckoning of the other. 
For anything - an expression, a work of art, a gesture - to communicate 
effectively it must stand out against a background of common 
understanding, a meaning horizon. Yet to be truly creative, it cannot simply 
pass along inherited meanings. It cannot be an issue of simple difference or 
idiosyncracy, cannot be a permutation already prefigured, but a 
revolutionary meaning horizon. It must institute new meanings which are 
rooted in, but not prefigured by the original potential structures that are 
concretized in the present setting. It must establish its own context; yet in 
order to signify anything at all, it must avail itself of inherited communal 
expressions, sedimented meanings. 
Everyday communication, for the most part, avails itself of communally 
understood words or word structures with sedimented meanings for 
heuristic, practical reasons. "Such communication thus exhibits what 
Heidegger called Gerede: idle talk, which merely passes along available 
meanings, trading them in ritualistic fashion within a commonly 
understood context" (Jones, 1989, p. 2). Patently, such talk is necessary if we 
want to buy a souvlaki or elicit directions to the closest subway station. 
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Authentic, creative speech in such a situation would be woefully out of 
place and might even be potentially incendiary, depending upon our 
audience. For example, there may often be an intentional foreclosure of the 
creative impulse to expression in certain contexts, lest one's linguistic 
facility be held to be "...fancy, intellectual, unmanly. Communication in an 
army barracks, for example, often involves the deliberate suppression of 
diversity in word, dress and action, while semantically empty, all-purpose 
• adjectives such as 'bloody' are used to convey emphasis..." (Goody, 1987, p. 
285). Such idle talk ritualistically achieves guaranteed acceptance because it 
operates within a mutually agreed context of understanding. Yet, such 
"constituted speech: already assumes that the decisive step of authentic 
nomination has already occurred. It has, however, become separated from 
its significant, originating context and has become vitiated and shallow due 
to that schism. 
Edwin Jones (1989, p. 3) raises two questions associated with the paradox 
of creativity: 1) how does authentic nomination become idle?; and 2) how 
does a new significance arise from stale, sedimented concepts? Of course the 
fact that they have retained significance indicates that sedimented meanings 
have had an originating, authentic character in the first place, suggesting a 
shared, communal sense of significance. Yet, by the same token, creative 
expression exhibits a personally felt sense of significance which is 
metaphoric before it can be conveyed to a community of subjects. 
Communal understanding and a personally felt sense of significance are, 
therefore, both operative in the creative act of expression. 
For the purposes of conceptual thought and linguistic convention, it is 
necessary to posit certain meaningful structures which are considered 
invalid within the rules set out by objective-scientific criteria. These may 
simply be characterized as meaningfully present in our lives, but of a 
nonconceptual and nonlinguistic nature. Such structures stemming from 
phenomenological description are not merely subjective or impressionistic. 
They are simply imbued with sense and are not deduced or inferred, but 
disclosed in the primordial situation. 
This is why, as we saw above, Heidegger makes the ontological/ontical 
distinction. The latter is an ontology based on substance and is evinced by 
the ordinary scientific procedure of giving priority to the existence of 
individual, particle-like atoms which are added together to form a whole. 
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The ontological whole, however, is significant, structurally integral, before _ 
its deduction by the summation of the parts. Metaphysically, though, how 
can one prove the existence of discrete entities which then give rise to clear 
and distinct ideas when one lacks, from the outset, an originary expression • 
of the required horizon of significance, some ontological - not merely 
ontical - ballast? Jones' central task is clear: "(It is to see)... how the 
presupposition of an objective physical universe, held to be univocally 
given as valid for all, is an idea that must itself have emerged through an 
expressive act that gave a new significance to an available concept and that 
set the norms for the modern understanding of 'Nature' (Jones, 1989, p.6). 
Though one can attempt an historical analysis - someone must have 
thought the idea in the first place and then articulated it - it is perhaps more 
fruitful to pursue the phenomenological exploration of the contact between 
prepersonal, prelinguistic perception and its "higher" order articulation. 
Given such a motivation, one can only ask how the unity of an ontical 
structure can be derived from primary experience of the world when it can 
only be thought. How do specific entities initially have presence and 
existence before their synthetic totalization? Seemingly, through a creative 
act that complies with Nietzsche's dictum: before the concept, a metaphor 
(Jones, 1989, p. 11). The puzzle has to be created before the parts make sense. 
The world has to be perceived metaphorically as a clock before one even 
starts looking around for the individual bits of evidence which will allow 
one to conclude that the world is a clock. It is "like" a clock first. The truly 
creative, expressive work hits us so hard because we see the truth in it so 
clearly right away. We are made to deconstruct the experience after the fact, 
however, in order to come to terms with its deviation from the cultural, 
historical norms which we abstractly understand as its source. In the case of 
perception, we identify with the source of the aesthetic experience because 
we already possess the mute perceptual experiences which inchoately 
inhabit the shared sedimented meaning horizon. 
As we have seen, a great deal of confusion concerning sedimented 
meaning and creative, authentic expression can be blamed on the practice of 
scientific conceptualization. In failing to recognize that it already has a 
strategy in place for subsuming phenomena under concepts which was 
originally creative and metaphoric, science assumes second-order, objective 
accounts of the world to be basic, whereas, in fact, such conceptualizations, 
in order to be valid and persuasive, must have already been structured at 
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the preobjective level of perception. What objective, scientific 
conceptualizations overlook, according to Jones, is that: 
...clearly defined thought cannot precede an originary, creative 
expression, that is, an intuition of significance that can be realized 
only in execution.. .authentic expression, whereby a meaning horizon 
exhibiting its own norm is initially established, will always be 
presupposed by any secondary expression. Without a clear account of 
such first-order, genuinely creative acts of expression in their capacity 
to make new meanings and new meaning horizons communally 
accessible, any effort to ground historical-social enterprises such as 
philosophy of natural science, including the sciences of language and 
indeed all epistemological inquiry, will forever be confronted by the 
antinomies that inevitably result from taking secondary expressions, 
the gedacht, as the basic phenomenon to be treated in the analysis of 
human understanding. Merleau-Ponty suggested as much in his 
admonition that if we want to understand clearly the privileged 
position accorded to Reason, 'we must begin by putting thought back 
among the phenomena of [authentic] expression' "(1989, pp. 113-14). 
La Langue and La Parole 
In his book, Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language, 
James Edie provides a rigorous analysis of how language-using 
consciousness is rooted in the foundational structures of perceptual, 
prelinguistic consciousness. His central thesis is that: 
language as a structure, as an ideal entity, is ontologically 
dependent on historical acts of usage, of speech-acts, which in each 
actual occurrence mean something new and different from anything 
which has ever previously been uttered, these same speech-acts 
logically presuppose the already ideally and objectively established 
formal laws according to which acts of linguistic meaning can take 
place (1976, p. x). 
As such, his interest lies with how personal, contextually derived meanings 
partake of a common intersubjectively constituted life-world of meanings, 
how all individual acts of speaking (la parole) are rooted in the structure of 
a language (la langue). In seeking an answer to how the ideal can become 
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immanent in real psychological acts of speech, he assumes, unlike Merleau- • 
Ponty, that there are phonological, morphological, and syntactical structures 
that are presupposed by speech-acts and which logically allow them to take 
place. His view, consequently, reverses Merleau-Ponty's ontology and 
epistemology which, as we have seen, insists that all second-order objective 
expressions are presupposed by prior acts of signification which occur 
preobjectively and prelinguistically in perceptual experience. For Merleau-
Ponty, the theoretical, analytic institution of linguistic laws can occur only 
after a creative, authentic articulation has taken place; all sedimentations of 
meaning are parasitic on this decisive prior act having already occurred. 
Hence, la parole is logically prior to la langue, contrary to what Edie 
supposes. 
Whereas Merleau-Ponty would claim that meaning arises from the 
miraculous animation of a thing through its nomination into Being, Edie 
argues that the speaking subject is already "hard-wired" to distinguish 
between meaningful and meaningless sentences due to the operation of 
linguistic laws which precede speech-acts. As he puts it: 
Beneath the level of words, and beneath the level of sentences, 
spoken language is a coherent system of phonetic variations which 
render the existence of words and phrases themselves possible. Words 
and phrases are composed of Phonemic 'signs', which in themselves 
do not mean anything independent of anything at all (in the sense 
that they do not designate or denote anything independent of this 
semeiological system itself) but are, rather, only the diacritical marks 
necessary to distinguish one word-sound from another according to 
certain patterns. The language, as a phonemic (semeiological) system, 
carries its meaning within it, as a global reference to the whole world 
of experience, capable of expressing an unlimited number of things, 
which only gradually take on a specific sense (Edie, 1976, p. 87). 
Merleau-Ponty would reject such a transcendental interpretation out of 
hand. Though he would concede that the babbling of babies which 
eventually results in true speech at around the age of two imitates the 
primordial melody, intonation and musical contour of speech, and that they 
never reflexively learn the rules of linguistic propriety in the form of 
explicit judgments and grammatical rules, this does not mean that their 
language wielding skills are pre-determined. Speaking, therefore, does not 
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activate pre-given linguistic structures, but creatively articulates things in 
their figural significance, in their salient presence. According to one of 
Merleau-Ponty's favourite analogies, the acquisition of language proceeds in 
the same way that an adult learns the style of a hitherto unknown work of 
art or piece of music. Just as one feels one's way into the gestural, modal 
presencing of the work, one perceives the melodic arc of a sentence in its 
entirety. It is simply not the case that either individual tones or phonemes 
are serially and transcendentally deciphered and then built up in 
consciousness according to abstract grammatical laws. 
Though, as we have semi., speech and thought are inseparable, Merleau-
Ponty would concede that la parole most definitely occurs against the 
background of la langue. Yet, la langue is not to be understood as 
operational in terms of an obeisance to acquired formal, grammatical rules, 
but simply as the cultural historical inheritance of sedimented meanings. La 
langue, for Merleau-Ponty, is the fundamental "silence" out of which all 
acts of la parole take place. The ground of all speech is this silence; yet, this is 
not to suggest that silence is a no-thing, is unstructured or is meaningless. It 
is, in fact: 
...highly determinate. Moreover, and this is even more important in 
our actual acts of speaking, the speech acts of la parole (our particular 
usages of our common language in each particular case) result in a 
kind of "coherent deformation" of the already sedimented meanings 
and which is constituted of all the forms, all the linguistic institutions 
of the historical tradition of our distinctive linguistic culture. We 
speak, in short, on the background of a complex, determinate, and 
already articulated matrix of linguistic structures which at each 
instance enable our speech-acts to take place, and thus enable us to 
break silence and to say something new in authentic and original acts 
of meaning. Thus la parole brings about a constant dislocation and 
continuing change in la langue. We may use the same words we have 
used on previous occasions, or the words the great thinkers and 
philosophers, the classical writers of our literary tradition have used, 
but the meaning of these words is never fully grasped and transmitted 
once and for all; the very meaning of our words is itself a limit-
concept which eludes speech by always escaping beyond it into the 
transcendental silence of the realm of conceptual thought, which, 
while polarizing our attempts at expression, always escapes us to 
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some extent, and thus always leaves room for more to be said, for our 
langue to be used by countless other speakers and writers for their 
purposes and for their intentions, which will, in turn, introduce us 
into new realms of linguistic meaning, which are nevertheless 
comprehensible and communicable to all on the basis of a common 
understanding and acceptance of the structures of this language, an 
acceptance of common rules which is sufficient for all purposes of 
communication but which is never fully adequate to bring expression 
to completion (Edie, 1976, pp. 102-103). 
Merleau-Ponty's attitude, then, is not that of a structuralist, but of one 
seeking to reconcile the phenomenology of the speech-act with the apparent 
linguistic rules which are realized in speaking. Such rules are not, however, 
to be assumed to be transcendentally conferred, but as simply emerging 
equally from the interstices between words as from the spoken words 
themselves, from the silence that surrounds speech. 
At this juncture, it would seem that Edie appears to accept Merleau-
Ponty's position that the immanent or existential meaning of words is not 
rendered by their correspondence with transcendental concepts, but solely in 
that meaning "inhabits" every speech-act and that each and every specific 
speech-act, viewed as a Gestalt, is meaningful in the relational totality of 
meanings that is the ultimate linguistic Gestalt: language. Nevertheless, this 
is not the case as, in the following passage, he exposes his deep faith in 
Husserlian neo-Cartesianism. He claims that: 
... precisely because the primary phonological systems according to 
which we speak necessarily reach their culmination in words, it is 
impossible to limit the discussion of what language means to the 
immanent and intralinguistic structures of phonology. With the 
emergence of words, meaning becomes dependent on syntactic (and 
semantic) rules and structures which are not accounted for by 
phonology and morphology. With the word, language becomes a 
semeiological system, which is to say that it is endowed with the 
function of standing for, indicating, or referring to something other 
than itself. What the higher systems of syntax and semantics bring 
into play is another "miraculous" human ability, the ability to take 
something for something else, to analogize (the elemental and all-
pervasive function of higher intelligence which the associationists 
81 
spoke of in terms of "association" and which Husserl called simply 
"pairing") (1976, p. 131). 
My difficulty with this argument is not so much that it is wrong per se, but 
that the shift from immanent meaning to transcendental meaning is both 
superfluous and needlessly complicating. To say, as Merleau-Ponty does, 
that words carry their meaning prelinguistically and preobjectively would 
appear to be sufficient. Since the transcendental conception which occurs at 
the cognitive level makes reference to the prelinguistic situation anyway, 
why should it assume a pre-eminent status as the gauge of meaningful 
speech-acts? Surely, the meaning of speech-acts is not predicated on 
adopting the role of linguistic analyst/vivisectionist in order to 
reductionistically and positivistically establish the one-to-one 
correspondence of every signifier with its significant? Since every 
consecutive conceptual overlay simply abstracts further away from the 
original context of meaning generation, and creative expression, and that 
Merleau-Ponty's position is never refuted, one wonders why Edie is so 
convinced of the truth of his position. Given that each ascendance to a new 
meta-linguistic plateau is parasitic on the original situational Gestalt (which 
according to the Logos of Being makes reference to the ultimate Gestalt of 
significations which is wide-open and inexhaustible), it simply seems 
unnecessary to casuitically quibble about the meaning of the specific speech-
act that has a whole melodic arc of meaning before its autopsy. Moreover, to 
accept that speech-acts take place within a context, within a field or 
atmosphere which is permeated by meaning, may even render the attempt 
at meta-linguistic interpretation counter-productive. Take the example of 
humour. To understand a joke, we do not need to assume a transcendental 
position because its gestural atmosphere is grasped in the context of the 
conversation prior to, and in defiance of, any posterior synthetic analysis 
and appraisal. Upon hearing a joke, we do not respond with "I'll get back to 
you about that one with regard to its validity and potentially humorous 
yield". The body is already possessed by "uncontrollable" spasms of glee 
prior to any thought of the possibility of the meaning-bearing capacity of the 
words heard. In fact, the amusing anecdote that has to be explained loses all 
of its initial potency; upon seeing that it has fallen flat, the teller will usually 
just reply with something along the lines of "It doesn't matter" or "I guess 
you had to be there" in preference to engaging in some meta-linguistic 
explanation. 
82 
What is particularly strange about Edie's arguments against Merleau-
Ponty's position is that, following upon the defence of his transcendentalit 
conception of meaning, he implicitly accepts Merleau-Ponty's contention 
that meaning emerges from the conversational context wherein the speaker 
solicits the engaging presence of his interlocutor. He claims that: 
...the sentence is thus normally the only full unit of thought and, as 
such, as we shall see, enjoys a certain independence from the words 
which compose it. But, at the same time, our sentences are highly 
transitory, passing, rapid happenings or events. They are what happen 
to words. We scarcely ever fix our sentences permanently in our 
minds or remember them. If we wish to remember them, we must 
deliberately "memorize" them. We learn vocabularies of words but 
not vocabularies of sentences (except for the most standard and stock 
phrases of a language). Words, on the contrary, represent 
sedimentations of more incomplete but more readily available 
meanings; they outlive the sentence, which quickly dies... (and) they 
get defined in dictionaries and can be stored in our cultural space in a 
way sentences (with exceptions perhaps for some of the greatest) are 
not (1976, p. 133). 
This passage serves only to reinforce Merleau-Ponty's position and, thus, to 
deal the fatal blow to the transcendentalist position. It is clear that it is not 
necessary for the words in a sentence to be transcendentally deciphered and 
then reconstructed through a synthetic act for meaning to emerge. The 
meaning is already there immanently in the context; and moreover, in that 
the specific words being used can rarely, if ever, be repeated verbatim, this 
serves only to underscore that meaning unfolds in a manner appropriate to 
the immediate conversational context, and not in accordance with abstract 
linguistic rules. The selection of specific words is, therefore, subordinate to 
the meaningful exchange in the conversational setting. This is why we 
retain meanings and do not necessarily remember the specific words 
employed. And this is just as true of the speaker as the audience. As 
Merleau-Ponty often remarks, it is sometimes the case that, in referring back 
to a conversation, it is impossible to recollect whether the words issued 
from myself or my interlocutor. The meaning and value of the exchange is 
all that matters in the long run. 
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Sedimented Meaning and Improvisitory Play 
•A great deal of what is held to be meaningful and valuable in a 
conversation is that it is not fully determinate, but that its playful, 
improvisatory nature heightens and broadens its experience through the 
sense of anticipation associated with its openendedness. If we only sought 
irrefutable data, clear and distinct ideas in conversation, then we would be 
quite happy in exchanging platitudes, cliches and jargon, in the literal world 
of sedimented meanings. There would be no interest in the unquantifiable, 
and there would no impetus to engage in creative expression. We would 
always possess the ready-made utilitarian structures necessary to imparting 
information and would never be at risk of our intended meanings being 
misinterpreted or derailed in their passage to another's ears. One would 
hope that even the most reductionistic among us could not view this ideal 
of language and its institution as anything other than completely dystopian. 
Two things appear to be certain: we do require a familiarity with 
sedimented meanings in order to communicate with others who share our 
cultural-historical inheritance; yet, nonetheless, central to our enjoyment of 
conversation, is that it improvises on such received meanings in a 
thoroughly engaged, unrehearsed, dynamic dialectic occurring between 
ourselves and our interlocutors. The dual functioning of previously 
instituted meanings acquired in the past and the openendedness of 
meaning on the horizonal future which is manifested in the 
improvisational present is perhaps best understood by analogy to the 
phenomenological experience of music. Let us assume for a moment that a 
musical note may be taken as analogous to a word. The performance of both 
must be practiced and sedimented before there is the possibility of engaging 
in either music or conversation. (A trumpeter, for example, must rehearse 
and perfect the embouche required for the production of a single tone to no 
less a degree than a baby acquiring language skills). The sedimentation of 
the approach to the individual tone and word is, therefore, clearly essential , 
as a prerequisite to communication. Nonetheless, neither the tone nor the 
word has meaning solely in and of itself in isolation, but only by reference 
to other sedimented structures in a relational totality of meaning. Hence, 
just as a word in conversation makes sense not only in its 
phenomenological contextual being, but also in that it has a function in a 
whole semeiological system of sedimented meanings, the tone in an 
improvised phrase of music is situationally meaningful yet still functions, 
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as well, within a system of sedimented harmonic structures. For the 
meaning of a conversation or a piece of music to blossom, then, previously 
acquired structures must be appealed to in order to provide a frame of 
reference for what is improvisationally unfolding; the creative figure must 
be perceived in relation to its meaning horizon as, if it is not, there is no 
way of recognizing the significance of the improvised phrase or to even 
perceive that it is an improvisation unless the experience is grasped as a 
whole Gestalt of meaning. 
Why music can serve as such an appropriate model for the elucidation of 
the relation of sedimented meanircgs and their creative, improvisational 
reinterpretation in a present is that it fully resists its transcendental 
understanding, interpretation and evaluation. Though the following will 
receive fuller treatment in Chapter Four, I think that it would be prudent to 
reach some conclusions concerning the analogy of the perception of 
meaning in conversation and music. Recalling the section above entitled 
"The Logos of Being", it would seem to be easily maintained that music is 
"pregnant with sense", that it has immanent meaning in that it does not 
make reference to extra-musical concepts, and that its value is established in 
its immediate contextual perception and appreciation. There would also 
seem to be no doubt that it is invitational, engaging and that it solicits 
attention in the full realization of its meaning; and that, consequently, self-
transcendence towards it is not something that has to be demanded or made 
imperative abstractly. Furthermore, its significance occurs in Gestalts 
wherein the present figure, especially in improvised music, such as jazz, 
stands out against a background of sedimented harmonic structures. And 
just as reference is made to past, previously acquired meanings, there is a 
simultaneous projection onto the future horizon which, due to the Logos of 
Being, is openended. Through the ek-stase of music, improvisations are 
known to be only present configurations and that the potential for future 
delineations is inexhaustible. Ultimately, then, all present creative 
expressions in music point simultaneously to the past and future and occur 
as fluid moments of a continual dynamic, dialectical process which forms a 
relational totality, an ultimate Gestalt of musical meaning. 
By this characterization, it should be clear that musical meaning is not 
transcendentally deciphered as a series of discrete now-points occurring in a 
linear series which is then reconstructed by a constituting consciousness. 
Rather, it is an invitational field of presence, an immediate palpable 
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opening to the Logos of Being, and the phenomenological experience of 
primordial contact. But, though a case can be made for the analogy of 
conversation and music in that both are immediate, contextually 
significant, and not abstractly, transcendentally made meaningful, music 
would seem to differ from conversation on at least a couple of fronts. 
Though both are, at root, perceived in a whole gestural, melodic arc of 
meaning, music so completely resists its reification, the possibility of its 
making reference to determinate concepts, that it is, for all intents and 
purposes, impossible to acquire anything beyond the most general sense of a 
piece, especially a sustained, complex instrumental work, upon hearing the 
work for the first time. At least, in a conversation, one walks away from it 
with the gist of what was said, even if the particular expressions employed 
have not been retained in memory. Oddly, though, and this is really and 
truly where conversation and music appear to part company, one can often, 
after hearing a piece for the first time, have complete recall of a melody that 
can be whistled note-for-note (or if one lacks perfect pitch, at least with the 
correct intervallic relationships) and almost certainly reproduced according 
to the same rhythm, speed and intonation of the original. That the meaning 
of the music, or at least its melodic configuration, can be so clearly perceived 
perceptually would seem to suggest that Merleau-Ponty is absolutely correct 
in assuming that meaning and expression are completely inextricable in 
their immediate, contextual experience. 
What is so intriguing about the comparison of conversation and music, 
moreover, is what is retained. As was seen, the gist of a conversation is all 
that usually can be recalled, whereas with music the exact melody can be 
whistled or hummed, more or less precisely, even in the most non-musical 
of situations. What could account for this? Is it that conversation is more 
directly reliant on previously sedimented structures and music more on the 
possibility of future improvisations? Could this distinction be explained by 
the apparent necessity in music of introducing the basic melody more than 
once, in accordance with the traditional AABA structure of classical 
sonatas? And, if so, is this due to the fact that musical meanings are not so 
determinate, are not so amenable to their sedimentation, and, thus, that 
their appreciation is more contingent on an anticipation of a future, rather 
than a retrieval of the past? 
To put this into perspective, let us consider the difference that exists 
between listening to a live performance and listening to a CD. Consider one 
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of the two main structures employed in jazz, the twelve bar "blues". As a 
sedimented structure, it is very determinate and very simple; furthermore 
its range of meaningful chord structures is limited a group of sixty chords 
basic to Western diatonic harmony. The possibility for improvisation and 
melodic innovation is, however, completely wide-open: everything from 
the straightforward articulation of Muddy Waters to the writhing filigree of 
Charlie Parker and John Coltrane. Though Muddy Water's intention would 
be quite clear in concert, I defy anyone to make the same claim about the 
other two. Though the introductory passages of Coltrane's "Trane-in' In" 
are digestible enough, where he goes with them is so complex that it would 
be virtually imp'ossible to understand their significance were it not for the 
fact that they take place in immediate juxtaposition to the opening 
statement; one would, perhaps, not even be in a position to identify the 
song at all without reference to the "head", and it would seem that Coltrane 
was creating a new song ex nihilo, which, in some sense, he is. Following 
the performance, all that one could seemingly say about the gist of his 
interpretation would be something along the lines of: "Could you believe 
the way he turned that phrase inside out and improvised on a locrian scale 
rather than the anticipated mixolydian. Unbelievable!" Such an 
appreciative ejaculation would hardly seem to be a very informative 
encapsulation. 
The constraints imposed on the perception of musical meaning by the ek-
stase of music in live performance are, however, not as rigid in listening to 
a CD of the same performance. One can listen more attentively to the solos 
any number of times in order to come to a fuller understanding and 
appreciation of the work by "sedimenting" the soloist's improvisational 
expressions. Such a procedure is hardly necessary in the context of a 
conversation, though. The difference would seem to be attributable to the 
fact that we have more direct access to countless sedimented meanings in 
language, while we have only sixty such sedimentations, in the form of 
chords, with which to build up an understanding of the musical meaning of 
a work. Being far more determinate, the creative expressions arising from 
conversation are not nearly as radically "free-form" as they are in jazz. 
Thus, it would seem, superficially, that conversation makes fuller use of 
past sedimentations of meaning, while music makes more use of the 
anticipation of future improvisations in the overall context of the 
meaningful situation. 
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Though it is somewhat odious to make such comparisons, it would seem 
that musical meaning, as compared with conversational meaning, more 
strongly resists its objectivation by a transcendental consciousness in that, in 
the attempt to capture music's meaning, all linguistic articulations of such 
meaning are far from satisfying. 
The Aesthetic Epiphany 
Earlier in this chapter, I outlined the possibility that every creative 
expression is occasioned by the encounter with another that is made possible 
through an act of ,self-transcendence which is at once fundamentally 
aesthetic and moral. It is this contention to which I now return in this 
concluding section. The ultimate ground for this seemingly incredible claim 
can be found in Heidegger's view on the nature of aesthetic experience 
which lies at the heart of his ontology. In common with Merleau-Ponty, the 
ultimate aim of Heidegger's philosophy is to describe the fundamental 
communion and communication existing between a subject embedded in 
the world and his engaging object, that is, the intentional structure of the 
Logos of Being, of the primordial situation which is revealed by means of 
the phenomenological reduction. Yet, while Merleau-Ponty is more 
concerned with the meaning inherent in the primordial situation, 
Heidegger's fascination is with Being. For this reason, the ultimate ground 
of his philosophy is an existential, the "being-in-the-world". Accordingly, 
"to be-in-the-world" involves a conception of the "worldhood" of the world 
which must be acknowledged. The issue of comportment towards the world, 
of allowing the "worlding of the world", is central to "dwelling in" and 
"inhabiting" the world. With the mere suggestion of comportment, then, 
we recognize that "being-in-the-world" is not strictly an ontological issue, 
but a moral one as well. 
It must be said immediately, though, that such "dwelling" or 
"inhabiting" is not to be understood in any quantitative sense such as being 
geometrically located in a space. To be is to be qualitatively situated, to "be 
there" where there is something to be done in a whole field of possibilities, 
in the openness in which we encounter another "being there" (Dasein) 
which may be resistant to our actualization of any particular potentiality. 
Thus, as I transcend my egological boundaries in my self-transcendence 
towards the world, I perceive qualitative tensions which attune me to the 
existence of the other. I become aware of the carnal resonance, the animate 
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presence to which I am inextricably, intentionally bound. Moreover, as I 
take heed of, "gather in", the other, I do not encounter a neutral thing, but 
embrace a felt significance. I recognize myself suddenly as a dialectical pole 
already engaged in conversation with another in one whole, dynamic 
intertwining. Yet, at this prelinguistic level, such conversation is Rede, or 
ontological discourse, which has not yet been made determinate as Gerede, 
what Merleau-Ponty refers to as "second-order", explicit and objective 
expression. 
Heidegger characterizes this tripartite moment of affectivity (attuned 
comportment), understanding (felt significance) and expression (Rede) as 
one unitary, thrown structure: disclosedness. And it is through this 
conception of disclosedness that he understands and explains the nature of 
creative, artistic expression. As Edwin Jones puts it: 
On Heidegger's phenomenological-ontological interpretation on 
human disclosedness, applied to the realm of aesthetic appreciation, a 
doctrine of communication emerges whereby creative expression is 
seen to be fundamental to the establishment of a mutual 
understanding on which all communication depends. The ultimate 
"meaning horizon," as I have been using the term, is furnished by a 
human being's prior understanding of its relationship to a world. 
This is the phenomenon Heidegger referred to as the worldhood of 
the world. It is such an understanding that comes to expression in 
works of art (1989, p. 128). 
In short, what the perceiving subject encounters in the aesthetic experience 
of an art work is nothing less than his existential positioning, his "being-in-
the-world" intersubjectively, meaningfully, and conversationally with 
others prior to any second-order understanding or explanation of the 
possibility of such interrelation. What the work of art ultimately reveals to 
a perceiving subject, then, is not just his "being-in-the-world", not just 
"being-there", Dasein, but "being-there-with-others", Mitsein. As such, then, 
Heidegger's ontological-aesthetic conception of creative expression 
approximates, to quite a degree, Merleau-Ponty's discussion of how the "in-
itself-for-us" requires the creative input of the self-transcendent subject in 
order to fully articulate itself. In both cases, the intersubjective field of 
communication, participation and belonging, the primordial ontological 
situation, is revealed through authentic, creative acts of expression. 
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Given his revolutionary ontology, a philosophy of "radical 
astonishment" as George Steiner calls it (1978, p. 31), Heidegger felt that it 
was crucial to break free from ordinary linguistic expressions in order to 
come to an understanding of our being that we are always familiar with, the 
being which is always presupposed in our significant dealings with our 
world. Hence, just as the creative painter must always attempt to transcend 
rigid historical-cultural genres in order to be authentically expressive, 
Heidegger recognized the need to transcend familiar, yet worn-out 
sedimentations of meaning by using them in novel ways in order to capture 
that which conventional language, by its very nature, cannot achieve. Put 
rather prosaically, Heidegger's most revolutionary contribution to the 
philosophy of language, and thus, to ontology and epistemology as well, was 
to turn objective nouns into eventful, process-based articulations more in 
keeping with the ek-stase of Being. Hence, "being" in the ontical sense, for 
example, is recast as "being-in-the-world". Through this deceptively simple 
turn of phrase, Heidegger was able to bring together and elucidate all of the 
themes central to his ontology, especially the comportment of the "life-
body" in specifically eliciting significant phenomena and revealing "the 
worlding of the world" in general. (The resemblance to Merleau-Ponty's 
conception of the attunement of the engaged, responsive body-subject in the 
articulation of the invitational, disclosing other in the primordial situation 
should be abundantly evident.) 
No one knows the inter-relation of attuned comportment, the perception 
and understanding of significance in the other, and the authentic, creative 
expression of that relation better than the poet. In Poetry, Language, 
Thought, one of Heidegger's central claims is that creativity is predicated on 
a "willingness to stop, listen, hear, remember, and respond to the call from 
Being" (1971, p. xv). What this means is that, in keeping with his 
exhortation to "let beings be", the perceiving subject must let the other 
presence itself according to its own style, and if this is to be expressed in 
language, that such language must be appropriate to the nature of the thing 
as it is situationally encountered. All speech that is appropriate in this sense 
is, for Heidegger, poetic; hence even pure prose is as poetic as any poetry. As 
he states it: "The voice of thought must be poetic because poetry is the saying 
of truth, the saying of the unconcealedness of beings (1971, p. 74), and it bids 
all that is - world and things, earth and sky, divinities and mortals - to come, 
90 
gathering into the simple onefold of their intimate belonging together" 
(1971, P.  206). 
One of the most compelling arguments for accepting that the Logos of the 
world revealed in the primordial situation is not solely ontological and 
epistemological, but moral and aesthetic as well, is provided in George 
Steiner's superb work, Real Presences (1989). Following Heidegger, he takes 
pains to explain that ethics and aesthetics are not to be understood in any 
traditional sense as normative systems which rank values according to 
some abstract conception of right/wrong, good/bad; in other words, that is, 
certain actions are more or less obligatory or certain objects more or less 
beautiful, respectively, but the authentic attitude towards the world, towards 
the "real presence", is also one of trust and answerability. As I have put it, 
self-transcendence, the act of opening to the world, embraces this very 
position: in the existential profferment of an invitation to communion, 
there is a trust on the part of the embodied self that the engaging other is 
there and that, accordingly, through the very act of transcendence, the self 
becomes answerable to that presence. 
That his theory meshes quite nicely with my own conception of 
primordial contact as an aesthetically grounded communicative 
communion between invitational and responsive selves and beings-in-the-
world may be given credence by his central contention that: 
...any coherent understanding of what language is and how language 
performs... any coherent account of the capacity of human speech to 
communicate meaning and feeling is, in the final analysis, 
underwritten by the assumption of God's [Nature's, Being's] presence. 
I will put forward the argument that the experience of aesthetic 
meaning in particular, that of literature, of the arts, of musical form, 
infers the necessary possibility of this "real presence" (1989, p.3). 
As he views it, the traditional obsession that philosophy has had with the 
dubitability of the existence of others, or of Nature, is a non-issue. The 
existence of others, including works of art, is, therefore, undeniable, yet 
involves, in a very real sense, a leap of faith: 
...[a] wager on the meaning of meaning, on the potential of insight 
and response when one human voice addresses another, when we 
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come face to face with the text and work of art or music, which is to 
say when we encounter the other in its condition of freedom, is a 
wager on transcendence (1989, p.4). 
Clearly, Steiner agrees with Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's 
characterization of the communion with others made possible through the 
reduction to the prepersonal realm of primordial contact. Yet his view is 
perhaps even more revolutionary for he claims that, not only is it possible 
to argue that an aesthetic approach to the world is ontologically basic, but 
that Being, the 'real presence', exists palpably in the aesthetic experience of 
art and music. As he puts it in the context of music in particular (1989, p.6): 
I believe the matter of music to be central to that of the meanings of 
man, of man's access to or abstention from metaphysical experience. 
Our capacities to compose and respond to musical form and sense 
directly implicate the mystery of the human condition. To ask 'what 
is music?' may well be one way of asking 'what is man?'. 
The mysterious intensity of the response to certain original, not merely 
"novel", "interesting" or, most pejoratively, "quaint", works of art suggests 
that an audience experiences a somatic reaction which does approximate the 
encounter with responsive interlocutors. One need only think of the public 
outrage provoked by the works of Picasso, Genet, and Nabokov upon their 
initial releases. There were riots in the streets of Paris when Stravinsky's 
Rite of Spring was first performed as a ballet in 1913. Though tame by today's 
standards, Lady Chatterly's Lover was considered unconscionable smut, and 
Mozart was pilloried for using descending chromatic octaves which was 
deemed chaotic and in gross violation of musical propriety. 
What might account for these reactions? As I have been arguing 
throughout, in the epiphanous moment in which an invitation is proffered 
and accepted - in which engaging other and embodied self achieve 
communion and initiate conversation - an improvisatory, aesthetically 
creative exchange is set into motion. Our first authentic encounter with 
Hamlet should be disturbing and epiphanous because we are, through a 
process of identification with Hamlet, staring in the face of the stark truth 
about ourselves and our relation to the world: the primordial situation. 
This encounter with the sublime at the moment of disclosedness is, 
paradoxically, both terrifying and reassuring in that we are made aware of an 
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onercius answer-ability to the other, but comforted by its carnal, embracing 
resonance. We are not alone, but we must act, must respond; as a hand is 
extended, so too, is a gauntlet. This moment of peak emotional experience is 
the ultimate trial of encounter, a trial in the sense both of a test and of an 
ordeal. 
The epiphany is the primal opening wherein we recognize that, yes, there 
is a dagger before us, that there is something and not nothing. We have 
unintentionally been cast into the world of Dasein and Mitsein, of felt 
significance. Intense empathetic identification crystallizes the urgent need 
for appropriate comportMent; we must listen, be at-tuned to the other; we 
must engage, and the conversation begins that reveals the ek-stase of time as 
we attempt and achieve response-ability. There is a lightning flash, an ecart; 
the presence emerges and a world begins to form around us. Gestalts arise 
• and perspective is born as we gently move into an open-ended, dynamic, 
dialectical exchange. David Michael Levin (1988, p. 386) uses the metaphor 
of a thunderbolt to capture the epiphany, the moment of disclosure: 
The thunderbolt, symbol of the Logos, of Phusis and the flashing 
glance of Being, ...[may be] thought as the symbolic, tropological 
presence of the ontological difference. The decisiveness of the 
thunderbolt, the character of the descission it makes, and makes 
visible, in the nightsky, is a 'repetition' by nature which gathers our 
dreambodyvision into a recollection of the ontological difference - 
that descission, that rending of the tissue, the flesh of the field, which 
takes place wherever there is an event of vision. The bolt bursts into 
presence, rends, tears, tears open, divides, differentiates, amplifies 
difference. Thus, the ontological difference is made visible in the field 
of our vision as that primordial descission, or opening in the matrix 
of Being, through which a figure-ground structuration comes into 
Being. The figure-ground, centre-periphery, focus-diffusion 
differentiation is the most primordial difference, the most primordial 
inscription and layout that the ontological difference makes in the 
field of our vision. In the 'instant' in which this most primordial 
process of differentiation takes place, an ek-static Gestaltung comes 
into being... 
What the "epiphanous moment", or as Heidegger calls it, "disclosedness", 
reveals is that, with the splitting off, the ecart, of the other as it becomes a 
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"real presence" to the self-transcendent subject, there occurs a tripartite 
moment of felt significance, attuned comportment and ontological 
discourse (creative expression) which suddenly takes on a temporal, ek-static 
dimension. At no time is the other ever an object. It cannot be felt or 
responsibly engaged except as a dialectical interlocutor, an equal participant 
in the process of improvisationally determining, sedimenting the meaning 
of ephemeral, situational Gestalts. 
The requirement for authentic articulation, and thus for improvisatory 
conduct, in each and every situation before it resolves to the horizon, 
suggests that the moment of felt significance, attuned comportment and 
creative expression occurring at the epiphanous moment has an aesthetic 
dimension. Having already discussed this characterization of the primordial 
situation primarily in ontological terms, I would like to return to Steiner's 
theory of art in order to indicate just how thoroughly aesthetic the entire 
process of disclosedness is. 
Steiner inveighs against the simplistic, journalistic, often sensationalistic, 
tendencies of art criticism. He condemns art critics who produce self-
involved, self-conscious commentaries upon commentaries while blithely 
and systematically ignoring the potent source of a masterpiece's meaning 
and intent: the truth and answerability attending sublime, primordial 
contact. Less forgivable, perhaps, is that most of us are inclined to read 
superficial, second-order interpretations instead of directly experiencing 
great works themselves; and in so doing, we distance ourselves from artistic 
revelation. As he states it: 
We flinch from the immediate pressures of mystery in poetic, in 
aesthetic acts of creation as we do from the realization of our 
diminished humanity, of all that is literally bestial in the 
murderousness and gadgetry of this age. The secondary is our 
narcotic. Like sleepwalkers, we are guarded by the numbing drone of 
the journalistic, of the theoretical, from the often harsh, imperious 
radiance of sheer presence. Beauty can, indeed, be 'terribly born', as 
Yeats says. The cry of those Angels in Rilke's Duino Elegies can 
embarrass intolerably. The news brought by annunciations not only 
stays new; it can be unendurable in its ambiguity. So we slide past the 
singing rpcks, their songs stifled, or made artifice, by secular gloss and 
critique. I sense that we shall Snot come home to the facts of our 
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unhousedness... if we do not redefine, if we do not re-experience, the 
life of meaning in the text, in music, in art. We must come to 
recognize, and the stress is on re-cognition, a meaningfulness which 
is that of a freedom of giving and of reception beyond the constraints 
of immanence (1989, pp. 49-50). 
As I interpret Steiner, the failure of art critics, especially literary critics, is 
that they belittle or, at least, neglect to countenance the centrality of 
immediate, personal contact with art in favour of establishing aesthetic 
norms/genres. As a consequence, the aesthetic experience tends to be 
marginalized by theoreticians whose tacit, yet often centrally motivating, 
assumption is that a work is to be categorized rather than perceived in its 
imperious "unity, harmony, and radiance", to use the words of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. Indeed, the more intent a critic is on mounting a consistent theory, 
the less attentive he will be to the artist's revelatory gift; with the end result 
that the felt significance of the work is de-fused, de-activated. 
What, then, is essential to art and subjective aesthetic experience, which 
critical commentary and interpretation only succeed in distorting and 
negating, according to Steiner? First, echoing Heidegger's and Merleau-
Ponty's ontology, is the amazing "fact" that another, be it an existent or a 
work of art, exists at all and is luminously responsive. The epiphany reveals 
not only a self destined to the world, but beings-in-the-world, the "worlding 
of the world"; this is what great art achieves. Secondly, Steiner reasons that 
just as the encounter with Being instills amazement, wonder and awe at the 
fact that myriad beings exist at all when they could just as easily not exist 
and that they present themselves according to their individual modes of 
expression - which in itself calls for specific forms of ontological discourse 
and poetic articulation appropriate to each and every situational encounter - 
so, too, do great works of art. As he puts it: 
The experiencing of created form is a meeting between freedoms. The 
famous question at the roots of metaphysics is: "why should there not 
be nothing?". This very same question underlies any grasp of poetics 
and of art. The poem, the sonata, the painting, could very well not be. 
Except in the trivial, contingent perspective of the commis sion, of 
material need, of psychic coercion, the aesthetic phenomenon, the 
shaping act, is at all times and in all places at liberty not to come into 
being (1989, p.152). 
95 
To artificially force-fit a truly original artwork into an abstract category in 
order to maintain a consistent theoretical position is both deceitful and, in 
some sense, unjust. As wonder is predicated on the fact that an existent 
could just as well not exist as exist (the ontological difference), the same 
attitude should apply to great works of art. Eliot's Four Quartets, for 
example, was not created to conform with pre-established poetic 
conventions or genres. What so immediately overwhelms us, what makes 
it sublime, is not just its originality, but that, by its very originality and 
individuality, it thwarts its easy codification within a pre-conceived, 
theoretical, historical continuum. Its production cannot have been 
predicted, its realization anticipated. And because it came from nowhere, 
out of the blue, so to speak, for this reason it should be easy to conclude that 
it could just as well not exist as exist. Therein lies a great deal of its 
tremendous affective power. In reading the Four Quartets, what we 
recognize is the speaking of truth as it was revealed to Eliot when it was 
revealed by a muse, by Being, at the instant of the ecart, the epiphany. 
• What poetry (and all other art forms) does, usually without intention, is 
transcend boundaries and traditions, not reinforce them. It is rare to find an 
artist such as Tristan Tzara, who once said "It is time to smash centuries of 
Baroque subtlety". Great works should be received according to their own 
merit and not interpreted within artificial psycho-historical parameters. It is 
fascinating to speculate on how, to take the example of "jazz" (I put this in 
parentheses as "jazz" should be understood as an artificial, all-encompassing 
term for an extremely diverse group of musical styles), ragtime evolved into 
dixieland, then into swing, then into bebop, and then resolved into "cool" 
versus "hot" jazz; yet one should never be so presumptuous as to identify a 
seminal, definitive moment at which one resolved into the other. 
Furthermore, they all still exist simultaneously in the here and now. There 
is here, then, an apposite analogy with ecology: variations occur through 
time without intentional direction; by themselves, seamlessly, "mutations" 
take place that could just as easily not have taken place as they did. Herein 
lies the marvel, the ontological difference. As Edwin Jones puts it explicitly 
with reference to art: "Creative expression institutes a new significance and 
establishes a new meaning horizon whose own structure provides the norm 
for its interpretation" (1989, p.140). 
Thirdly, Steiner argues that the reception and ingestion of a work's 
meaning, the artist's communicative intention, by an audience involves 
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trust. As he captures it in the following passage, there is a covenant of 
response and answer-ability between artist and audience that is at once 
perceptual, cognitive, affective and spiritual: 
Face to face with the presence of offered meaning which we call a text 
(or a painting or a symphony), we seek to hear its language. As we 
would that of the elect stranger coming towards us. There is in this 
endeavour, as deconstruction would immediately point out, an 
ultimately unprovable hope and presupposition of sense, a 
presumption that intelligibility is conceivable and, indeed, realizable. 
Such a presupposition is always susceptible of refutation. The 
presence before us may be that of a mute (Beckett edges us towards 
that grim jest), of a madman uttering gibberish or, more disturbingly, 
of an intensely communicative persona whose idiom - linguistic, 
stylistic, hermetically-grounded - we simply cannot grasp. There are 
literary, artistic, musical works which remain closed or only 
superficially accessible to even the most welcoming of perceptions. In 
short, the movement towards reception and apprehension does 
embody an initial, fundamental act of trust. It entails the risk of 
disappointment or worse. As we shall note, the guest may turn 
despotic or venomous. But without the gamble on welcome, no door 
can be opened when freedom knocks (1989, p. 156). 
What makes this ethical moment even more complex and intense is that 
the meeting is ambiguous because it is so radically openended. For the 
achievement of communion and communication, one must make a 
creative, aesthetic leap of faith in the absence of strict moral guidelines for 
appropriate behaviour. Following Heidegger, Levin captures this moment 
of seeming existential crisis in the following manner: 
When we understand, as he [Heidegger] says, 'the present and the 
future are not the object of a science but [the product] of construction 
or action', then we see that we have no viable alternative but to take 
responsibility for our corner, our situation, despite its ambiguity, 
despite its paradox; and that we must make our decisions, make our 
commitments, take our stands, despite the risks and the anxieties - 
equally moral and epistemological - which they cause in us. Of course, 
we should pay attention to these anxieties, for they can keep us 
honest, vigilant, tolerant of difference, open-minded (1988, p.33). 
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A theoretical aesthetician who attempts to mount consistent, scientific, 
absolute aesthetic categories might find Steiner's and Levin's 
hermeneutically-grounded theories of art wholly unsatisfactory, if not 
absurd or chimerical. It would simply be difficult for him to countenance 
that aesthetic experience includes felt significance, attuned comportment 
and creative communication at the level of prepersonal, precognitive 
ontological engagement in concrete perceptual situations. He would 
steadfastly refuse to accept that the meaning Of a work is never wholly 
revealed, but is given in ephiphanous moments of disclosure when a 
glimpse of the real presence in an -ek-static Gestalt rends the darkness of 
meaninglessness like a lightning bolt. With the reduction to the perceptual 
level of primordial contact, we are made aware that situations are always 
openended, and that any creative articulation of that experience should be 
tempered by the recognition of the inexhaustibility of the encounter; hence 
the need for trust in the real presence or the meaning of the work of art 
existing right there, before us. The very evanescence of the dynamic 
moment of revelation is what calls for appropriate improvisatory aesthetic 
and moral conduct: 
We advance step by step towards a delineation of the given space; our 
perceptions are more and more justly incident to the circumference of 
possible intent and meaning. The congruence is never complete. It is 
never uniform with its object. If it was, the act of reception would be 
wholly equivalent to that of original enunciation. Our guest would 
have nothing to bring us. But exactly as in differential calculus, the 
open-endedness of the philological method does not annul its rigour 
or revelatory potential. On the contrary. It is the very fact that 
circumscription and determination are only partial, that they remain 
mobile, self-correcting, which confirms both the autonomy of the 
meaningful presence in the poetic and the integrity of our reception. I 
have said before: a good reading falls short of the text or art object by a 
distance, by a Perimeter of inadequacy which are [sic] themselves 
luminous as is the corona around the darkened sun. The falling-short 
is a guarantor of the experienced 'otherness' - the freedom to be or not 
to be, to enter into or abstain from a commerce of spirit with us - in 
the poem, the painting, the piece of music (Steiner, 1989, p.  175). 
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Positivistic scientific accounts of aesthetic experience are deficient for a 
number of reasons. First; is that the perceiving subject invests his very being 
in his interpretation of an art work, commits himself to responsibly 
acknowledging the real presence in the full awareness that his trust in the 
other's being there is contingent, at risk of rejection. He does not assume the 
stance of a disinterested, academic vivisector neutrally affixing predicates to 
an alien object; instead, he engages a vibrant, carnal interlocutor. His leap of 
faith through his act of self-transcendence is not an instance of decorum, but 
of profound moral commitment. 
Secondly, as Steiner (1989, p. 36) puts it: 
The sciences... proceed by research. In science, work of the very first 
order can be collective and cumulative. Scientific papers do bring new 
recognitions and methods in a demonstrable or refutable sense. In the 
laboratory, in the mathematical seminar, central techniques of 
perception and manipulation can be taught. Not one of these three 
configurations is genuinely applicable to aesthetic study and 
pronouncement, except at the most formal, linguistic-textual level. 
The positing of an opinion about a painter, poet or composer is not a 
falsifiable proceeding. 
This, however, is not to suggest that aesthetic experience is wholly relative, 
and subjective and, therefore, that there can be no agreement concerning the 
substance of interpretations and value-judgments. With respect to the 
argument that the epiphany may plausibly have an essential, universal 
character which may be revealed under artificial testing conditions in the 
laboratory, Levin has this to say: 
Arthur Deikman, a prominent experimentalist, has recently reported 
some noteworthy psychological experiments with 'subjects' who are 
doing traditional Buddhist meditation. It was discovered that, when 
these 'subjects' were queried about their visual experience with a blue 
vase they were asked to focus on, they noted, in particular, the 
following significant shifts: 
(1) increased vividness, brightness, and richness in the colour; 
(2) a sense of its 'aliveness' (not felt to be incompatible with the 
fact that the thing would certainly not be classified among 
living beings); 
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(3) increased sense of realness and a visible deepening of the 
thing's significance; 
(4) a felt decrease in the distance, or difference, between it and 
them; 
(5) a more explicitly affective organization of their perceptual 
response. 
And Deikman singles out three factors which he believes to 
contribute to this perceptual shift: first, a heightened, more 
appreciative attention to the sensuous, aesthetic element of the 
perceptual situation; second, the cessation of logically controlled, 
analytic, and abstract processes - 6f thought; and third, an attitude he 
characterizes as 'receptivity to stimuli' (openness instead of 
defensiveness or suspiciousness). There are, of course, other factors as 
well. But it is surely significant that these factors, at least, have 
received confirmation in controlled experimental conditions (1988, 
p.400). 
Thirdly, to assume that aesthetic interpretation can be cumulative and 
absolute is, in effect, to assume that commentary upon commentary, the 
tertiary reading of secondary interpretations is valid; yet, as we have seen, 
such an approach can only further distance us from the source of meaning 
and intention that lies at the heart of the aesthetic experience of a 
masterpiece: contact with the real presence. 
The Real Presence and Transpersonal Ecology 
Hermeneutically retrieving Chapter One, I think that it is possible to 
argue that transpersonal ecology and the aesthetically-grounded nature of 
the primordial situation have much in common. What grounds Naess' 
statement of Ecosophy T, and, by extension, Fox's Transpersonal Ecology, is 
that ontological belonging is predicated on attempting the 
phenomenological reduction, on asking progressively deeper questions 
about the relation of selves and beings-in-the-world, conceived as processes, 
so that fundamental assumptions concerning that relation are revealed. 
What this chapter has attempted to elucidate is that - and this is where Fox 
and I part company - whereas he characterizes the aesthetic valuation of 
Nature as an instance of extrinsic, utilitarian valuation (1990, pp. 154-160), I 
regard the appreciation of Nature as fundamentally aesthetic. Moreover, 
insofar as moments of epiphanous disclosure are aesthetic in that.creative 
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expression, along with felt significance and attuned comportment, is 
ontologically basic to the revelation of the Logos of primordial contact, 
communion and communication, it is imperative to view aesthetic wonder 
as the handmaiden of appropriate ecocentric behaviour, worldly 
comportment. Aesthetic engagement, then, is a matter of prepersonal, 
perceptual contact and not of its second-order codification as an instance of 
either intrinsic or instrumental valuation. 
I believe that there are a number of reasons for seeing an analogy between 
transpersonal ecology and an aesthetic phenomenology of the Logos of 
primordial communion and conversation. First, the whole chapter has 
reasoned that selves and beings-in-the-world are never polarized as subject 
and object as rationalism and empiricism would have it. To the degree that 
a self accepts an existential invitation to commune and converse with 
another existent, a trust in and answerability to the other is creatively 
improvised and concretized. At no time, then, do "subject" and "object" 
encounter each other in any pre-ordained fashion as discrete entities in a 
neutral, value-free realm. By contrast, the whole process of self-
transcendence is clearly , a movement away from any narrow, atomistic, or 
particle-like conception of self. 
Secondly, the nature of the epiphany, the ecart, that sets the process of ek-
stase into motion as a dynamic, dialectical exchange between selves and 
beings-in-the-world would seem to be central to the process of Self-
realization! as I interpret the term. Both the phenomenological reduction to 
the prepersonal, perceptual primordial situation and Self-identification! 
very clearly contain a leap of faith in beings' being there, in the possibility of 
identification with others, which effectively renders inconsequential the 
necessity of ontologically proving the existence of other beings and of 
ethically establishing prescriptive norms of behaviour. Both activities are 
superfluous since the other is undeniably there as a trusting conversational 
partner, a joint participant in the improvisation and sedimentation of the 
meaning of the contextual encounter. 
Thirdly, both Self-realization! and attuned comportment, ecocentric care 
and concern, take place in jointly participatory situations of inter-relation 
that are acknowledged to be fully openended and inexhaustible. Through 
the ek-stase of temporal Gestalts, the self continually transcends egoic, 
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biographic boundaries in an ever-expanding helix of wonder and 
astonishment at the amazing fact that one is in the world with other selves. 
In conclusion, both philosophical approaches characterize our being-in-
the-world as a condition of radical freedom to engage and communicate 
with other beings with an ecocentrically appropriate attitude of care and 
concern, "steadfast friendliness". What this chapter has attempted to 
articulate is that, by the grace of the flesh, we enjoy an incarnate relationship 
with the resonant being and meaning of others at all times in concrete 
contexts. Situationally, we are always presented with existential invitations 
to commune and converse. Though encounters with the sublime, the real 
presence, are seemingly rare, moments of disclosedness, revelation, are 
always at hand as long as our "steadfast friendliness" is maintained and we 
accept the proffered invitation, thereby reaping the experiential reward, the 
existential gift. As long as we maintain a trust in, and answer-ability to, 
other beings, and nurture the openended capacity for care and concern, the 
worldly comportment that is made possible through Self-realization!, we 
may be assured of communion with our conversational partner. 
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3 ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS 
Do We Need an Aesthetics to Appreciate Nature? 
In the quest for a seemingly elusive metaphysical alternative to dualism, 
many environmental philosophers, especially Ronald Hepburn, Allen 
Carlson and Yrjo Sepanmaa, have recently turned to the philosophies of art 
and beauty to see if aesthetic contact with nature might generate appropriate 
environmental concern. A central feature of most of the current exploration 
of nature aesthetics is a reconsideration of the much neglected field of 
natural or environmental aesthetics and how its investigation might yield 
moral results. The central difficulty which is identified by most current 
authors is that the starting point must be a critical examination of the 
distinction between artistic beauty and natural beauty. This forms the basis 
for the examination of certain fundamental questions such as: Is natural 
beauty identical to artistic beauty, even similar? Should natural beauty be 
examined within its own paradigm or by reference to art, if the first question 
resolves into the negative? Should natural science and ecology provide the 
foundations for a novel nature aesthetics? Where do we draw the line 
between art, nature, environment, beauty and aesthetics? Is it possible, or 
desirable, to seek objective, rigorous arguments which may supply the 
groundwork for the realization of a consistent, rational, exhaustive 
environmental aesthetics? In reference to the last, Salim Kemal and Ivan 
Gaskell respond by issuing a caveat (1995, p. 3): 
(The) characteristics of the conception of landscape, natural beauty, 
and nature, and the difficulties they suggest in the way of making 
clear conceptual distinctions, undermine any attempt to produce an 
hierarchy of concepts that will constitute a definitive foundationalist 
grasp of their complex interaction. Nature is not the most 
fundamental concept of natural beauty or landscape, and the attempt 
to resolve issues about the experience of natural beauty by deriving its 
vocabulary from such concepts is likely to fail. Better then to deal with 
natural beauty by showing the cluster of concepts that make up the 
parameters of our present understanding, without worrying about the 
metaphysical certainties that a determinate foundationalist schema 
promises. 
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Two authors in particular, T.J. Diffey and Ronald Hepburn, eschew 
metaphysics in order to reach a looser, more everyday understanding of 
natural beauty than that which is required by a rigorously logical theory of 
environmental aesthetics. The basis of Diffey's paper, "Natural Beauty 
without Metaphysics" is that, in a general inquiry into natural beauty, we 
should not unduly stress the importance of the traditional philosophy of 
beauty as its fundamental questions such as "whether beauty is a real 
quality, or whether judgments of beauty are subjective or objective" (1995, p. 
43) may needlessly limit its scope. With reference to the second component 
of the question, Diffey argues that there is such a contemporary obsession 
with relativism/subjectivism that all attempts to argue for some public 
criteria for understanding and characterizing natural beauty are effectively 
debarred from consideration. What he finds particularly deflating about the 
subjectivist/relativist position is that, in its blithe dismissal of more 
objective responses to the question of "What is beauty?", it assumes an 
arrogant philosophical superiority. He maintains that (1995, p. 44): 
The doctrine that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder appears 
invincible because in aesthetics above all there seems to be the least 
space for error; or to put it the other way around, in matters of taste 
what seems to be the case must be the case, for that is what taste is. If 
everyone believes that what is beautiful is what pleases him or her, 
what possible grounds could there be for denying that if it pleases 
then it is beautiful? 
Yet, on the other hand, he criticizes traditional philosophical responses 
to the question of "What is beauty?" for being unnecessarily constrained by 
only three possible lines of interpretation: "beauty as the object of biological 
or sexual interest; beauty as disinterested appreciation of a rational mind; 
and an idealist rating of art above beauty in importance" (1995, p.47). Clearly, 
these are of very little use in the discussion of the appreciation of natural 
beauty: the first, patently, has no pertinence; the third has already rejected 
the possibility of any profound or informed comparisons between artistic 
beauty and natural beauty; and the second is just too biased in favour of 
objective contemplation at the expense of subjective appreciation to be 
wholly convincing. 
So how can we make a case for natural beauty? Though Diffey, 
admittedly, does not want to offer any explicit, definitive answers, his 
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conclusion is, nonetheless, weak. He reasons that, since nature is such an 
amorphous concept, the only way to speak of natural beauty is by identifying 
certain features of nature, such as landscapes, views or prospects which have 
already been recognized aesthetically and, thereby, he shifts the discussion 
away from natural beauty to natural aesthetics. Yet he leaves the discussion 
of natural aesthetics at that and his final word is unfortunately not very 
enlightening: "To ask if a prospect is beautiful, or of any aesthetic interest, is 
as odd as asking whether murder or lying are wrong" (1995, p. 52). 
In inverse proportion to the shallowness of penetration into the 
question of natural beauty contained in Diffey's essay is the profundity of 
Ronald Hepburn's ruminations. In particular, the central theme of 
Hepburn's thought bemoans the shift away from the aesthetic appreciation 
of nature and the conflation of the aesthetic and the artistic in the twentieth-
century. He suggests that the neglect of natural beauty in aesthetic 
investigation is so strong that "aesthetics is even defined by some mid-
century writers as 'the philosophy of art', 'the philosophy of criticism', the 
analysis of the language and concepts used in describing and appraising art 
objects" (1984, p. 9). But, although he is critical of this narrowing in the field 
of aesthetics, he offers some reasons for why it has occurred, why aesthetic 
concern with natural objects is "rather a rare phenomenon" (1984, p.9). 
Primarily, he attacks the reductionistic/mechanistic view of nature 
promulgated by objective reason that has polarized humans and non-
humans. On a societal level, he reasons, dualism has the effect of belittling 
the role of natural beauty as a moral educator and of alienating humans 
from a putatively unintelligible, absurd world. And on a cultural level, 
dualism creates a general dissatisfaction with, and even repugnance 
towards, natural objects, with the result that the traditional imitation and 
representation of natural objects stemming originally from Aristotle is no 
longer considered valuable; since the world is conceptually dead, essentially 
mute, contemporary artists must embrace some form of expressionism, 
must create their own objects to express their inner life. 
Identifying objective reason as the source of the neglect of natural beauty 
is not Hepburn's central task. Rather, he argues that this neglect has very 
negative consequences; for in accepting so limited a scope, aesthetics ignores 
an "important and richly complex set of relevant data" (1984, p. 11) and 
precludes.a whole range of possible experiences of the world. He concludes, 
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therefore, that a systematic identification, description and evaluation of 
natural objects must accompany any discussion of art objects if aesthetics is 
to generate any consistent, generalized norms of aesthetic appreciation. 
In his book, The Beauty of Environment (1986), Yrjo Sepanmaa 
rigorously attempts Hepburn's project. His intention is to convince the 
reader of the moral importance of protecting non-human environments by 
appealing to their aesthetic sensibilities. He makes it clear that the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature must operate within an aesthetic paradigm that is 
different in kind from art aesthetics; consequently, his arguments grow 
more out of the philosophy of beauty than the philosophy of art. TO 
understand his conclusion, however, one must first examine the detailed 
distinctions that he draws between art objects and natural objects. 
The primary difference that Sepanmaa outlines is that the art object is 
intentionally created by an artist as an artifact. The production of the work, 
however, is not just its physical formation - "animals and machines are also 
capable of that" (1986, p. 56) - but the result of decisions made. A work of art, 
then, is purposefully conceived to afford aesthetic pleasure and its every 
feature may be viewed as having potential aesthetic interest. A natural 
object, however, merely exists; it has not been created to serve any human 
aesthetic end. Furthermore, art objects are created and received within a 
tradition of artistic conventions, while natural objects have no such status. 
Consequently, art objects, unlike natural objects, can be judged to be either 
successful or unsuccessful, good or bad, to the degree that they realize the 
creator's intentions. It would seem, then, that art and nature require to be 
examined within two distinct aesthetic paradigms. In the case of the former, 
the artist's intention, the artifact and the audience's reception of the work 
are all relevant in an estimation of the work's aesthetic value; yet, in the 
case of the latter, only the natural object and the perceiver's ability to discern 
or disclose aesthetic qualities in the object have any aesthetic significance. In 
the absence of an artist, however, it is debatable whether the natural object 
can be judged aesthetically, and, hence, interpreted within an artistic 
aesthetic paradigm. 
Carlson and Positive Aesthetics 
Allen Carlson (1984), too, believes that although nature has aesthetic 
value, it is not artistic value, and should be evaluated within its own 
106 
aesthetic paradigm. His justification for this is a distinction he makes 
between positive aesthetics and negative or critical aesthetics. He maintains 
that, since an art object is intentionally created, and therefore every feature 
may be interpreted and evaluated, it is permissible to judge such an object as 
aesthetically good or bad. And since negative aesthetic judgments are 
possible, it is clear that art should be evaluated within the negative or 
critical aesthetic paradigm. Natural objects, however, are not intentionally 
created and, therefore, cannot be deemed to be aesthetically bad. Indeed, as 
Carlson argues, all virgin nature, unaffected by humans, is essentially 
beautiful and thus can have only positive aesthetic value. Consequently, in 
Carlson's view, to attempt to apply negative aesthetic judgments to natural 
objects is a futile task. Nature must be evaluated within its own unique, 
non-artistic, positive aesthetic paradigm. 
Though initially Carlson's justification for his claim that all virgin 
nature is beautiful echoes Hepburn's positive estimation of nature as the 
norm of aesthetic inquiry, his position on positive aesthetics is far more 
philosophically rigorous. His first defence of positive aesthetics is a response 
to the charges that 1) even if the positive aesthetics position is true insofar as 
all virgin nature is beautiful, the appreciation of the natural world may not 
be aesthetic; and 2) if only positive aesthetic judgments are permissible 
(negative judgments being impossible) there is really no aesthetic judgment 
being made, and, hence, no aesthetic appreciation of nature. Carlson 
counters these criticisms on two fronts. First, he argues (1984, p. 13) that 
even if one grants that, given the impossibility of having negative aesthetic 
judgments, it is not permissible to speak of one's positive judgement as 
aesthetic, it does not follow that one's appreciation of nature is not aesthetic. 
Second, he reasons (1984, pp. 13-14) that although negative aesthetic 
judgments are impossible and only positive aesthetic judgments are 
permissible, it is wrong to assume, in the absence of a choice, that there is no 
aesthetic judgment. For if it is granted that all virgin nature is beautiful, and 
that it is aesthetically good, it is not so much the case that negative 
judgments are impossible, but that they could never be justifiably attached 
to what is always beautiful. To claim, for example, that the Victoria Falls are 
inconsequential - a negative judgment - would certainly have no purchase 
by anyone's standards. Hence, in principle, negative aesthetic jud_gments are 
possible, but their application to actual virgin nature would not be. Again, 
then, it would seem that the contention that the appreciation of nature is 
aesthetic is not defeated. 
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Having shown that our appreciation of nature is indeed aesthetic, but 
perhaps neither positive or negative, Carlson presents another justification 
of a positive aesthetics. His starting-point is the notion of the sublime in 
nature, stemming from Burke and Kant, according to which nature cannot 
have an author and has no design, and its threatening, uncontrollable 
otherness forces a positive appreciation that manifests itself as "amazement, 
wonder or awe" (1984, p. 14). Insofar as nature, then, is both "alien" in that it 
is beyond our control, and "obscure" in that it is beyond complete human 
understanding, negative aesthetic criticism of it would appear to be 
"pointless and presumptive". For, as Carlson indicates (1984, pp. 15-16), to 
whom would one appeal to alter the natural setting in order to augment its 
aesthetic yield? Moreover, in our considerable ignorance of the forces of 
nature, what grounds could we have for assuming that nature could be 
aesthetically better and, hence, that negative aesthetic judgments would be 
justifiable? Clearly, if the concept of the sublime is accepted, one is forced to 
conclude that, in the absence of an artist, it makes no sense to attempt a 
negative aesthetic evaluation of nature; nature must be seen positively, as 
well as aesthetically. 
As forcefully as Carlson argues for the acceptance of nature's being 
aesthetically appreciated solely in a positive manner, there are, however, 
still arguments that he does not address. First, it is possible to ask what he 
means by "virgin" nature. Surely any environment, merely in being 
identified as "environment" and thus assumed under a concept is under 
human control and is not, therefore, untouched or virgin. Though this may 
seem a trivial point, it may not be if one considers Carlson's ultimate aim: 
the establishment of appropriate moral concern for nature and the 
protection of wilderness by means of an appeal to the possibility of its 
positive aesthetic appreciation. For Carlson's aim to be realized his 
argument must effectively demonstrate that virgin nature can only be 
positively evaluated, and this entails proof of a human inability to control 
nature. He attempts this through the notion of the sublime, which is 
appropriate in that the notion of the sublime hinges on nature being 
foreign, its threatening otherness filling the perceiver with awe and wonder. 
Yet, as Yi-Fu Tuan (1974, p. 112) sees it, the very bracketing of "virgin 
nature", or as he calls it, "wilderness", is to devoid it of "awe" and "threat" 
because the very conceptualization of wilderness as an object (even of a 
sublime nature) distances it and puts it under our control. And as long as it 
is under our control, by Carlson's own characterization, nature can be 
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judged to be aesthetically good or bad, can be examined within the 
critical/negative aesthetic paradigm. Hence Carlson's insistence on a 
separate positive aesthetic paradigm for nature would appear to be 
questionable. 
Furthermore, would the possibility of evaluating nature within the 
critical/negative artistic aesthetic paradigm hinder the realization of 
Carlson's intention? Does it really matter aesthetically whether or not 
nature is virgin or disturbed, or even merely conceptualized, by humans? 
Since Carlson establishes the aesthetic value of nature by appeal to it always 
being beautiful and, conversely, being ugly to the degree that it is disturbed 
by humans, it certainly does matter. What if, in the case of a burnt forest, it 
is not known whether the cause of the fire was anthropogenic or natural in 
origin? According to Carlson, a burnt forest, if part of a natural process, such 
as ecological succession, has positive aesthetic qualities due to that fact, but 
would lack them if the burning had occurred due to human activity. If one 
were not aware of the fact that the fire was due to human agency, one might 
perhaps appreciate the burning in the same way one would appreciate a 
dissonant chord in music, as something which provides contrast and 
anticipates resolution - something which might even increase one's 
positive appreciation. But knowing that the fire was anthropogenic in origin 
should not really impair the anticipation of rebirth and rejuvenation. Only 
knowledge that the woodland was being cleared for a development would 
preclude aesthetic valuation, surely? Furthermore, what if the fire was not 
intentional, but the result of carelessness - would this make positive 
evaluation impossible? And finally, does not the ranking of human-
disturbed areas and wilderness implicitly suggest that negative aesthetic 
criticism, though banished from considerations of virgin nature, is still 
pertinent to the broader field of environmental aesthetics? An argument for 
a separate aesthetic paradigm would, consequently, seem to be a very 
difficult task; and its desirability and necessity may even be called into 
question. 
Art Objects and Natural Objects 
Carlson's call for two separate aesthetic paradigms may, however, be 
justified if one returns to Sepanmaa's other distinctions between art objects 
and natural objects. Though the two agree that any object whatsoever can be 
viewed aesthetically, with "appropriate aesthetic appreciation... that 
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appreciation of an object which reveals what aesthetic qualities and value it 
has" (Carlson, 1984, p.25), they acknowledge that there is a strong contrast 
between the perception of art objects and natural objects. 
What is peculiar to the perception of art stems from the art object itself. 
An art object differs fundamentally from a natural object in that it is a 
limited, static, unified, self-contained, fully determined totality which is set 
apart from its surroundings and has a formal completeness in itself. In being 
framed, it determines a very specific attitude on the part of the perceiver. 
The presence of the frame distances the spectator and determines his/her 
response. The frame, in isolating the work' from its environment and 
making it clear that what is not enclosed by the frame is not part of the 
aesthetic experience, delineates a limited, definite context for interpretation. 
It informs the perceiver that every element within it signifies something 
other than itself and that each has a role in the overall interpretation and 
understanding of the work. The art object, as Hepburn states it, contains " 
built-in guides to interpretation and contextual controls for our response" 
(1984, p. 16). In short, the frame communicates to the observer that the work 
is intelligible as a perceptual whole. 
In order to understand an art object and appreciate its aesthetic qualities, 
then, the perceiver has to know how the work is to be seen, must know 
what it is, what its historical significance is and how it is to be classified. 
He/she must have some knowledge of art history and criticism. For 
example, one's aesthetic appreciation of a Van Gogh is contingent on 
knowing that it is a post-impressionist painting, and not a German 
expressionist work (Carlson, 1984, p. 25). Since artistic categories precede 
aesthetic judgments, one must be aware of stylistic conventions, and 
interpret and evaluate the work within its specific genre before it can be 
deemed to be aesthetically good or bad. Simply put, one must be aware that 
each facet of the work contains references to external sources and that each 
referent must be identified before the work can be understood and 
appreciated. 
In perceiving a natural object, however, the observer is faced with a very 
different set of circumstances since nature is basically "frameless". A natural 
object differs from an art object primarily in that it is not separable from its 
environmental setting. It represents only a momentary Gestalt, a temporary 
focus against its background, the natural environment. It is not a fully _ 
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determinate, static totality, but an ephemeral grouping of immediately-
given phenomena. As such, it places very different demands on the 
perceiver than does the art work. For one, the very fact of being in nature 
erodes the distance between perceiver and the natural "object" or, perhaps 
more accurately, between perceiver and an event that possesses aesthetic 
value. There are no references to interpret since there are no environmental 
categories (as there are in art history and criticism) to which the perceiver 
can appeal in order to shape his/her interpretation. Thus, aesthetic 
understanding and evaluation of a natural object is entirely dependent on 
one's capacity to group the present scene, to create an object. One's aesthetic 
appreciation of a natural object is contingent on one's ability to delineate 
and articulate the natural object. The natural object is different from an art 
object, then, in that what lies beyond the present focal point on the horizon 
can always be incorporated into the "object"; one's experience is, as a result, 
always open to modification. Moreover, since the interpretation of the 
significant qualities perceived in the temporary object are always corrigible, 
there is an elusiveness to the aesthetic qualities in the natural object which - 
"creates a restlessness, an alertness, a search for ever new standpoints, and 
for more comprehensive Gestalts" (Hepburn, 1984, p.25). Ultimately, then, 
the distinction between the perception of the art object and the perception of 
the natural object is that, in the case of the latter, one's ability to understand 
and evaluate the object and to have an appropriate aesthetic experience 
relies on one's active grouping of phenomena, the supplying of a context, a 
phenomenological delineation of the natural object in the presencing field. 
In turn, however, this momentary significant combination of phenomena 
"presupposes a readiness in the observer.., and an ability to classify" 
(Sepanmaa, 1986, p.43). In the case of an art object, the observer is far more 
passive and distanced: since the art object is intentional, everything that has 
bearing on reception and intelligibility is contained within its circumscribed 
boundaries. One has only to disinterestedly affix the external referent to the 
reference in the work in order to divine the work's meaning and experience 
its aesthetic value. 
That an art object comes complete with a frame and that a natural object 
is frameless - the frame being supplied by the perceiver - would seem to 
draw an absolute distinction between the two, and thus justify their 
inspection within radically different aesthetic paradigms. But, are natural 
objects never framed by convention? The case of the landmark, the scenic 
outlook, for example, would appear to blur the distinction between natural 
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objects and art objects. Sepanmaa recognizes that landmarks or "outstanding 
objects" are the products of social activity, of cultural definition, and can be 
defined as "communal, memorable and socially recognized places in the 
landscape" (1984, p.45). He states that there is an analogy between the 
landmark and the art object in that: 
It is pre-determined from where we should go to the sight or 
viewspot, from where one should look and when. External regulators 
of this kind are paths, roads, as well as, especially for motor tourists, 
rest-places, signs, view-signs, quotation and name boards, guide 
pamphlets and books, postcards, maps.-The view, the landscape, has a 
facade, the viewer a place, a viewing-point or route, which is a path of 
structures, for example outlook towers (the numerous towers of 
Niagara, for example). At such places there are even binoculars with 
which the landscape can be viewed in greater detail, or devices that 
give a typed description. 
The existence of such landmarks suggests that there are pre-established 
norms for experiencing nature aesthetically that approximate artistic 
conventions or genres. The landmark approaches the classic in art in so far 
as it offers a standard for aesthetically judging objects of a similar kind. 
Yet, while Sepanmaa acknowledges this analogy between art objects and 
certain natural objects, he is highly critical of the use of landmarks as a 
means of interpreting and establishing the aesthetic value of other natural 
objects. For in assuming that only that which is culturally designated as 
having aesthetic value indeed has such value, one loses sight of the 
framelessness of nature - of the need for the perceiver to recognize the open-
endedness of the perceptual situation and contextually delineate the natural 
object so as to experience appropriate aesthetic appreciation. The entire 
distinction between the art object and the natural object is that the status of 
the latter is always corrigible; it is the dynamic tension between the 
immediately-given phenomena and the framer that generates aesthetic 
value in the eventful natural setting. And since it is known to the perceiver 
that the delineation of the context is open-ended, that the designation of the 
"object" is transitory, the framed, fixed, fully-determined object represented 
by the landmark is of no aesthetic value. Since the aesthetic appreciation of 
natural objects is contingent on temporary framing, on constantly revising 
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one's viewpoint, the perceiver is aware of the need "to overcome 
stereotyped grouping and cliched ways of seeing" (Hepburn, 1984, P.  47). 
Subjectivist and Objectivist Theories of Aesthetic Appreciation 
Having dismissed landmarks in the field of environmental aesthetics as 
suitable analogues of classics in art history and criticism, and art aesthetics, 
Sepanrnaa nevertheless finds himself on the horns of a dilemma which 
stems from an inability to account for the origins of appropriate aesthetic 
appreciation. Is it the product of the recognition of an object of 
consciousness as an aesthetic object or a distinctive type of perceptual 
experience? On the one hand, since his overall aim is to establish moral 
concern for nature through the establishing of the appropriate appreciation 
of nature, he does not want to commit himself to a subjectivist/relativist 
account of natural beauty; for in so doing, he would have to admit that 
beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Such a position leads to aestheticism, 
the narcissistic, resourcist view that nature exists to give us aesthetic 
pleasure or, as the novelist John Fowles puts it, turns nature into "a free 
clinic for admirers of their own sensitivity" (1979, p.39). Sepanmaa must 
even reject the subjectivist/formalist account mounted by Clive Bell who 
suggested that what affords aesthetic appreciation is solely the perception of 
what he designated "significant form", the "lines - and colours combined in a 
certain way, certain forms and relations of forms that stir our aesthetic 
emotions" (cited in Rader, 1979, p.288). Though Bell's theory is initially 
appealing in that it mirrors the notion of aesthetic experience in response to 
the sublime (a mute, non-cognitive aesthetic appreciation characterized as 
wonder or awe - which has the additional benefit of not necessarily 
requiring an expressive artist), it is far too personal to serve as the basis for 
the objective, normative system that he requires to ground ethical concern 
for nature and ensure its protection. 
Thus, Sepanmaa must reject both a subjectivist aesthetic theory on the 
grounds that it is too relative, and jettison aesthetic appreciation construed 
as a kind of consciousness. Moreover, however, he must also dismiss an 
objectivist/intellectualist account of appropriate aesthetic appreciation. The 
reason for this is that this account assumes that aesthetic value exists in the 
object as an identifiable property, and that aesthetic appreciation arises from 
the rational inspection of the correspondence obtaining between observable 
aspects inherent in the work and their conceptual referents. But, if one must 
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adopt such a dispassionate, disinterested distance from the object - and one 
surely must if one is to transcendentally decipher the connection between 
symbols expressed in the work and their conceptual yield in order to be 
rafforded an aesthetic experience - one loses the cornerstone of Sepanmaa's 
argument for natural aesthetics: engaged contextual immediacy in the 
perception of nature. 
Whereas distancing is appropriate for the interpretation and evaluation 
of an art object, even mandatory, it is not appropriate for the perception of 
natural objects. As Sepanmaa argued in the case of the landmark, there is 
not a body of environmental depictions to which one can appeal in order to 
demonstrate the aesthetic value of a natural object. Whereas the art critic 
can refer to the established genres identified in art history in order to 
aesthetically judge the value of an art object, this is not an option for the 
environmental critic. Even if there were enough landmarks to serve as 
standards for the comparison of the relative aesthetic value of natural 
objects, it would not, in Sepanmaa's view, be appropriate to adopt such an 
approach. For the landmark, in being so fixed conceptually, is far too 
determinate to allow for the free improvisatory play in a natural aesthetic 
field that is appropriate to the aesthetic appreciation of nature. In denying 
the open-endedness of the perceptual situation and limiting the creative 
framing or delineation of the natural object by the observer, the landmark 
ceases to afford aesthetic experience. In conceptually distancing the perceiver 
from nature, the intellectualist/formalist account implicitly belittles the 
importance of the contextual relation between observer and nature, the 
intensity of the lived experience of a world that is alive, dynamic and 
eventful. And in so doing, it prevents the perceiver from experiencing 
appropriate aesthetic appreciation. The objectivist theory is appropriate for 
art aesthetics in that art is fictitious, "amoral, external to the moral" 
(Sepanmaa, 1986, p.68). This is not the case for environmental aesthetics: the 
environment is real and, hence, aesthetic appreciation of nature has a truly 
moral dimension. 
But, though Sepanmaa must reject both subjectivist and objectivist 
theories in his search for the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, he 
still wishes to maintain a line of reasoning that would incorporate both a 
personal sensitivity to natural objects and an objective rational standard for 
establishing the beauty of the natural environment. In his attempt to 
delineate some middle ground, he suggests that individual perception 
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should be united with a knowledge of the operational mechanisms of 
nature. In fact, as he argues throughout, ecological value so utterly 
determines aesthetic value that it would be impossible to discover aesthetic 
value in any natural object that did not have ecological value as well. As he 
states it: "The claim that that which is against ecological laws cannot be 
beautiful appears to be analytically true" (1986, p. 135). His aim here is clear 
enough: he seeks a rational standard for appraising natural environments 
that would approximate the role of art history in appraising art objects. And 
it is obvious to him that an understanding of ecological laws can assist in 
the identification, depiction and evaluation of natural objects. That such 
knowledge can be aesthetically relevant is also suggested ma passage from 
Hepburn (1984, p. 135): 
Suppose I am walking over a Wide expanse of sand and mud. The 
quality of the scene is perhaps that of wild, glad emptiness. But 
suppose that this is a tidal basin, the tide being out. The realization is 
not aesthetically irrelevant. I see myself now as walking on what is for 
half the day sea-bed. The wild, glad emptiness may be tempered by a 
disturbing weirdness. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that, in such a case, immediate aesthetic 
appreciation of the scene is affected by its environmental classification. The 
aesthetic significance of the event is directly proportional to the observer's 
familiarity with nature, if not natural history as well. Consequently, there 
seems to be a strong analogy between the roles of art history and ecology in 
establishing the aesthetic value of an object. How useful, and how valuable 
is this resemblance? If it could be demonstrated that a body of ecological 
laws, or perhaps more appropriately, natural history, could act as a standard 
catalogue of environmental depictions similar in kind to genres or 
conventions in art history, would it be sufficient for identifying and 
evaluating natural environments? Surely the fact that conventions in art 
are established by critics while ecological "truths" are hypothesised by 
ecologists indicates that art history and ecology represent two very different 
normative strategies? Unfortunately, Sepanmaa never spells out the 
analogy in much detail. Moreover, is it always the case, as Sepanmaa claims, 
that "ecology provides the norm to which concepts of beauty must 
conform" (1986, p.136)? Put otherwise, is it possible that ecological 
knowledge might be a necessary (if that), but insufficient condition for the 
aesthetic experience of nature? Do we even have to always be aware of an 
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environment's history and its ecological functioning before we can 
appreciate it aesthetically? 
Since Sepanmaa claims that beauty and ecological value are 
"analytically" inseparable, meaning that the negation of the statement 
entails a contradiction, ecology would have to not only aid in the aesthetic 
judgment of the aesthetic object, but provide necessary conditions for the 
maximization of the aesthetic yield of the natural object. Unfortunately 
though, this assumption of logical necessity simply cannot be maintained. 
The claim is easily dismissed without even questioning the validity of 
assuming there to be ecological laws - something about which even 
ecologists are not in accord. As Neil Evernden reasons: 
...it is by no means obvious that even if such laws were to exist, that 
they would inevitably coincide with aesthetic significance, or even 
with "beauty". There is no doubt that lakes killed by acid rain are 
more beautiful than energy-rich eutrophic lakes that are literally 
crawling with life; foresters have been able to demonstrate with ease 
that people find selectively logged forests not only more beautiful but 
more "natural" than untouched stands; and the pastoral or agrarian 
landscapes so beloved of tourists are infinitely - and deliberately - less 
diverse than were the natural ecosystems that preceded them (1988, p. 
185). 
It would seem, then, that the collapsing of the distinction between the 
ecological and the aesthetic may have dire consequences, particularly since 
Sepanmaa desires to argue on aesthetic grounds for the protection of virgin 
,nature and not disturbed areas which may be more beautiful and promise a 
higher aesthetic yield. 
Sepanmaa's inability to reconcile subjectivist and objectivist conceptions 
of beauty through ecology does not fail just because he cannot establish a 
necessary connection between beauty and ecological value, however. The 
attempted reconciliation is unsuccessful because he assigns too great an 
importance to ecological knowledge as a necessary condition for aesthetic 
experience. Why he chooses such a route is not surprising: he wants so badly 
to avoid aestheticism - the subjective use of natural objects solely as a means 
to aesthetic gratification - that he is not content to simply describe how a 
natural object might be seen as beautiful by a perceiver. Rather, he seeks to 
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demonstrate that a natural object must be seen as beautiful. And to this end, 
he must invoke an objective norm which will establish the undeniable 
beauty of the natural object: hence, ecology's significance. 
In a paper entitled "Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic Appreciation of 
Nature", Ronald Hepburn provides just the line of reasoning that might 
rescue Sepanmaa from his morass. He maintains that, in the case of art, due 
to the existence of art criticism, we can relatively easily isolate the features of 
a work that are significant for serious appreciation while identifying and 
jettisoning what is merely trivial. But clearly, as we have seen through this 
chapter, the same does not obtain for nature appreciation. This is a very 
serious problem for Hepburn, for: 
When we seek to defend areas of "outstanding natural beauty" against 
depredations, it matters greatly what account we can give of the 
appreciation of that beauty: how its value can be set alongside 
competing and vociferously promoted values involved in industry, 
commerce and urban expansion. If we wish to attach very high value 
to the appreciation of natural beauty, we must be able to show that 
more is involved in such appreciation than the pleasant, unfocused 
enjoyment of a picnic place, or a fleeting and distanced impression of 
countryside through a tourist-coach window, or obligatory visits to 
standard viewpoints or (should I say) snapshot-points (1995, p. 65). 
Why Hepburn's thought is of the utmost importance is that he 
succinctly, appreciatively and virtually exhaustively, reviews that cluster of 
concepts that are appropriate to the discussion of natural aesthetics while 
putting into abeyance metaphysical questions of necessity and sufficiency. 
His discussion of aesthetic appreciation, most of all, rests with the 
examination of two key dichotomies: the "sensuous component"/"thought 
component" (which are, for all intents and purposes, representative of the 
subjectivist/objectivist duality) and the trivial/serious distinction which 
ultimately elucidates the issue of the aesthetic appreciation of nature. In 
response to the question of what we mean by the "aesthetic appreciation of 
nature", he introduces (and, as I suggested, "succinctly") the foundational 
concepts for approaching the issue in this manner: 
By "nature" we must mean not just gentle pastoral landscape, but also 
tropical forest, tundra, ice floes, deserts, and objects (and events) made 
perceptible only by way of microscope or telescope. If nature's 
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materials are vast, so too is the freedom of the percipient. We have 
endless choice of scale, freedom to choose the boundary of attention, 
-choice between the moving - whether natural objects or the spectator 
or both - and the static. Our choice of viewpoint can range from that 
of the underwater diver to the view of the upper surface of the clouds 
from an aircraft or an astronaut's view of the planet as a sphere (1995, 
p. 66). 
The important concepts to be garnered from this passage are "events", 
"moving", "static", "scale" and "attention". All are of equal value, indeed 
central in Hepburn's thought. Yet, while such concepts - might superficially 
be taken as suggestive of some sort of variety of subjectivism, this would be 
a simplistic interpretation. For what Hepburn is attempting to do is to draw 
his readers' attention to a contemplation of the dichotomies detailed above. 
One can accept received, cultural notions of appreciation - on either side of 
the subjectivist/objectivist bias - or really look at the ideas accruing to the 
lived experience of nature. To adopt either extreme is to also commit to a 
trivial or serious approach to nature appreciation. Hepburn is non-
judgemental. His focus rests with the depth that one applies to the 
commitment to either position. Against trivial perceptual and reflective 
approaches, equally, he states that: 
(They can) be attentive or inattentive, can be discriminating or 
undiscriminating, lively or lazy: that the doors of perception can need 
cleansing, the conventions and the simplifications of popular 
perception can need resisting. The reflective component, likewise, can 
be feebled or stereotyped, individual, original or exploratory. It can be 
immature or confused (1995, p. 68). 
At root, the simple sensuous enjoyment of nature can be trivial if it does 
not take into account the otherness of the natural object, and its 
independent mode of existence that transcends any overly simplistic 
fixation with its aesthetic yield. Yet, by the same token, one does not want to 
think too hard about the object lest its engaging appeal vanishes under a 
blanket of theory: the problem associated with an over-emphasis on the 
thought-component. Just as it is perilous to simply view nature as pretty 
spectacle, it is equally wrong to so distance oneself from the experience of 
nature that one assumes that one is simply an independent, rational ego. 
Nature's otherness must not assume a superordinate position over our 
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deep embeddedness in its unfolding which allows for our sensitive 
delineation of the natural object in full appreciation of nature's equal, 
participatory working out of the setting. All that is truly required is a 
balance between the two components. As Hepburn states it: 
Between the extremes, we might find an acceptable ideal for serious 
aesthetic perception in encouraging ourselves to enhance the . 
thought-load almost to the point, but not beyond the point, at which 
it begins to overwhelm the vivacity of the particular perception (1995, 
p. 73). 
The seriousness of this brief quote cannot be underestimated as it paves 
the way for the detailed discussion on the autonomy of nature, on the one 
hand, and our appropriation of its natural forms, on the other, which 
concludes the paper. Against the trivial, sentimental anthropomorphism of 
nature to which the sensuous component tends, he argues that a serious 
aesthetic concern with nature will militate against such a position. If we do 
not go to subjective extremes, we must admit that any serious involvement 
in natural forms and structures will possess, at the very least, an inchoate 
thought component. If we make the effort of taking our engagement in 
nature seriously, "the more earnest will be our regard for, and our respect 
for, the integrity and the proper modes of being of the objects in nature 
themselves, inanimate and animate" (1995, p. 70). We must not then simply 
jettison the tendency to anthropomorphize, but really come to terms with 
our annexation or appropriation of phenomena which does not occur in 
any calculating or manipulative way, but simply in "being imaginatively 
seized by them, and coming to cherish their expressive aptness, and to rely 
upon them in our efforts to understand ourselves" (1995, p. 71). 
Yet, by contrast, we must recognize that wholesale annexation is both 
impossible and inappropriate, that nature's autonomy, its "otherness", 
must still be dealt with. We must acknowledge nature's autonomy. The 
traditional, certainly most pervasive arguments for seeing nature in and of 
itself, are through scientific theory. Yet this is problematic on two fronts, 
according to Hepburn (1995, pp. 71-72). First, being mechanistic and 
reductionistic, science must disinterestedly reduce the sensuous experience 
to its component elements; it "must fragment or overwhelm or dissolve the 
aesthetic perception, instead of enriching it. Aesthetic experience must be 
human experience - episodic, phenomenal. To destroy it can hardly be to 
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deepen it" (Hepburn, 1995, p. 71). Secondly, too great an awareness of 
nature's dysteleology, of the evanescence and fundamental insignificance of 
the individual ecologically speaking, may preclude the true appreciation of a 
butterfly or a gazelle before they are predated - something which may, in 
fact, sensuously, be very aesthetically relevant, though, granted, of a, 
perhaps, quite negative variety. Yet to falsify the being's natural role, to 
view it solely in terms of its aesthetic appeal is to deny it its otherness, its 
significance in a whole intersubjective field. Furthermore, to trivialize the 
experience by turning our back on nature's dark side, we "shirk the 
challenge to the would-be appreciator's own creativity" (1995, p.72). 
Are we just tilting at windmills, then, to seek a serious, non-trivial case 
for the aesthetic appreciation of nature? Hepburn replies in the negative. 
His prescription is to first develop deeper understandings of nature which 
are not so quick to view non-human interaction through a moral filter. As 
he puts it (1995, p. 72): "If, for instance, we can celebrate nature's overall 
animation, vitality - creative and destructive in indissoluble unity - we may 
reach a reflective, or contemplative equilibrium, that is neither unqualified 
by melancholy nor disillusioned and repelled". Second, he recognizes that 
the annexation or appropriation attitude, too, may be approached in a more 
serious manner, through a discussion of metaphor: 
We speak of depths and heights - in relation to moods or feelings or 
hopes and fears: of soarings and of glooms. We are lifted and dashed, 
chilled, spiritually frozen, and thawed. We drown, we surface; we 
suffer dark nights of the soul. Again, there is no simple one-to-one 
correlation between mental state and natural item. I may irtteriorise 
the desert - as bleak emptiness... or I may interiorise it as unscripted 
openness, potentiality...(1995, p.73) 
Against solipsistic, trivial appreciations of nature, he argues that such 
annexed forms as metaphors are not limited to the self, but may be 
universally intersubjective. Furthermore, they need never be of a trivial 
nature, but are reliant on the individual to creatively animate them, even 
to the point of sheer, black terror in the soul. And, interestingly, such 
interiorizations are by no means a sheer human fabrication, but "seem half 
completed in nature itself... are apprehended with a mysterious sense that 
the components... deeply matter to us, though one cannot say how: the 
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shape of a hill, the precise placing of a stand of trees, or a solitary rock" (1995, 
p. 75). 
Hepburn's conclusion is of a very phenomenological nature, at least as it 
has been pursued in this dissertation. Against his critics who maintain that 
annexation, interiorization will always make aesthetic appreciation relative 
and that it is pointless to pursue any serious aesthetic theory of natural 
appreciation, he counters by arguing that the depth of one's associations is 
entirely dependent on the imagination and seriousness of the perceiving 
subject in the face of nature's otherness combined with an awareness of the 
degree of appropriateness to the specific context. If one chooses to accept that 
there can only be one perspective on a natural object, that it has a certain 
dimension, tensile strength, colour, whatever, then one will not be 
interested in engaging in imaginative play with one's surroundings.
•Furthermore, since the issue of a definitive meaning for natural objects has 
been settled, one will not have the openness and the seriousness that is 
required for true aesthetic appreciation in any case. What, moreover, has to 
be borne in mind is that for the discussion of the trivial and serious, one 
must recognize how important the issue of perspective is. A cliff face seen 
from 30,000 feet above has nowhere near the significance of the majestic cliff 
seen at close hand. The same can also be said of the perception of art: if at 
too great a remove from art objects or music, they, too, will lose their 
immediate poignancy. Yet, to fully recognize the role of the individual in 
selecting viewpoints, establishing boundaries for the joint determination of 
meaning and significance by self and world - in short, the establishment of 
perspective - one may certainly make a case for the serious aesthetic 
appreciation of nature, in Hepburn's opinion. 
Do we need a distinction between art aesthetics and nature aesthetics? 
In his paper, "Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature", Allen Carlson 
adopts a more philosophically rigorous approach to Hepburn's distinction 
between the sensuous component and the thought component in the 
aesthetic appreciation of nature and more fervently insists upon the central 
role that a knowledge of natural history can play in the elucidation of the 
latter. Yet, unlike Hepburn, his interest does not reside so much in an 
analysis of the trivial/serious distinction, but with the very nature of 
appreciation in its historical development. In particular, he focuses on the 
notion of disinterestedness, basic to the "aesthetic attitude", which is 
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defined by Jerome Stolnitz as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to 
and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake 
alone" (1995, p.200). On the surface this would appear to have great 
potential for the appreciation of nature as it would seem to release natural 
objects from the requirement to resemble art objects in some manner in 
order to be appreciated. Since appreciation is wholly appropriated by a 
subjective attitude at the expense of the object, anything at all, even any 
natural object, can be viewed aesthetically and, more important, 
appreciatively. 
Carlson is nonetheless concerned that this may, perhaps, go too far. 
Though there has been a backlash against disinterestedness for being too 
passive and contemplative with a concomitant rise in the area of 
appreciation, he argues that the wholesale rejection of disinterestedness 
may be wrong-headed for the simple reason that relevant knowledge about 
an object informs appreciation. In short, he would seem to agree with 
Hepburn that true appreciation requires a balance between the thought-
component and the sensuous-component wherein neither overwhelms the 
other, particularly with reference to the latter swamping the former; hence, 
we explicitly understand Carlson's appeal for the need for an informed 
awareness about an object's status for true appreciation to occur. The 
difficulty is that disinterestedness is an essentially passive, contemplative 
position while appreciation is an active, engaged attitude that sets the stage 
for our imaginative and emotional interplay with natural objects. They, 
thus, move towards opposing poles: "disinterestedness pulls toward the 
general criterion of aesthetic relevance, sympathy in the other direction" 
(Carlson, 1995, p. 201). 
The question is what is to guide our aesthetic attitude if we altogether 
reject norms of aesthetic relevance? Surely we require at least some 
guidance in order to ensure that our appreciation is appropriate to the 
object? If appreciation is responsive to an object "taken on its own terms", 
then surely there are some relevant directives, such as information external 
to the object in the form of "thoughts, images or bits of knowledge" (1995, 
p.202). 
To get to the heart of the matter, Carlson turns his attention to art 
appreciation wherein information external to the specific art work is most 
assuredly relevant to the appropriate reception and appreciation of the 
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piece. In particular, he applauds Stolnitz's consideration of the shift in 
attention away from the aesthetic attitude (sensuous component) to a 
consideration of art appreciation (thought component) in this way: 
Instead of the strict application of the general criterion of aesthetic 
relevance, we find concerning, for instance, the issue of relevant 
knowledge (that) we need not, however, condemn all 'knowledge 
about' as aesthetically irrelevant... 'knowledge about' is relevant 
under three conditions: when it does not weaken or destroy aesthetic 
attention to the object, when it pertains to the meaning and 
expressiveness of the object, and when it enhances the quality and 
significance of one's immediate aesthetic response to the object. Note 
that only the first condition accommodates the aesthetic; the latter 
two aim at enhancing the appreciation of the object. With the 
emphasis thus shifted to appreciation, sympathy outweighs 
disinterestedness, and we truly "follow the lead of the object." 
Moreover, it is not now the blind leading the blind, for the 
aestheticising cow-like stare gives way to appreciation not only 
responsive to the object but informed by knowledge of it. (1995, p. 203) 
Carlson, even more than Hepburn, clearly emphasizes the need for 
relevant information about objects for true appreciation to flow. But there 
remains a key question: given that the foregoing quote is in relation to art 
appreciation, is he implying that there is a significant relation between art 
and nature appreciation and, if not, what are the salient differences as he 
sees it? 
Carlson's framework for pursuing an answer to this is to divide both art 
and nature appreciation into design and order appreciation. First, with 
regards to the design appreciation of art, the central feature for appreciation 
is that the work has been intentionally created to afford aesthetic experience. 
The delimited, framed work is then disinterestedly evaluated as a totality in 
and of itself, utterly divorced from its relation to other things, even the 
artist, according to standards of aesthetic relevance, singularity, its place 
within an artistic tradition or genre and the like. The aesthetic requirements 
for design appreciation are threefold: the presence of an initial design (the 
intention, the problem or the situation being examined), the object 
embodying this design (seen in Aristotelian terms of radiance, balance and 
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harmony), and the individual who embodies the design (the skill behind 
the realization of the initial intention). 
Secondly, with regards to the order appreciation of art, the position 
becomes less obvious and a little more complex. Though it contains the 
same central features of design, work and artist as design appreciation, the 
role of the first is of far less importance than it is in design appreciation. 
Instead of an initial intention that is realized in the work, the work simply 
unfolds due to "motor energies" (1995, p.209). Nonetheless, against the 
denials of artists like Jackson Pollock who claim that they are just one 
source of energy that produces the final pattern, the role of the aitist cannot 
be completely overlooked for the simple reason that such variables as 
choice of colour of paints, their viscosity, and their placement on the canvas 
are not completely unselective; there is at least a "general notion " of what 
guise the resultant work will emerge in. What is especially important is that 
the artist is in no stronger a position than his/her audience to interpret the 
significance of the patterning of the ulltimate artifact. 
Thirdly, with regards to the design appreciation of nature, Carlson is 
dismissive of any attempts to assimilate the appreciation of nature into the 
appreciation of art by means of attempts to sketch an analogy between the 
resemblance of design in natural and art objects (1995, pp.213-214): 
Frequently the appreciation of nature is assimilated to the 
appreciation of art. Such an assimilation is both a theoretical mistake 
and an appreciative pity. On the theoretical level, it typically involves 
misunderstanding not only of appreciation but also one or both of art 
and nature. On the appreciative level, it can result in either failing to 
appreciate nature at all or appreciating it in an inappropriate manner - 
relying on the wrong information, engaging in the wrong acts of 
aspection, and having the wrong response. As Ronald Hepburn 
points out in a classic discussion of appreciating nature: If our 
"aesthetic education" instills in us "the attitudes, the tactics of 
approach, the expectations proper to the appreciation of art works 
only", we "either pay very little aesthetic heed to natural objects or 
else heed them in the wrong way". We "look - and of course look in 
vain - for what can be found and enjoyed only in art". 
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Though a somewhat daunting passage, there are within it a few points of 
absolutely central importance to Carlson's overall argument. The first has 
been mentioned more than once in this chapter, yet cannot be overstressed: 
art objects are isolated, framed, self-contained entities created intentionally 
to afford aesthetic appreciation to the distanced observer, while natural 
objects are appreciated in their interrelation with other things, are open-
ended, dynamic and eventful and are opportunities for appreciative 
interplay of engaged self and world. To attempt any sort of assimilation of 
the two is, clearly, untenable: they are utterly polarized by their natures and 
it debases both of them to collapse that distinction. Moreover, there are two 
additional features: a) at the centre of the art experience is the issiie of 
aesthetic relevance; there is no such analogue in the appreciation of nature: 
b) in nature, the object is appreciated for what it is and for what sort of 
properties it has, while in art appreciation, there is a sense that the 
properties of the appreciator are in some way imposed on the object. 
Ultimately assimilation is a mistake as: 
both works of art and natural objects are in appreciation more or less 
severed from their natures and their histories. Thus, both kinds of 
objects may be approached in the same way: as pure aesthetic objects. 
The result is one form of appreciation - aesthetic appreciation - which 
appropriately applies to any and all kinds of things. Art appreciation 
and nature appreciation collapse into one (Carlson, 1995, p.214). 
The second main argument for the design appreciation of nature (which 
also attempts the assimilation of art appreciation and nature appreciation) is 
far more contentious and is rarely attempted in contemporary aesthetics, 
though it was taken far more seriously in the nineteenth century. The basic 
contention is that it is possible to argue for nature's having a creator, and, 
that, consequently, there is intention involved and that nature, therefore, 
has a design that may be appreciated. The overall view is that since the 
world is God's plan, there is no difference between art appreciation and 
nature appreciation as both are products of God's purpose and his design 
(Carlson, 1995, p.215). Against this, some authors, such as Nelson Potter, 
have reasoned that the argument is both naive, presumptuous, and 
anthropomorphic, as there is no way that we can know what God's 
intentions are, while the intentions of an artist, being human, are 
transparent, at least to some degree., On this particular score, there do seem 
to be justifiable grounds for rejecting the assimilation of nature appreciation 
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to art appreciation as long as such an attempt is grounded in the supposition 
that there is a similarity obtaining between the design aspects of art and 
natural objects. Oddly enough, though, the theistic view does provide one 
surprising aspect which is important for the appreciation of nature. God's 
handiwork must be seen in objects, so at least part of our appreciation must 
be of an object-oriented nature. And with object-oriented appreciation "the 
way we construe the object of appreciation - the general account or the story 
we accept about it - determines the nature of its appreciation. With 
paradigmatic works of art this fact is obscured, for there is little dispute and 
therefore no alternative stories about them" (Carlson, 1995, p.217). 
Finally, with his fourth and final configuration, nature and order 
appreciation, Carlson finds his Josephine. Having rejected design 
appreciation as significant or even possible for nature appreciation, he takes 
up the theist position outlined above. What he finds attractive is that an 
individual selects objects of appreciation in a general nonaesthetic, 
nonartistic manner, seeking the stories which make the object "visible and 
intelligible". "Awareness and understanding of the key entities - the order, 
the forces which produced it, and the account which illuminates it - and of 
the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the 
appreciative response" (1995, p.218). 
What sort of story is appropriate, then, for his object-oriented 
appreciation of nature? Clearly, if one requires a story to explain the order of 
nature and the forces that have determined that order, it makes sense to 
look no further than science. For no alternative story can more adequately 
supply the object-orientated appreciation of nature, and reveal the 
biological, and geological evolutionary processes that have given rise to 
natural objects. Given that we would find it queer, even absurd, to seek the 
tales relevant for the aesthetic appraisal and appreciation of art objects 
outside mythology, psychology, history and the like, we should find it 
equally puzzling and meaningless to search for the appropriate stories for 
the appreciation of nature beyond its most illuminating and rigorous 
source: natural science. As Carlson puts it: "Awareness and understanding 
of evolutionary theory, for example, is relevant to appreciating the natural 
order as revealed in flora and fauna; without such knowledge the biosphere 
may strike us as chaotic" (1995, p.220). 
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Where nature so radically parts company with art, though, is that "the • 
work of art is individual, original, while the environment repeats itself in 
variations" (Sepanmaa, 1988, p.64). This is certainly true, but it cart also be 
maintained that nature is fundamentally seamless and that any feature may 
be interpreted according to the same basic story. No matter whether one's 
object is a scarab beetle, baobab, pangolin, short-grass prairie or even biome, 
an understanding of its natural history, no matter how rudimentary, 
together with a respectful acknowledgement of its otherness, will yield an 
appreciation of it meaning, significance, beauty and appropriateness. One 
does not necessarily need an appreciation of art to foster an appropriate 
appreciation of nature. 
Carlson's paper may be seen to house two different issues: The first issue 
concerns in part his distinction of appreciation from disinterestedness; the 
second concerns his advocacy of the necessity of at least some knowledge of 
natural history, ecology and evolution for the appropriate appreciation of 
nature. In the remainder of this chapter I shall examine both questions by 
reference to articles by Arnold Berleant and Noel Carroll, respectively. 
In his paper, "The Aesthetics of Art and Nature," Berleant ponders 
"whether there is one aesthetics or two, an aesthetic that encompasses both 
art and nature or one aesthetic that is distinctively artistic and another that 
identifies the appreciation of natural beauty" (1995, p.228). The cornerstone 
of 13erleant's essay is his conception of the aesthetics of nature. In common 
with virtually every author discussed in this chapter, he rejects the futile 
task of assimilating nature appreciation into art appreciation for the very 
reason that disinterestedness and appreciation pull in opposite directions 
and are, consequently, thoroughly incompatible. Considering the traditional 
debate over the seemingly intransigent polarization of designed art objects 
and ordered natural objects, he insightfully asks if the distinctive 
appreciative attitudes appropriate to art and nature appreciation 
individually are actually, at root, perceptual or merely the product of theory. 
"A world of objects is easier to circumscribe and control, but is this the 
world of lived experience?" (1995, p.232). He also suggests that although the 
presence of a frame would seem to require a passive, contemplative attitude 
on the part of the perceiver in that everything of value in the work is 
contained within its physical boundaries, he argues that the frame does not 
completely circumscribe the aesthetic experience as the viewer is required as 
a participant for the work to reach its conclusion, fulfil its intention. In the 
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absence of an audience, a painting is just paint, canvas and wood. Its 
significance, its conceptual content, is animated by the concrete presence of 
an observer: "We are beginning to discover that the history of the modern 
arts is more a history of perception than a history of objects, and that 
perception, moreover, is not just a visual act but a somatic engagement in 
the aesthetic field (italics mine). Such a development the traditional object-
orientated theory is hard put to account for" (1995, p. 233). This is truly 
iconoclastic. It introduces a crisis into the whole art/nature concept. If 
traditional aesthetics is so blinded by its objectivity as to neglect the lived 
perceptual dimension in the aesthetic experience of art, how can we hope to 
develop an aesthetic paradigm for nature appreciation when nature is even 
more resistant to reification? "If we are going to need a separate aesthetic for 
nature, why be burdened with a model so alien to experience?" (1995, p. 
233). 
Following the lead of thinkers as diverse as Immanuel Kant and Yi-Fu 
Tuan, he suggests that the notion of sublimity offers the potential 
groundwork for a unifying theory of art and nature appreciation. One 
feature is especially interesting. In the absence of comfortable human 
categories for coming to terms with the wild nature revealed in the , 
encounter with the sublime, the notion of beauty becomes utterly polarized. 
On the one hand, 'free nature, however, is not necessarily beautiful nature - 
it can be threatening, frightening, or simply desolate. Nature is not beautiful 
simply because its space or forms are not (totally) man-made. But it is only 
in these forms that the particular beauty of nature can reveal itself"; while 
on the other hand, nature's beauty "is necessarily bound up with 
contingency; it affords the viewer the freedom to view and review himself 
and his world in a manner that it is not predetermined" (Seel, 1992, pp. 78- 
81). The openendedness of the encounter with the sublime can, therefore, 
be either profoundly disturbing or liberating. The notion of the sublime is 
particularly satisfying as it rejects any type of objectification that undermines 
the assimilation of art and nature. There are no conceptual impediments in 
the experience of the wild, unpredictable imperiousness of the sublime. 
There is only engagement, wonder and awe. There are no distanced vantage 
points from which to disinterestedly ruminate on ultimate purposes. Yet 
one does not have to endure the potential psychological torment associated 
with an encounter with the sublime to understand our basic participatory 
adherence in natural settings. "The boundlessness of the natural world does 
not just surround us; it assimilates us. Not only are we unable to sense 
128 
absolute limits in nature; we cannot distance the natural world from 
ourselves in order to measure and judge it with complete objectivity" (1995, 
p.236). 
In short, we do not have to be caught up in the maelstrom of sublimity 
in order to understand our being-in-the-world as any participatory gesture 
or serious attempt at belonging will reveal that engagement is possible in 
the most mundane of locations. In our liberation from disinterested 
framing "we can take as much delight in profusion and continuity as we 
have been taught to find in symmetry and regularity" (1995, p.237). Berleant 
is not alone on this score. Joseph Kupfer (1997) states that contrast and 
opposition - light/dark, hard/soft, density/diffuseness - are shared by both 
the aesthetic experience of art and nature, though perhaps more 
dramatically in nature. The aesthetic experience of nature does, though, 
seem to possess qualities that are rarely, if ever, found in art, such as 
profusion and continuity, simplicity, anticipation, serendipity. In particular, 
though, he focuses on a distinction between "profusion" and "austerity". 
Experiences of the former are permeated by an ebullience of forms, sensible - 
qualities, pattern and colour, density and texture, odour and sound - an 
"inexhaustible largesse" (1997, p.2) Profusion is commonly encountered in 
the experience of not just animate assemblages such as flocks of wading 
birds, but also in the contact with inorganic phenomena such as stars, 
clouds, snowflakes, pebbles in a stream and the like. Austerity, by contrast, is 
a repetitive system inherent in the perception of putatively stark landscapes 
such as desert, tundra, ice and sea. The sensory experience is relatively 
simple, and form and quality are pared down to essentials - it lacks the 
exuberance of the profuse. "Instead of the frivolity of ornamentation, there 
are clean lines, unrelenting" (1997, p.3). 
With the notions of engagement and participation in hand, Berleant sets 
the stage for a single aesthetics for nature and art. Yet he eschews the 
tempting avenue of assimilation. Rather, he is convinced that there is a case 
to be made for the aesthetics of nature serving as the model for appreciating 
art, "for continuity and perceptual immersion occur in our experience of art 
as much as in nature" (1995, p. 238). In the perception of a sculpture, for 
example, neither the work nor the perceiver has the upper hand_ The three-
dimensionality of a sculpture means that the perceiver must move around 
the sculpture in order to fully appreciate it, which introduces a temporal 
dimension. The work and the perceiver, therefore, are engaged in the 
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mutual determination of the meaning and interrelation of each other in the - 
concrete situation[ Furthermore, although critics would like to maintain the 
dissimilarity of art and nature on the grounds that, though both may 
manifest order, nature is chaotic, unpredictable, Berleant counters thus: 
While there is formal structure in a quartz crystal and a starfish as 
there is in the symmetry of the Taj Mahal and Notre Dame Cathedral, 
art, like nature, has its share of deliberate disarray. We can find as 
much disorder in the opening movements of Bach's great organ 
Toccatas in C major and D minor and in Debussy's through-composed 
songs as in the irregular curve of a beach or the scattering of daisies in 
a field (1995, P.  238). 
Taking such a phenomenological tack, Berleant distances himself from 
virtually every author Currently commenting on nature aesthetics. In 
rejecting altogether the subject/object split that bedevils all 
rational/objective discourses on the relation of art and nature aesthetics 
(including all theories that debate thought vs sensuous component, 
disinterestedness vs appreciation and the like all of which, whether 
embracing a subjectivist or objectivist bias, employ the same mode of 
reasoning, argue within the same rational/objective parameters), he 
unearths the most basic feature of aesthetic appreciation, and, in fact, the 
most basic human experience: our engaged, interrelated participation in 
being. Value inheres in situations, contexts, not solely in subject or object: 
"...It is not the thing but the atmosphere which is the primary partner of 
perception qua disposition" (Bohme, 1992, p. 100). All the troublesome 
cognitive squabbles are swept away by the acknowledgement of the simple 
perceptual immediacy we enjoy with others, be they at or natural objects as 
in this case, that we always possess as a given and that does not need to be 
argued for or justified and that, in fact, grounds all rational theorizing. As 
he states it: 
What draws together natural beauty and the arts are some 
commonalities in our relation and response: Both can be experienced 
perceptually; both can be appreciated aesthetically; and more 
particularly still, both can function reciprocally with the appreciator, 
enticing the participant to join in a unified perceptual situation. Such 
appreciation requires a radically different aesthetic from eighteenth-
century disinterestedness. I call this an aesthetics of engagement, and 
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it is one that environmental appreciation especially encourages (1995, 
p.239). 
The second main issue meriting discussion from Carlson's paper 
concerns his advocacy of at least some knowledge of natural history, ecology 
and evolution for the appropriate appreciation of nature. Many authors, 
including mys'elf, have difficulty with Carlson's conclusion. Though I agree 
that there is no doubt that an acquaintance with natural history can 
certainly enhance and deepen the appreciation of nature, I cannot accept 
that it is the sole avenue for engagement and appreciation. One, but not the 
only one. In agreement with both Hepburn and Carlson, I recognize that an 
inarticulate, self-indulgent "involvement" with nature both trivializes the 
aesthetic experience - there should be some relevant story directing the 
experience that deepens it, makes it meaningful, significant - and, more 
important, debases non-human beings by denying their transcendent 
otherness. Noel Carroll, for one, certainly appreciates Carlson's efforts, but 
regards them as unnecessarily limiting. To again employ Hepburn's 
schema, Carroll would argue that Carlson's sense of appreciation 
overemphasizes the thought-component at the cost of a diminution in the 
sensuous-component. Carroll argues, quite accurately and reasonably, that 
there are many people who are not naturalists who have profoundly 
moving experiences of nature without even a passing knowledge of, or 
interest in natural history, ecology or evolutionary processes. (The same 
may be said of many non-musicians who could not imagine a fulfilling life 
in the absence of music. I have often wondered if perhaps their experience 
may be even more intense than my own as a musician who cannot help but 
hear music in terms of chordal structure, counterpoint and the like. I cannot 
know if my partially mediated experience is greater or lesser than a non-
musician's as I cannot often escape my propensity for hearing scales or 
modal clusters.) What is common to both the experience of nature and 
music, then, is that appreciation is simply an issue of being moved by one's 
engaging object: "We may appreciate nature by opening ourselves to its 
stimulus, and to being put in a certain emotional state by attending to its 
aspects" (Carroll, 1995, p. 245). 
Carroll's paper centres on the analysis and criticism of three arguments 
from Carlson of which I shall only deal with the first. The argument 
revolves around Carlson's discussion of three competing models for 
appreciating nature: the object paradigm, the landscape or scenery model, 
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and the environmental paradigm. The first is the framed/unframed 
argument that has already been discussed at length in this chapter. But it has 
an interesting twist. If we remove a rock from its natural setting and place it 
on our mantelpiece, we are literally framing it. We also are aware that we 
can figuratively achieve the same result by means of our disciplined 
perceptual enframing skills activated by our direct experience of nature. In 
either case, the overall result is an object removed from its ecological and 
evolutionary context and, hence, divorced from the only source that can 
give it meaning and significance. But if it is unframed in both the literal and 
figurative sense, it is utterly indeterminate and unappreciable. "In the first 
case; the object model is insensitive; in the second, it is, putatively, 
inoperable" (1995, p.248). 
The second is the landscape or scenery model which, again, has been 
dealt with, but Carroll adds that in regarding nature in the same way as art, 
there are two profound differences: the latter is primarily visual, while the 
approach to the former is synaesthetic; moreover, the latter is two-
dimensional, while the former is three-dimensional: "It offers a 
participatory space, not simply a space that we apprehend from the outside" 
(1995, p.248). 
The third, the natural environmental model of appreciation, is one of 
Carlson's but stems from a paper written earlier in his career, entitled • 
''Appreciation and the Natural Environment" (1979). The central thesis is 
that nature must be taken as nature and not as art for the simple reason that 
art is static while nature is dynamic. Yet for appreciation of nature as nature 
we cannot see it as existing solely in and of itself; we need a range of 
relevant categories for determining it to some degree, to make it accessible. 
We need science as it supplies us with the knowledge that "guides us to the 
appropriate foci of aesthetic significance" (1995, p.249). 
As we saw earlier, Carroll takes umbrage at the implicit suggestion that 
Carlson's theory is all-inclusive, exhaustive. In order to defend his arousal 
theory of nature appreciation, he admits that, though his theory might be 
understood as the imposition of emotional- Gestalts on indeterminate 
nature, "nevertheless, there are features of nature especially in relation to 
human organisms, which, though they are admittedly 'selected', are 
difficult to think of as 'impositions' (1995, p. 251). He employs the 
following example: 
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Certain natural expanses have natural frames or what I prefer to call 
natural closure: caves, copses, grottoes, clearings, arbors, valleys, etc. 
And other natural expanses, though lacking frames, have features 
that are naturally salient for human organisms - i.e. they have 
features such as moving water, bright illumination, etc. that draw our 
attention instinctually toward them. And where our emotional 
arousal is predicated on either natural closure or natural salience, it 
makes little sense to say that our emotional responses, focused on said 
features are impositions. 
Though Carroll's central thesis is reasonable - that there is no real reason 
to take any appreciative approach towards nature as the gospel and that his 
view is just one possible route, no better or worse than any other - his essay 
is seriously marred by a failure to mount a distinct argument outlining his 
position, relying as it does mainly on an exposition of Carlson's views. 
Nonetheless, an attempt should be made at a distillation. His central image 
of appreciative arousal is a waterfall. He says that he is exhilarated by the 
grandeur of the waterfall. The exhilaration aroused by the waterfall is not 
inappropriate as the waterfall itself is grand. It: 
meets the criteria of scale appropriate to grandeur, where grandeur, in 
turn, is one of the appropriate sources of exhilaration. In this case, our 
perceptual make-up initially focuses our attention on certain features 
of the natural expanse, which attention generates a state of emotional 
arousal, which state, in turn, issues in reinforcing feedback that 
consolidates the initial selective gestalt of the emotional arousement 
experience. The arousal model of nature appreciation has an account 
of how we isolate certain aspects of nature and why these are 
appropriate aspects to focus upon: that is, they are emotionally 
appropriate (1995, p. 252). 
In other words, we do not require scientific understanding in order to be 
deeply moved by, and therefore appreciative of, a natural object: "the 
cognitive component of our emotional response does the job of fixing the 
aspects that are relevant to appreciation" (1995, p. 253). This would seem to 
fall prey easily to at least two criticisms. First, to use Hepburn's schema, this 
could only be seen as the apotheosis of the trivial. One can only be 
appreciative of the grandiose and spectacular? Surely not. I happen to be 
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very appreciative of a very plain, simple little grey-brown bird called a 
Dusky Robin that lives only in Tasmania. I cannot quite put my finger on it, 
but it just has a pleasant, unobtrusive demeanour and a quite musical, 
though brief, song. Perhaps that is the very reason I am attracted to this bird. 
I might even be the only one in the world who thinks so, yet that does not 
detract from the fact that the bird is appreciated, and appreciated in inverse 
proportion to its grandiosity. By Carroll's delineation of what is appropriate 
for appreciation, my sentiments would be inappropriate as they do not 
match the scale of the present spectacle. I find this most alarming, especially 
when we are talking about living, sentient beings and not just some dusty 
artifact in a gloomy museum. 
Second, and this pretty well follows on from the criticism above, in the 
absence of natural history as a relevance gauge, what would the cognitive 
component of our emotional psyche make of a crocodile drowning a 
wildebeest? The intense revulsion, presumably, that would arise from such 
a scene (in the absence of a knowledge of ecology) would, seemingly, not be 
inappropriate as the emotion is on the same scale as the object. But is it? 
There is nothing at all rare, spectacular or significant about a crocodile 
feasting on a gnu. This makes Carroll's position even more untenable since 
the scene is not all that significant and, therefore, an emotional outburst 
would be inappropriate as it does not match the scale of the spectacle. So, 
while I agree that there may be a time and a place for the suspension of a 
reliance on natural historical knowledge, and, therefore, for simple visceral 
exhilaration, Carroll's argument is just too weak to be convincing. 
Conclusion: How should we appreciate nature ? 
In the foregoing, I have attempted to draw out the approaches that 
dominate current thinking on the themes of natural beauty and natural 
aesthetics. Almost all of the authors presented are disillusioned by the trend 
in contemporary aesthetic philosophy to assimilate natural beauty into art 
beauty, something which has, Until recently, received little, if any, 
challenges since E.H. Gombrich handed down the stone tablet ruling that 
appreciation could embrace only three central features: an initial design, the 
object embodying this design, and the individual who embodies the design 
in the object. This has, with few exceptions, effectively turned the majority 
of thinkers against traditional aesthetics. Most have, therefore, sought 
refuge in considerations of natural beauty and the appreciation it instills. 
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The major impediment, as we have seen, is that aesthetics cannot 
countenance the supposition -that appreciation can ensue from an aesthetic 
experience where there is no artist present, and, hence, no intention 
grounding the appreciated object. This is metaphysical heresy as it does not 
allow for the ranking of objects against a normative standard of aesthetic 
success or failure. It places beauty in the eye of the beholder and, therefore, 
explicitly makes all objects equally worthy of appreciation, whether that 
appreciation is either serious or trivial. 
One might think this if it were not for the fact that, though the role of 
the artist has been removed from the equation, there still remains a 
significant object and an appreciative audience. The presence of the 
intractable object means that a relevant, significant sense of appreciation 
should temper any proclivity toward aestheticism or narcissism. Hepburn 
laid the groundwork through a recasting of the subject/object relation as 
sensuous component/thought component, and through a consideration of 
the triviality or seriousness with which one can approach the notion of 
appreciation. His seminal contribution was that: "We might find an 
acceptable ideal for serious aesthetic perception in encouraging ourselves to 
enhance the thought-load almost to the point, but not beyond the point, at 
which it begins to overwhelm the vivacity of the particular 
perception"(1995, p. 73). His suggestion was that subjective perception 
requires some guidance in the form of an acquaintance with natural history 
in order to ensure that one's positive appreciation of an object is not 
irrelevant, that it is appropriately serious, and that the sensuous component 
does not overwhelm the thought component and, thus, trivialize the 
experience. 
Following Hepburn's lead, we saw that two authors in particular, 
Sepanmaa and Carlson, and here, too, I would include Callicott (1974), treat 
the knowledge of ecology, in the case of Sepanmaa, and natural history in 
the case of the other two, as mandatory for any serious experience of 
appreciation. Where Sepanmaa ran aground was through his quixotic 
determination to wrest a consistent aesthetics of nature rooted in ecology 
which proved, ultimately, unfruitful. Carlson's more rigorous 
epistemology, however, placed him in a more compelling position. 
Through his reworking of the traditional aesthetic notion of 
disinterestedness - something considered anathema by virtually all of his 
peers - he argued that disinterestedness is not just the passive, 
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contemplative activity most would assume it to be, but a crucial feature of 
appreciation. Disinterestedness, as opposed to pure subjective annexation or 
assimilation which fails to give due acknowledgement to objects and their 
"otherness", is essential in that it is the means for accepting the knowledge 
essential for significant appreciation. He justified this insistence on the 
permissibility of having "knowledge about" (in the form of natural history) 
by including the following provisos (1995, p. 203): a) as long as it does not 
detract from the concrete experience (i.e. overwhelm the sensuous-
component); b) as long as it is faithful to the expressiveness of the object, 
thereby respecting its "otherness"; and c) as long as it enhances and deepens 
appreciation for the natural object. 
There are a few other minor configurations which I include here in the 
vague hope of achieving something resembling all-inclusiveness. Noel 
Carroll argued, quite justifiably, that though Carlson's contribution to the 
development of the concept of appreciation is monolithic, there is still 
room for alternate senses of appreciation, that knowledge of natural history 
is not necessarily a prerequisite for appreciation. I agreed that his "arousal 
model of nature appreciation", in extolling the virtue of an emotional, 
visceral response to nature is certainly acceptable; yet, I was unable to 
discern anything in his argumentation other than self-contradiction. 
Though not discussed in the text, or at least not at length, it is important to 
mention the works of the following: Yi-Fu Tuan (1995), who argues that, for 
some, true appreciation only occurs in settings where the subject is almost 
completely removed from a human social, cultural and historical context in 
extreme environments such as in deserts or polar regions. These regions are 
sublime as nature shatters the bounds that permit disinterested 
contemplation and assimilates the human presence; Donald Crawford 
(1995), who effects a straightforward, philosophically traditional case for the 
similarity of art objects and natural objects and, thus, for their assimilation 
due to their semantic similarity and employs Hegel's notion of spirit which 
explicitly treats natural objects as inferior to artobjects due to their lack of 
intentionality with the result that, in comparing statues and rocks, even the 
most unsuccessful work of art has a greater perfection than the most 
beautiful rocks in that the former is animated by human spirit, self-
conscious purpose (1995, p. 192). The great strength of Crawford's essay, 
however, is that he ultimately rejects the Hegelian aesthetics on the 
grounds that it is too broad and formal, that "it doesn't require perceptual 
discrimination and sensitivity to discern beauty" (1995, p. 192). Against the 
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search for the grandiose, the rare and spectacular, he suggests that the subtle 
differences obtaining between, say, a Norway spruce and a Scotch Pine may 
augment appreciation of beauty. His insistence on the subtle discrimination 
between natural objects which is made possible within natural historical 
parameters and which, therefore, enhances aesthetic appreciation, strongly 
commends this essay; Joseph Meeker (1972) and Tom Bartuska with Gerald 
Young (1975), who recognize the undeniable similarity of art objects and 
ecosystems in that: a) they share the elements and internal relationships of a 
phenomenally objective field; b) there is an awareness of form based on the 
relationships among objects in that field; and c) there is a high degree of 
unity, coherence and completeness; and Douglas Porteous (1996, p. 27ff) 
who, though it is not the central theme of his book, sheds light on the 
thought-component/sensuous-component through the right brain/left 
brain findings of cognitive psychology. Rather than embracing the 
phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty and Levin which treats 
perception and cognition as distinct, yet equally and always available modes 
of approaching Being, Porteous identifies the qualitative/quantitative 
distinction lying at the heart of the perceptual/cognitive distinction with 
left/right brain functioning. The right brain yields an autocentric view, 
while the left brain yields an allocentric view. The distinction is well known 
as the contrast between a subject-centred and object-centred perceptual bias. 
The left-brain, allocentric outlook is primarily visual, "cool", intellectual, 
distanced, detached, linear, manipulative, and orthodox and, as such, its 
appropriate mode of communication is the articulation of tangible detail 
through verbal expression. By contrast, the right-brain, autocentric outlook 
is synaesthetic, "hot", physical, engaged, experiential, hermeneutic, creative, 
interrelated and intuitive, and is predicated on pattern recognition 
expressible through eidetic (image) language. (1996, pp. 27-31). It is this latter, 
autocentric attitude which lies at the heart of the aesthetic appreciation of 
nature, in Porteous' opinion. For, unlike the distanced, allocentric attitude 
which "makes it easy to regard nature and environment as a series of objects 
worthy of disregard or exploitation" (1996, p. 31), the autocentric attitude, 
being primarily acoustic is thoroughly engaged by the natural setting. In 
being all-surrounding, more transitory, fluid and unfocused than visual 
stimuli, sounds entreat active participation in the aesthetic delineation of 
the setting (1996, p. 33). Though very reductionistic and far too concerned 
with praxis, in my view, Porteous' position certainly adds another 
dimension to nature aesthetics. 
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The most radical work being done on the theme of appreciation, 
however, is by ArnOld Berleant and Gernot Bohme. They take all of the 
dichotomies such as subject! object, disinterestedness/appreciation, thought-
component/sensuous-component and the like, and reject them all out of 
hand. Berleant argued for one aesthetic, an aesthetic of engagement. His 
central argument was that an art work requires the presence of a perceiver 
in order to achieve its communicative goal. This, then, suggests that neither 
the perceiver nor the work can have meaning independently of each other. 
There is, as he calls it, a "somatic engagement in the aesthetic field" which 
unites perceiver and object into a perceptual unity in which the 
interrelation of - both, their equal participation in the mutual determination 
of meaning and significance, is made manifest as aesthetic appreciation. 
This is not the disinterested appreciation of an object's formal properties, 
but a "fascination with intricate detail, subtle tone, endless variety, and the 
imaginative delight in what we would call in a human artifact marvellous 
intention, all as part of an environmental setting with which we, as 
appreciative participants, are continuous" (1995, p. 238). 
Berleant's aesthetics of engagement embraces three central features: 
continuity in that subject and object, self and world, are inseparable in the 
aesthetic field of somatic engagement; perceptual integration or synaesthesia 
which occurs as the perceiver opens himself up to the full resonance of 
meaning and significance available in the lived perceptual situation; and 
the participation which ultimately yields appreciation as the context takes 
shape and assumes meaning and significance. The three together offer 
tremendous potential for the groundwork of a phenomenology of music 
and nature which will be explored in the final chapter. 
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MUSICAL MEANING 
It is interesting that, in the search for a new environmentally appropriate 
metaphysic grounded in the aesthetic value of nature, environmental 
aestheticians have systematically avoided the field of musical aesthetics. 
Though natural value construed as aesthetics rather than as moral value 
has its merits, one can wonder why natural aesthetics value should be 
limited to its visual or literary aesthetic yield. For as we saw in the last 
chapter, the assimilation of natural objects into art objects treats perception 
as a subject/object relation and employs objective language which is 
grounded in aft- epistemology antagonistic to an environmentally 
appropriate metaphysic. 
The perception of music, however, may offer a sense of natural value 
which is more environmentally appropriate. Though musical perception 
may seem a strange thing to model natural perception on, the attempt may 
be justified by the fact that musical perception represents one example of a 
situation in which we all perceive phenomenologically: i.e., embodied self 
and engaging other, as equal participants, institute .musical meaning in the 
concrete, perceptual situation. Music differs fundamentally from the visual 
and literary arts, then, in that its full significance is not, indeed cannot be, 
revealed objectively, independently of its eventful unfolding in immediate 
experience. The reason for this is that it does not have an extrinsic, but an 
intrinsic content; its meaning is not established by the identification of 
referents with reference, but through the concrete, participatory attempt to 
establish musical meaning. The essence of the musical "object" is not 
something that can be neutrally identified and received as property X 
existing independently of a distanced, disinterested subject. It exists only as 
long as self and other are united for the object's delineation in a thoroughly 
-interrelated and engaged setting: Its meaning, unlike that of other art 
objects, is not fixed eternally, externally to itself by means of transcendental 
concepts. It is determined relationally through the joint operation of self 
and musical phenomena, or more exactly, akumena. As such the musical 
"object" always maintains its otherness through its resistance to its full 
conceptual reification. The perception and cognition of the musical object 
employs a unique epistemology which thoroughly precludes any 
• mechanistic/reductionistic approach. It may perhaps be the case, then, that 
the moral concern for nature and its preservation that preoccupied 
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Hepburn, Carlson and Sepanamaa in the pfeceding chapter may —get a 
stronger "hearing" through the description of the musical object, rather 
than through visual or literary objects. Consequently, the perception of 
musical akumena may more adequately or directly stimulate the sort of 
appreciation which is sought for natural objects. 
It is the purpose of the present and final chapters, taken together, to argue 
for the phenomenological similarity of the perception of musical and 
natural objects in that neither need be understood solely in 
objective/reductionistic ways and that, perhaps, the appreciation of natural 
value may be analogous to the appreciation of musical value. Thus, the 
analogy may offer the groundwork for a more environmentally appropriate 
attitude than is provided by more objective, dualistic accounts. One of the 
central themes will centre on the expressive/evocative character of music in 
order to elucidate how the perception/cognition of music may offer a non-
objective model for natural perception/cognition. An attempt will be made 
to show that the perception of music, even more fundamentally than the 
reading of poetry, may yield a sense of value, an appreciation, which may 
also obtain in the perception of natural objects. This is not to say that a 
musical appreciation of nature is superior in any way to the appreciation 
attending the poetic nomination of natural objects, but only that, in order to 
be meaningfully grasped, music steadfastly resists wholly objective 
interpretation. Its value grows out of tonal relationships and not out of a 
tone's correspondence with some extra-musical content. Like an ecosystem 
wherein species have no meaning in isolation, but only in their 
interrelation with other species in a continually evolving context, the 
musical opus is not a conglomeration of discrete tones, but a continuous 
process of interrelated tones which evolve as harmonies. Thus, while it may 
be possible to label chords as tonic, subdominant or dominant in the way 
that we affix names to species or ecological communities, the identification 
of chord progressions is not crucial for understanding a piece, and 
appreciating its significance. 
Clearly, music can be reduced abstractly and theoretically to its 
component parts, to its harmonic units, chords which can be labelled as F 
minor seventh, B flat dominant thirteenth, E flat major ninth, for example. 
Yet its abstract, theoretical vivisection after the fact by the music critic is 
acknowledged to be solely heuristic, an evil made necessary by the 
intransigence of musical experience to its conceptual reification. Put 
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otherwise, if the import of a piece of music is to be communicated to 
someone who is not actually engaged in the work's concrete sounding, its 
meaning must be expressed in terms that are communally understood; 
hence, there is a somewhat objective vocabulary for describing music. 
Moreover, it may even be the case that a passing acquaintance with musical 
genres and styles, and perhaps some musical theory, may enhance its 
experience, may provide the relevant information which prevents its 
appreciation from becoming trivial, shallow. That is, a grounding in the 
basics of musical theory may approximate the role of natural history in 
setting significant parameters for the meaningful appreciation of natural 
objeci:s that would be in keeping with Hepburn's and Carlson's 
argumentation. 
Music and Language 
For some authors, however, it is not so clear that musical meaning is 
revealed phenomenologically in its immediate perception, and not 
objectively. In particular, Noam Chomsky (1957) and John Sloboda (1985) 
have attempted to demonstrate _that, at a deep level, language and music 
share a common structure. Their assumption is that phonology, the 
division of sounds into communicative units, syntax, the combination of 
these units into "legal" or "illegal" sequences, and semantics, the meaning 
carried by such sequences, exist both in language and music (Sloboda, 1985, 
p. 11). Consequently, just as there are "correct" or "incorrect" statements in 
language, there are "correct" or "incorrect" musical statements. There is, 
then, a "natural" structure to both modes of communication: a subject-
predicate structure to language and a tonic-subdominant-dominant-tonic 
structure to music. And the violation of these structures are known to be 
wrong when heard. For the moment we will ignore the proposition that 
musical structure is natural, not conventional, and the suggestion that 
music, being far less structurally complex than language (there are only sixty 
basic chords in Western diatonic harmony whereas there are countless 
nouns, verbs, adverbs and adjectives in any number of languages), even 
makes assertions at all. These claims will be re-examined in the final section 
on the phenomenology of music. 
What, specifically, Sloboda, a cognitive psychologist, has to say about 
phonology is that musical notes are perceived and meaningfully categorized 
in a manner similar to linguistic phonemes according to the frequency and 
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duration of their sounds (1985, pp. 24-31). His suggestion is that just as the 
meaning of a linguistic utterance is determined by the perception of vocal 
inflection - the slight rise or drop of the voice - so, too, the meaning of 
music involves a "categorical perception" of frequency variation which has 
semantic significance. His justification for such a conclusion is that 
musicians that he has tested will, when supplied the first and fifth notes of a 
triad, where the middle note, the third, which determines the triad to be 
major or minor, oscillates between the pitches that determine the chord as 
major or minor, categorically select a specific pitch in order to make the 
chord determinate in their minds: Whether true or not, what significance 
does this observation have? Just because a musician in a laboratory is -.- 
required to establish a chord's major or minor tonality, what does this say 
about the resemblance of meaning in language and music as they are 
practiced in everyday life? Might it not be the case that the atmosphere of 
the lived context in which both are experienced, the perception of the meta-
linguistic meaning inherent in vocal inflection, to use his example, is better 
understood phenomenologically rather than mechanistically and 
reductionistically? Might it not be more satisfyingly described in terms of the 
participation of self and interlocutor in an engaged setting, rather than as a 
neutral causal exchange between discrete, atomistic phenomena? If it is true 
that a musician will always categorically perceive the meaning of the 
tonality of a chord, and so determine it as major or minor, does he not, 
when he is liberated from the artificial constraints of the laboratory, take his 
cue from the chords that precede and ensue from the present chord, from 
the temporal movement of the piece in its dynamic entirety? Does not 
Sloboda's reductionistic approach unduly simplify and, therefore, distort 
and debase what is in fact a very rich, complex and profound perceptual 
experience'? A very significant difference between a chord and a word is that 
the labelling of a single chord in itself, in isolation from its musical context, 
devoid of its interrelation with other harmonies, is meaningless. A chord is 
simply not the same as a word which always has denotative meaning in 
isolation as it is inextricably bound to its corresponding concept. The 
analogy, as a result, would seem to be facile, if not trivial. 
Sloboda argues that the duration of a phoneme or tone is also a 
determinant of meaning in that duration, also, is categorically perceived. 
The analogy is so obvious that one can only wonder why he mentions it. 
Patently, the attack and decay of a phoneme or tone determines 
categorization and, therefore, meaning; clearly, the perception of the attack 
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of the phonemes "chop" and "shop" involves categorization in the 
establishment of meaning (1985, p. 29). But, though "chop" and "shop" are 
like tones in that they only have meaning in the context of their use in a 
sentence rather than by their articulation in isolation, they are unlike tones 
insofar as they are merely tools for imparting determinate information. 
The attack and decay of tones, however, play a far more significant role in 
the determination of musical meaning. It is a fascinating aspect of music 
that tones played by different instruments, if the attack of the tone is not 
heard, sound identical as pure tones. The attack, then, is an absolute 
determinant of the overall colour and mood of the piece, not just a vehiele 
for establishing one definitive, denotative meaning. The decay of the tone, 
too, has great significance relative to the type of instrument which performs 
it. In orchestrating a work, the physical limitations of instruments with 
regards to melody, harmony and especially rhythm must be borne in mind. 
With certain instruments, such as woodwinds and brass, an individual tone 
may be prolonged up to the point that the musician runs out of air; their 
tones, consequently, decay more slowly than other instruments. Tones 
produced by strings may give the initial impression of deferring their decay, 
yet there are subtle breaks corresponding to the shift in the direction of 
bowing. Finally, sounds performed on percussion instruments, including 
the piano and the guitar, decay rapidly. (It should be mentioned, however, 
that the electrified versions of the latter allow for the indefinite decay of 
their soundings.) Clearly, then, if the composer's intention is to sustain or 
intensify a tone or harmony over any stretch a time, the physical limitations 
of the instrument must be acknowledged, and he must temper his 
arrangement accordingly. The point to be gleaned here is twofold: first, 
while the attack of a phoneme is an absolute determinant of the meaning of 
a phrase, the attack of a tone which often establishes its gestural significance 
in the overall mood of the piece, if unheard, may somewhat diminish the 
overall experience of the work, yet it will never preclude the perception of 
the meaning of the work as a whole; and second, the decay of a phoneme is 
always prescribed; in its role as merely a tool for importing information, its 
sounding is essentially percussive and punctual; its slow decay would only 
serve to annoy or disorient. In short, while the division of linguistic 
utterance into its component phonemes is necessary for communication, 
which unfolds serially, linearly, in order to establish a coherent linguistic 
utterance, the division of musical sound into its component tone s is an 
impediment to communication as music unfolds cyclically, herrneneutically 
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in order to establish its meaning: a communicative resonance. In other 
words, a simple dialectic occurring between interlocutors demands that only 
one voice speaks at a time, yet for most types of music the intention is to 
create a harmony of voices, overlapping voicings. It would, therefore, seem 
that the simultaneous layering of phonemes, on the one hand, and tones on 
the other, yields polyphony in the case of music, and cacophony in the case 
of linguistic exchange. 
With regards to the syntactical similarity of language and music, Sloboda 
rightly argues that there are grammatical rules in language which ensure 
that listeners will be able to sort utterances they hear into "acceptable". and 
"unacceptable" categories (1985, p. 33). He encounters difficulties, however, 
when he claims that: 
If one were to consult any standard textbook on harmony, one finds 
that it contains a large set of prescriptions for the sequence of chords 
that are or are not permissible in tonal music (1985, p. 41). 
His mistake is not so much that he conflates music and language by 
implicitly claiming that there can be acceptable or unacceptable categories for 
musical statements, but that the "textbook" he cites as a definitive authority 
on harmony could only be a textbook on classical harmony. There are rules 
of classical harmony that "forbid" the use of parallel fifths and octaves and 
which, therefore, would consider the employment of such sequences 
impermissible. (It must be said that the formulation of such rules, however, 
is highly selective and, in common with all attempts at the codification of 
theoretical rules, takes place after the fact and are but rarely appealed to in 
the composition of a work. Mozart, for example, heard concertos and 
symphonies in his head fully orchestrated in their entirety, and when he did 
commit them to manuscript form - usually to pay off his gambling debts - 
there was no shortage of parallel octaves.) In the case of twentieth century 
compositions, moreover, it seems possible to claim that great compositions 
represent a deliberate flouting of the "rules" of classical harmony. The 
permissibility/impermissibility of certain harmonic structures simply does 
not appear to have much purchase any longer. In classical harmony, the use 
of the flat-nine interval is deemed "unacceptable". Yet pianists such as Errol 
Garner, Duke Ellington and Herbie Hancock regularly broke or break this 
inviolable maxim; to such a degree, in fact, that the interval is now a 
mandatory voicing in every jazz pianist's arsenal. It is simply no longer the 
144 
case that a critic would or could take umbrage at such transgressions or 
claim that music employing such structures is meaningless. Clearly, musical 
meaning is less constrained by rule obedience than linguistic meaning. 
There is, then, a profound difference between the two. 
Sloboda's attempted assimilation of music into language completely 
collapses when he abandons his scientific/reductionistic view of music and 
implicitly examines musical perception in a non-theoretical, experiential 
manner (1985, p.44). To maintain his thesis that subject-predicate form and 
tonic-subdominant-dominant-tonic are structurally identical, he must claim 
that the "violation" of such structures is impermissible or meaningless. 
This is easy to prove in the case of language; clearly, the phrase "ate cat dog 
the the", in violating subject-predicate form, is impermissible and 
meaningless. But does this hold for music? If one takes a rising melodic line 
of c, e, g, a in the key of C major which then resolves to g and attempts to 
harmonize it, by Sloboda's definition, the c, e, g forming the tonic chord 
makes the "a" which is not part of the tonic triad, an "a" in the f, a, c 
subdominant chord of F major which then must resolve to the dominant G 
chord of the C major scale. Only by this interpretation can the tonic-
subdominant-dominant-tonic structure be maintained and, thus, make the 
chordal progression permissible and meaningful. Unfortunately though, 
this is not how the melodic line from Beethoven's piano sonata (Op. 14, No. 
1) is harmonized. Though the c, e, g is from the tonic chord, the "a" is not 
from the anticipated f, a, c subdominant chord. Rather, it is an "a" from the 
chord of d, f#, a, the dominant chord of the key of G major, and the final g is 
not part of the c, e, g tonic chord of C major, but the "g" of g, b, d, the tonic 
chord of the G major key into which Beethoven has modulated. Beethoven, 
knowing that the listener would expect him to follow the normal tonic-
subdominant-dominant-tonic pattern, deliberately thwarts the listener's 
expectations for aesthetic effect. What he does is, by Sloboda's 
characterization of musical structure, impermissible and meaningless. Yet, 
by general consensus, this harmonization is both beautiful and meaningful. 
The question of its impermissibility would, consequently, not seem to be at 
issue. 
Even Sloboda must grant this and, for this reason, shelves his scientific 
analysis of musical structure - in favour of a more phenomenological 
interpretation. He makes it clear that the structure of music does not 
resemble a linguistic structure that rigidly determines one's perception and 
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cognition of meaning. It is understood that a rigid tonic-subdominant-
dominant-tonic structure, though correct, would not be as beautiful as what 
Beethoven in fact achieves. The surprising structural twist, in its sounding 
and perceptual reception, not in its intellection, is what determines the 
work's aesthetic quality and appreciation. Thus, in fact, Sloboda accepts the 
opposite of his thesis. He reveals that the very aesthetic qualities of the 
theme stem from the violation of accepted musical decorum, and the 
thwarting of what is musically anticipated. There is, then, a profound 
difference between the meaning of language and music. In language, it is 
assumed that speaker and listener abide by grammatical rules that assure 
unambiguous utterances and the reception of intended meaning. In music, 
however, the composer is not so rule-bound. In fact, the composer, as 
Sloboda himself states it: "...anticipates the strategies that a listener in his 
culture will use to structure his or her experience, and seeks to thwart these 
strategies in interesting ways" (1985, p. 51). 
Music and Langer's Symbolism 
Though it must be concluded that Sloboda's attempt to establish a 
semantic identity between music and language fails, there have been other 
formulations which have faired better for not being so scientific and 
reductionistic. Susanne Langer's Philosophy in a New Key (1959), a seminal 
work in musical aesthetics, has, in particular, been considered to be the 
definitive work on language and music. What commends Langer's work is 
the philosophical rigour and scepticism that she brings to her specific 
interest. She takes pains, at first, to explain what she is not trying to 
demonstrate. For instance, she makes it clear that music is not a language in 
the normal sense. As she states it: 
Music... is pre-eminently non-representative even in its classical 
productions, its highest attainments. It exhibits pure form, not as 
embellishment, but in its very essence; we can take it in its flower - for 
instance, German music from Bach to Beethoven - and have 
practically nothing but tonal structures before us: no scene, no object, 
no fact (1959, p. 209). 
What, specifically, she is criticizing here, as many critics of musical 
expression have charged as well, is the hypothesis that music: 1) is 
expressive of the composer's emotions; and 2) that an audience, in hearing 
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the music will subsequently experience that same emotion. With regards to 
the composer's intention, she first ponders how a composer could possibly • 
experience so many emotions in the composition of a single work. More 
important, though, she questions why a composer would select music, of all 
things, as a means of catharsis. As she puts it: 
Sheer self-expression requires no artistic form. A lynching-party 
howling round the gallows-tree, a woman wringing her hands over a 
sick child, a lover who has just rescued his sweetheart in an accident 
and stands trembling, sweating and perhaps laughing or crying with 
••• 
	
	 emotion, is giving vent to intense feelings; but such scenes are not 
occasions for music, least of all composing (1959, p. 216). 
In short, a punch or a glare is a better avenue for expressing anger than 
composing an agitated movement of a sonata. 
Having reasoned that music does not imitate or represent a specific 
human emotion, and is not aesthetically good or bad to the degree that it 
succeeds or fails to express emotions, Langer seeks to account for why people 
are powerfully affected by music. She grants that "music is known indeed, to 
affect pulse-rate and respiration, to facilitate or disturb concentration, to 
excite or relax the organism, while the stimulus lasts..." (1959, p. 212). The 
point she raises in her second criticism is that the attachment of emotion to 
such responses is based on an inference that the emotion must be in the 
music and that we experience the particular emotion in some determinate, 
causal fashion. She argues that this emotional identification merely reflects 
a psychological fact that people tend to associate feelings with music. And, in 
her view, this is only a response to sound in general, not music specifically. 
Such a response is no different to experiencing fear upon hearing a fire-
alarm. As she facetiously, yet trenchantly, inquires: "if music really grieves 
or frightens us, why do we listen to it" (1959, p. 214)? 
Having dismissed musical expressiveness as a kind of language that can 
convey specific emotions, Langer centres her attack on Schopenhauer's 
thesis that music is a real language with a conceptual content, "...an 
impersonal, negotiable, real semantic, a symbolism with a content of ideas, 
instead of an overt sign of somebody's emotional condition" (1959, p. 219). 
Though Schopenhauer did not sufficiently expand on this analogy, Langer 
interprets him as saying that there is an "ideational content... embodied in 
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the language [italics mine] of tones" (1959, P.  219). That is, there is a causal 
quality to music, especially programme music,. that permits and insists that 
the listener affix a specific emotional concept to a musical tonality. That 
there is a one-to-one correspondence, therefore, between tones and extra-
musical contents, in Langer's interpretation of Schopenhauer, is refuted. 
Certainly, some composers, notably Berlioz and Delius, have used this 
technique with questionable results: the head falling from the scaffold 
represented by tympani in Berlioz's "Symphonie Fantastique" and the 
cuckoo chiming, on beat, in Delius' ."Two pieces for Small Orchestra". One 
can wonder, however, whether there would be one-to-one correspondence 
1-Aetween tone and concept were it not for the presence of the text: ,Does the 
music itself, alone, force the listener to imagine specific objects? 
Furthermore, does not this use of music as a linguistic avenue diminish the 
aesthetic quality and autonomy of the music? One eighteenth-century critic, 
J.A. Huller, certainly thought so. He condemned onomatopoetic programme 
music rather severely. As he put it in his review of one such work: "There 
one can hear clocks striking, ducks jabbering, frogs quacking [sic], and pretty 
soon one will be able to hear fleas sneezing and grass growing" (Langer, 
1959, p. 220). In fairness to Schopenhauer, he may not have had programme 
music in mind when he claimed music to be semantic. If, however, Langer's 
interpretation is at all accurate, one would have to conclude that the 
onomatopoetic use of music, the use of music as a mimetic language, 
would, at least partially, appear to diminish the aesthetic value of the music 
by making it so utilitarian. 
But, though Langer is strongly critical of the thesis that a specific content 
can be represented in music, she does not altogether reject the view that 
music conveys something and is, therefore, meaningful. Her contention is 
not that a composer expresses a specific emotion through his/her music, but 
imparts his/her understanding of human feeling in general. She captures it 
in this way: 
Music is not self-expression, but formulation and representation of 
emotions, moods, mental tensions and resolutions - a 'logical picture' 
of sentient, responsive life, a source of insight, not a plea for 
sympathy. Feelings revealed in music are essentially not 'the passion, 
love, or longing of such-and-such an individual's inviting us to put 
ourselves in that individual's place, but are presented directly to our 
understanding, that we may grasp, realize, comprehend these feelings, 
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without pretending to have them or imparting them to anyone else 
(1959, p. 222) 
In short, the composer articulates a generalized form of emotion that is 
linguistically ineffable, but which is received as symbolic of something. The 
individual listener recognizes this and attempts to discern the work's 
meaning. Langer, however, does not want the reader to take the word 
"symbolic" too literally. She will not go so far as to explicitly state an analogy 
between linguistic phonemes and musical tones as Sloboda does. Rather, all 
she claims is that semantic musical units can be combined in myriad ways,. 
thaf they are easily "distinguished, remembered and repeated: andi,finally, 
they have a remarkable tendency to modify each other's characters in 
combinations as words do, by serving each as a context" (1959, p. 228). 
Fortunately, she declines to make the resemblance more specific usages and 
refuses to mount a full-blown defence of music as a language. In fact, in 
order to prevent the reader from asking too much of the resemblance, she 
explicitly denies that music is a language with a vocabulary, as she 
admOnishes: 
To call the tones of a scale its 'words', harmony its 'grammar', and 
thematic development its 'syntax', is a useless allegory. For tones lack 
the very thing that distinguishes a word from a mere vocable: fixed 
connotation, or 'dictionary meaning' (1959, p. 228). 
Langer's final exposition is even more carefully phrased and guarded 
than the last; it is even seemingly apologetic. On page 241, she claims that: 
"in music we have an unconsummated symbol, a significant form without 
conventional significance..." Her reason for this final characterization of 
symbolism seems clear enough. She wants the reader to in no way assume 
that musical meaning can be captured in language or is amenable to 
objective scrutiny, discursive reason. Rather, in the end, she seems to call 
for a phenomenological approach to music. She makes it evident that since 
significance is not conventionally fixed and that, consequently, the attempt 
to label is wrong-headed; significance must be established relationally, 
situationally, through the immediate experience of music. She will not 
specifically espouse a phenomenological approach, however. She assumes 
that such a subjective approach will result in a pre-occupation with one's 
feelings (an over-emphasis on the sensuous-component as Hepb urn would 
say) and, as a result that appreciation of the "object" in its otherness will be 
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neglected. But, neither does she want to defend a symbolist approach; for, in 
so doing, she would have to defend the attempt to apply objective tags - 
something which, in over-emphasizing the thought-component, distances 
the listener, and abstracts away from the musical experience, thereby 
dissipating the relational generation of musical significance. Her argument, 
then, is an attempt to balance the objective, symbolist position and the 
subjective, emotive position. In claiming that music imparts only the 
generalized form of emotion, she combats the solely subjective, emotional 
response to music. And in arguing that music imparts only an 
"unconsummated symbol", she precludes the application of specific, 
objective, abstract concepts to music. Though one can, sceptically, ask how 
Langer can demonstrate that a generalized form of emotion - which is 
ineffable - exists and why she must reject a phenomenological approach that 
seems to offer so many solutions to her various concerns, it is probably 
better to place such questions in abeyance for the moment. These will be 
explored presently. It should be said, though, that her attempt to reconcile 
emotive and symbolist positions is, all in all, quite satisfying. 
The Expressionist Theory of Musical Meaning 
Langer, though, does have her critics. Peter Kivy, in particular, assails 
her, not for her statement that music is, to some degree, similar to a 
language in that it conveys an "unconsummated symbol", the generalized 
form of emotion, but for her conclusion that music does not express specific 
emotions. In The Corded Shell (1980), Kivy's central task is to temper 
respectable "scientific" analyses of music with accounts of musical 
expressiveness. In short, he wants emotive descriptions to be deemed 
respectable and, thus, seeks to demonstrate that they can be "objective" in 
the sense of having inter-subjective validity and application. 
His launching-point and the nexus of his reasoning revolves around a 
distinction he draws between something "expressing X" or being "an 
expression of X" and something being "expressive of X". A shout and a 
clenched fist are said to be "expressions of X" as they are logically dependent 
upon a subject's actually being angry. To say that a St. Bernard has a sad face, 
however, is not to say that its face "expresses" sadness. For, in order for that 
to be true, the dog would actually have to be sad. Instead, the St. Bernard's 
face is said to be "expressive of" sadness: such a claim is logically 
independent of how the dog feels. 
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The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated as Kivy wants to 
claim that traditional theories of musical expressiveness all treat 
expressiveness as "expressing X" or being "an expression of X" and have, as 
a result, failed. For it is obvious to Kivy that emotions are not in music and, 
hence, that expressiveness is not logically dependent on the music having 
this or that emotion. What he seeks to show is that music is "expressive of' 
specific emotions, not just the generalized form of emotion that Langer 
discusses. His task, then, is not one of proving logical entailment, but of 
showing that, psychologically, listeners tend to attach specific emotions to 
musical works insofar as something in the music resembles human 
emotive expression. He, consequently, rejects what he calls the "arou-3a1 
speech theory" of musical expressiveness which he characterizes in the 
following manner: 
1) music is sad (or cheerful, or whatever) in virtue of its arousing 
sadness in the listener; 2) it arouses sadness by resembling, musically, 
the speaking voice when it arouses sadness; for 3) the listener 
recognizes the likeness and feels an appropriate emotion by a kind of 
sympathy, or fellow-feeling, much as I might be saddened by the 
sadness of a friend (1980, p. 22). 
Such a theory is perhaps easily dismissed. As Langer indicates, if one really 
does experience sadness or anger, etc. in the experience of music, why would 
anyone subject oneself to the music? Furthermore, instrumental music, 
melodically, is far more complex than the human voice when it expresses 
emotion. It is, therefore, difficult to understand musical expressiveness 
solely as the function of an analogy with the impassioned speaking voice. 
Music just does not have the causal ability to arouse specific emotions in the 
listener, in Kivy's view. 
Kivy's arguments all stem from what he refers to as the "cognitive 
speech theory" which he delineates in the following manner: 
1) music is sad (or cheerful or whatever) in virtue of its representing 
the expressive tones and other expressive characteristics of the 
human voice; 2) the listener recognizes and identifies these musical 
'icons'; 3) this recognition, in turn, triggers an emotion in the listener, 
not necessarily the one represented in the music" (1980, p. 24). 
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Though, for the reasons cited above, Kivy must reject speech as the sole 
bearer of expressiveness, this is his basic argument; all he does to amend the 
argument is to replace "speech" with "utterance" - the sum total of human 
expressive behaviour. The argument, as it stands, is not all that different 
from Langer's in that it treats musical expressiveness as "expressive of" 
rather than as "expression of". It differs, however, in that Kivy accepts, 
while Langer rejects, the hypothesis that expressive means "expressive of" 
particular human emotions. Rather than music arousing specific emotions, 
then, musical expressiveness is seen by Kivy as the result of a cognitive act 
on the part of the listener who, in hearing the music, understands the 
resemblance between the musical "icon" and a specific human emotiovial 
utterance and then supplies the appropriate emotive label. 
How exactly does this take place? What is a musical "icon"? Against 
Langer's charges which reasoned that there are no rules for establishing that 
a specific piece has "objective" property X, that music lacks distinct 
meanings, and is, therefore, not a language, not strictly symbolic, Kivy 
counters that the cognitive speech theory of musical expressiveness does 
not claim that music is symbolic. He maintains that Langer's definition of 
meaning is too limited, that one does not need to construe expressiveness as 
a one-to-one correspondence between musical icon and abstract concept. To 
state that emotions are recognized is not to commit oneself to a semantic 
theory of musical expressiveness, in Kivy's view. As he states it: "we 
recognize sadness in the St. Bernard's face, but need not say that the St. 
Bernard's faces means sadness" (1980, p. 49). The St. Bernard's face does not 
need to be seen as symbolic or as an exemplification of sadness. He further 
reasons that: 
The tailor's green swatch is not a sample of green, does not exemplify 
green, is not, hence, a symbol of green merely in virtue of being green. 
It must also function, in some sort of system, as a sample, as an 
exemplification, hence as a symbol. Not everything that is green so 
functions, which is why not everything green is a sample, 
exemplification, symbol of green (1980, p. 61). 
Kivy's opinion, then, is just that one recognizes the resemblance between 
the musical icon and the human emotion. One does not require a strict 
denotative connection to establish this resemblance as expressive. 
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A serious objection that can be levelled against Kivy's thesis, however, is 
that we hear music, but we do not hear the posture and movement that he 
includes under the rubric of human "utterance". This is not as insignificant 
a point as it might seem initially. Even if his theory could be maintained at 
a cultural level, even a societal level, it fails when tested against the human 
"utterance" inherent in other cultures. With regard to the difficulties of 
associating a piece of music with universal human utterance, Pamela Harris 
has this to say: 
I experienced this in hearing traditional music played by the 
Gwambiano Indians of Colombia. They described it as joyful wedding 
music. To me, this music sounded pensive rather than joyful, and I 
was quite surprised to learn that it was wedding music (1989, p. 28). 
Throughout, Kivy relies on visual and literary analogies to demonstrate 
how we find music expressive. On pages 57-58, he argues that a circle with 
three lines on it where eyes and a mouth would be on a face will be seen as a 
face. He suggests that: "just as we see the face in the circle, and the human 
form in the wooden spoon, we hear the gesture and the utterance in the 
music, and not another thing." The analogy is so facile as to lack credibility. 
It is not enough to conclude, from the observation that an almost 
exclusively visual species animates visual phenomena, that we animate 
sounds as well. Since a stare is usually associated with an intention to 
predate, the capacity to discern the significance of another's aspect is of 
critical importance. Sounds have nowhere near the same force, save for 
alarms or sirens, perhaps, which are, by their nature symbolic, established by 
convention. It should also be stated that I do not have any difficulty with 
Kivy's phenomenological characterization of the gestural, bodily 
significance of the musical experience, but only with his more specific claim 
that we hear music as speech, utterance (1980, p. 58). 
In fairness to Kivy, this particular argument is not all that central to his 
overall strategy. But it does reflect the vagueness of his generalizations 
concerning human psychology (which, ironically, forms the ground of his 
attack on Langer's hypothesis of the "unconsummated symbol"). The far 
more important criticism is that he justifies his theory of musical 
expressiveness by reference to music that is attached to a text. In Chapter 
Eight, he cites two famous examples in which there is a mismatch between 
music and text as examples of our perception of musical expressiveness. The 
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first (1980, P.  71) is an aria from the last act of Mozart's Le Nozze di Figaro. 
Barbarina has lost a pin and sings "Oh how dreadful. Have I lost it?" What 
is interesting about the passage is that the music's sadness is completely out 
of proportion to the sadness expressed in the text; it is seemingly more 
appropriate to the loss of a lover than the loss of a pin. It is immediately 
clear to the audience, then, that the expressiveness of the music and the text 
pull in opposite directions. What is important, then, is not just that the 
music apparently has an expressiveness independently of the text, but also, 
against Kivy's thesis, appears to militate against its easy categorization as 
expressive of a distinct, determinate emotion. 
"Che faro senza Euridice", from Gluck's opera Orfeo, too, represents a 
mismatch of text and music (1980, pp. 73-75). The disparity is even more 
pronounced, though; for the expressiveness of the music is not just out of 
proportion to the expressiveness of the text, but is, in fact, at odds with it. 
The profound sorrow expressed by Orfeo at the loss of Euridice is belied by 
the up-beat major tonality of the music. The expressiveness of the music is 
not appropriate, then, because it exceeds the expressiveness of the text as in 
Le Nozze di Figaro, but, by contrast, because it is utterly unsuitable. As 
Eduard Hanslick remarked: "one could just as well or, indeed, much more 
faithfully set the opposite words to the same tune ("I have found my 
Euridice, nothing can equal my joy")" (1957, p. 24). 
But while Hanslick mentions Orfeo in order to show that music is not 
expressive of emotions, Kivy wants to demonstrate that the expressiveness 
of music is established by the conventional association of specific emotions 
with specific musical structures. That is, while Hanslick considers music to 
be expressively neutral and ambiguous, that expressiveness can only be 
communicated by a text, and that, therefore, in the absence of text, a 
disparity of expressiveness can exist between music and text, Kivy claims 
that the music itself is expressive of a specific emotion and that its 
appropriate union with a text is, consequently, immediately grasped by the 
listener. Unfortunately for Kivy, though, he can cite no example of a 
musical work's being expressive independently of its conjunction with a 
text. It is, therefore, difficult for him to maintain that music is not 
expressively neutral. It would seem that Hanslick is right, or, at least, that 
his objection cannot be met. - 
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Moreover, Kivy is adamant that the ability to identify certain emotions is 
not grounded in any semantic, symbolic relation between tones and 
concepts. Yet, at the same time, while rejecting the possibility of 
conventional meanings being rule-governed, he claims, on page 67, that 
there are "public criteria for expression". But if conventional musical 
associations are communally described and promulgated, it would seem that 
there is a meaning connection between tones and emotions, not just 
resemblance. If there is public agreement concerning expressiveness, a 
consensus in the application of a concept to a musical structure, then there 
must be denotative meaning. 
Perhaps the most damaging criticism of Kivy's thesis is that, as he 
himself argues: 
even if the theory of expressiveness proposed is for the most part 
correct, it is completely trivial. For to call a work of art X, where "X" 
names a nontrivial property, the possession of X must be directly 
relevant to our evaluation of the work. But it is not directly relevant 
to our evaluation, at least of "pure", textless, programless, 
instrumental music that it does or does not have this or that 
expressive property: it is not the better or worse for being sad or 
cheerful, or any such thing. Therefore, sadness and happiness, and 
other expressive properties of music are trivial properties, and the 
theory that explains them, a trivial theory - of no importance to the 
philosophy of art (1980, p. 112). 
As it is stated, this argument does not represent a criticism only of Kivy's 
theory, but for all instances of arousal theory. What the arousal theory must 
defend is that, not only are the expressive properties of music dispositional, 
but that such properties are relevant to the judgment of the goodness or 
badness of music and, as such, are non-trivial. The usual line, run by 
arousalists, is that since there are states of mind which are intrinsically 
valuable, such as happiness, any music which has the dispositional ability to 
arouse them is instrumentally good. 
There is an array of difficulties with this argument. Even if it can be 
maintained that music has this dispositional character, is instrumentally 
good, is it aesthetically relevant that a piece can, say, cheer us up? 
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Surely that is not the only reason that we listen to music and find it 
valuable? Moreover, even if it could be maintained that cheerfulness is an 
"objective" property of music, why should music be considered better or 
worse to the degree that it has objective expressive properties, rather than 
none at all? Being happy is a good for humans, but is it for music? 
Furthermore, utility-value would appear to hold only for crafts and not for 
art. Ultimately, it would just seem to be the case that the search for 
expressive properties in music yields the following dubious, seemingly 
unanswerable, results: 1) even if music could possess objective expressive 
properties - which is highly debatable - does this make it intrinsically 
valuable?; 2) .:locs it not debase music to treat it solely in terms of its 
utilitarian functioning?; and 3) is it not the case that, in being preoccupied 
with questions of what music can do to improve our mental state, we lose 
sight of the music's significance qua music, and in determining its value 
solely in terms of the degree that it succeeds or fails to promote 
psychological integrity, we are explicitly trivializing the musical experience? 
The Formalist Theory of Musical Meaning 
In order to reveal why theories of musical expressiveness cannot 
demonstrate that a specific piece has an emotive content or that it even has 
an objective, conceptual content at all, it would seem prudent to contrast 
such theories with a formalist account of musical meaning. In particular, 
Eduard Hanslick, in his search for the ultimate aesthetic principles of music, 
what it is about music that makes it beautiful, reasons that it is unacceptable 
to take the representation of emotions as the essence or purpose of music. 
He argues that, since different listeners may hear different things in a piece 
of music- e.g. one may hear the representation of anger and another the 
representation of piety - we lack unanimity in our judgment of what the 
piece's content is, and, thus, cannot account for its beauty. But it is not just 
that we lack a consensus of what constitutes the beautiful in music (we may 
in fact agree on what is being expressed, what the music is "expressive of") 
that presents problems. Rather, what he maintains is that it is meaningless 
to claim that music can represent anything. "A rose is fragrant, but we do 
not say that its content is the representation of fragrance" (Hanslick, 1957, p. 
ii). It is the notion of representation itself that presents logical difficulties. 
For to represent something involves the intentional relation of two 
dissimilar things through a mental act, involves the attachment of concepts 
extrinsic to an object. And this is impermissible in the case of music, in 
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Hanslick's view. For, as he understands it, the content of music is 
specifically musical; its meaning and value "is solely in its tonal connections 
without reference to an extraneous, extramusical content" (1957, P.  iii). The 
content of music, then, is pure form, not emotions, and its essence is not to 
arouse emotions, but to engage, to stimulate the active imagination of the 
listener to a contemplation of its formal beauty. 
Hanslick's central concern, then, is to establish the beauty and autonomy 
of the musical object. He, consequently, seeks to evince how music does not 
possess transcendent meaning. It is not necessary to elaborate his first 
argument as it has already been dealt with in this chapter. Suffice it to say 
that, in common with Langer and Kivy, he rejects any sort of arousal theory 
of musical expressiveness on the grounds that: "the connection between a 
piece of music and changes in our feelings is not one of strict causation" 
(1957, p. 9). His second argument, however, revolves around the distinction 
between literary or visual art and music. He reasons that music is unique in 
that its content is not the representation of emotions that can be identified 
by means of an objective concept. The argument is simple: any emotion 
which we experience is made specific, can be labelled as "hope" or 
"melancholy", only by reference to the object that is hoped for or longed for. 
But since music cannot represent the specific concepts which determine 
feelings to be of a particular nature, neither can it represent these specific 
emotions. Moreover, it is no better to claim that, perhaps, music can 
represent unspecific emotions as Langer maintains. For it only makes sense 
to speak of something being represented once it has been identified, has had 
a concept applied to it. To have an emotion at all is to classify it, to make it 
conceptually determinate. Thus, to make any reference to an emotion is to 
employ a concept. And the only way to represent that emotion is by means 
of its concept. Hence, to say that an unspecific emotion can be represented is 
absurd. Hanslick, thus, would seem to be justified in asserting that 
"unspecific" and "represented" entails a contradiction (1957, p. 28). 
The logical error committed by "heteronomists" - those who accept that 
music makes reference to an extrinsic content - is in assuming that the 
meaning of music is conceptual. Yet, there cannot be any necessity obtaining 
between the arrangement of certain tones and the experience of specific 
emotions. But, that music cannot make reference to concepts does not mean 
that music does not express any ideas whatsoever. Hanslick argues that 
there are a range of ideas relating to the motion and intensity of music 
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which we can justifiably appeal to when speaking of a particular work (1957, 
p. 14). Since there is a basic isomorphism of the dynamics of music and the 
dynamics of our mental states, we can claim that, to some degree, that the 
physical manifestation of music in sound, its speed and intensity, can match 
our emotional states quite non-arbitrarily. We can justifiably describe both 
the particular tonal groupings in a piece and the specific quality of an 
emotional state as being "calm" or violent". For such concepts may be said 
to capture the physical nature of sound in general. We must be careful, 
however, when we move beyond the ascription of calmness to a particular 
tonal quality to claim that it expresses "love" or "fear". For when we start 
using such concepts in relation to a work's meaning, we are no longer 
referring to ideas that music can express. Given that there is no necessary 
correspondence between the tonal relations of a piece and abstract concepts, 
we are not revealing anything about the essence of music if we rely on such 
concepts. We have mistaken the actual content of music when we treat it is 
as solely conceptual. 
What about the apparent fact of our always responding to certain 
tonalities in the same way, of, for example, always experiencing joy in the 
sounding of certain chords? According to Hanslick, there is still no necessity 
to this relation and, therefore, we cannot claim that joy is expressed by 
certain harmonic structures (1957, pp. 16-17). Rather, such a relation between 
musical structures and a particular mental state is only the result of a well-
established association. The relation is only symbolic, and is no more 
necessary than the stipulation that a certain word is to stand for a specific 
concept. The relation is no more necessary than the conventionally 
established symbolism that obtains between a red light and the command to 
stop. The association of symbol and response is both initially arbitrary and 
wholly utilitarian. The same holds true for music; a tonal cluster and its 
association with a specific emotional response is arbitrary. Music, in itself, is 
neutral and ambiguous. 
An additional difficulty that Hanslick has with heteronomists, as 
opposed to autonomists who accept that music has only intrinsic meaning, 
is that they confuse musical logic with propositional logic (1957, p. 42). He 
does, however, acknowledge that this confusion is understandable, in some 
sense, in that there is a similarity between the logic of propositions and the 
logic of musical phrases. There is, for instance, a primitive "recognition", an 
intuitive understanding, which allows us to distinguish between 
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propositions which express "genuine thoughts" or "empty phrases" (1957, p. 
42). It is this recognition that allows us to grasp the "rational coherence of a 
group of tones". There is, then, a similarity between propositional and 
musical "sentences" in that they both have sense and logic. The resemblance 
should not be overestimated, however, as the two types of logic are of a 
radically different order. Musical logic is dependent on the correct relation of 
tones, while propositional logic is grounded in the coherence of concepts. 
Our response to musical or propositional statements differ in significant 
ways. Upon hearing or reading a proposition, we recognize the words being 
used, and know the concepts which they symbolize. Hence, the meaning 
that we derive from a proposition is based on the translation of what is 
stated to what it designates. We are also aware that such a relation has been 
arbitrarily instituted, and that the symbol lacks intrinsic significance. In a 
musical sentence, by contrast, there is no distinction between the symbols - 
the tones heard - and the musical ideas they embody. There is no 
representation as there is no distinction between what is meaningful in the 
musical experience and its mode of presencing itself. In short, what is 
expressed in music cannot be translated. Words and tones, by their very 
natures, simply cannot be used interchangeably to express an idea. 
This distinction in hand, Hanslick argues for the distinctive nature of 
music that sets it apart from the visual or literary arts. He states that: "every 
art has its own range of ideas which it represents in its own medium of 
expression, eg. tones, words, colours, stone" (1957, p. 11). As we saw in the - 
last chapter, whatever is expressed in the visual or literary arts is amenable 
to conceptual description, analysis and evaluation. As long as a work is 
intentionally created, is deliberately framed for its aesthetic reception, it has 
a conceptual dimension. Even a blank canvas, as long as it has been 
intentionally fabricated, has at least a basic conceptual content made 
accessible through a suite of concepts such as "blank", "white" or "square". 
Where music parts company with other art forms is that its content is 
nothing more than the expression of a purely musical idea by means of 
"tonally moving forms" (1957, p. 59). Since the logic of music cannot be 
expressed in linguistic propositions, it defies description. Its essence is 
wholly autonomous. Hence, Hanslick would appear to be utterly justified in 
stating that: "what in every other art is still description is in music already 
metaphor" (1957, p. 41). That the content of music is wholly autonomous, it 
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follows that any attempt to argue for the thesis that music represents 
concepts is misguided and fruitless. 
What, moreover, distinguishes music from the other arts is that what 
makes it beautiful is uniquely musical. In the visual and literary arts, the 
appreciation of beauty grows out of the capacity of the perceiving subject to 
understand its conceptual yield. The degree to which the individual work 
succeeds or fails to establish the correspondence between references and 
referents, therefore, determines whether or not it is received as aesthetically 
good or bad. Importantly, this means that non-musical arts can embody ugly 
or disturbing contents as long as their symbolizations are aesthetically 
effective. Yet, by contrast, since music cannot represent anything beyond its 
unfolding in tonally moving structures, claims that it can be ugly have no 
purchase. 
A Phenomenology of Musical Meaning 
So where is musical meaning? Why is music important to us? If it is not 
emotive and not cognitive, what is there in music that moves us, makes us 
put on Marley (say) and not Stravinsky? The short answer, from Chapter 
Two, is the listening stance which includes felt significance, attuned 
comportment, and creative expression: response-ability/answer-ability. 
These will be dealt with in order. What do we feel as significant in the 
hearing of a piece of music? I think that we could claim, first off, that we 
have a communication and communion with the source of soundings. 
Following Langer, "music" (organized sound, provided by the composer) is 
an expression of forms of sentience: 1) it grows, attenuates, flows, slows, 
embodies conflict, resolution, speed, arrest, silence and is profoundly 
gestural; 2) it is not a symbolism, not a series of symbols, transcendently 
deciphered, nor a language (for in language, symbolism exists as a simple 
one-to-one correspondence between words and conceived items of 
experience; yet music lacks fixed association, a single, unequivocal, 
conventional reference); 3) music would seem to exemplify a whole Gestalt 
experience in that its character is immediate and inter-relational: no tone 
makes sense in isolation, but only in its temporal presence as a focal now 
receding gently onto its horizonal resolution (the solo against its 
sedimented chordal structure); 4) music embodies this rhythm of horizonal 
waxing and waning, engages and invites, yet maintains its opacity and 
transcendence (and, in so doing, underscores the importance of 
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improvisation and hermeneutic up-dating on the part of the listener and 
performer who has aonsummated the musical moment of shared meaning); 
5) the elements of music not only fuse together to yield a greater entity (a 
synergism, like an ecosystem, wherein something emerges or is created 
beyond the simple enumeration of individual elements, but also wherein 
individual species maintain their transcendent status in a complex of inter-
relation; 6) music resonates with structure, pattern and significance 
amenable to reason, yet a reasoning that is not discursive; 7) music is 
ineffable, but open to a respectful encounter with its resonating presence; it, 
therefore, eluminates the field of prepersonal, prelinguistic embodiment 
and is valuable for demonstrating the centrality of the listening stance at the 
core of transpersonal care and concern, and 8) music develops through 
tonally moving forms in a realm of pure/virtual duration. This is measured 
in terms of sensibility (Heidegger's modal presencing), qualitative tensions 
and ontological discourse, aesthetic appreciation. Tones move in relation to 
each other - always and only to each other - in virtual, phenomenological 
time. Janus-faced, they point backwards and forwards in a whole temporal 
thrust which both establishes/grounds their significance and anticipates 
their contextual and evolutionary renewal. 
The point of the remainder of this chapter, then, is to reason that the 
examination of the perception of music provides a workable model for the 
elucidation of the transpersonal ecological enterprise, when transpersonal 
ecology is defined as "...the this-worldly realization of as expansive a sense 
of self as possible in a world in which selves and things-in-the-world are 
conceived as processes". In that the essence of music is temporal, eventful 
and the self is truly limited in its ability to abstractly conceive of that 
movement, the attempt to draw an analogy between the perception of music 
and the aims of transpersonal ecology might be justified. 
So let us begin with a consideration of how the perception of music 
might elucidate the three important elements of appropriate worldly 
behaviour, being-in-the-world, spelt out in Chapter Two: 1) felt significance; 
2) at-tuned comportment; and 3) creative expression, ontological discourse. 
Felt Significance 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the phenomenological reduction reveals the 
Logos of embodied self and engaging other in the primordial situation. At 
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root, the acknowledgement of the invitational other by the 'transcendent self 
involves an ecart wherein the ek-stase of the situation is set into motion as 
a type of on-going conversation. It may seem that music, then, being, for the 
most part, ineffable, except by means of abstract formalist or expressionist 
theoretical accounts, is non-conversational. Yet, it may be argued that few 
items of experience are as immediately meaningful, and profoundly 
significant as music. How can this be possible, though, if we assume that 
meaning is predicated on cognition and rational discourse? How can music 
be said to be meaningful? What is it about music, fundamentally, that sets it 
apart from the other arts and other types of experience? 
To answer this, the -first step is to bracket any attempt at rational 
description, and analytic evaluation, to let music sing for itself at the level of 
its most immediate perceptual encounter. How do we hear, and what do we 
encounter in, music at this level? One answer is supplied by Susanne 
Langer who maintains that there are both passive and active responses to 
music heard. She has this to say about the distinction (1953, p. 136): 
...passive hearing takes in 1) absolute pitch (even if we cannot name 
the tones); it has a certain lowness or highness, 2) absolute duration, 
3) timbre (even if we cannot sort out specific tone qualities in 
ensemble playing, the overall impression is inescapably "given"), 4) 
volume, consonance, dissonance - in jazz these conflicts are accepted 
more easily, 5) stress - accents, attack, swing, pulse, gentle, stormy or 
speedy motion at perfectly definite tempo... while in active hearing... 
[there is a]... 1) logical connectedness of tonal sequence, impression of 
development, definite expectation, and 2) [there are]... subordinate 
melodies/indistinct "tuneless" melodies, inner voice movements. 
While I would agree that all of the above are definitely elements of the 
musical experience, I do not see why Langer feels that the division of 
hearing into active and passive modes is necessary, on the one hand, and 
that, on the other hand, she does not delve sufficiently deeply into the 
essential phenomenological experience of musical sounding, how it takes 
shape in the primordial musical situation. I find fault with the former as it 
does nothing to erode the traditional thought component/sensuous 
component that has historically plagued musical aesthetics. The latter 
objection, however, is of far greater consequence. 
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Though Langer, certainly more than her peers, gave more weight to the 
immediate perception of music, rather than its abstract cognition as a 
symbolic language, she never fully penetrates into the Logos of the 
primordial situation wherein the full felt significance of music as a 
communicative other arises. In The Experiencing of Musical Sound, (1979) 
F. Joseph Smith first provides an account of the centrality of what I call the 
"listening stance" before moving on to a more specifically musical 
description of the primordial situation. Echoing the findings of Chapter 
Two, he argues that self-transcendence towards Dasein is not just my 
worlding of the world, but the opening of the world of discourse where in 
self and other come together and listen to the Logos. As he puts it (1979, p. 
37): 
...transcendence is "musical": the discourse of the living dialectic 
between me and you, and this living dialectic is conveyed only by 
living word as meaningful sound. In his essay on "logos" in Vortage 
und Aufsatze, Heidegger emphasizes the necessity of listening to the 
Logos. We cannot hear at all with our ears unless we already harken. 
An ontological harkening precedes any ontic hearing. Thus, we can 
hear not just because we have physical ears; rather we have ears 
because we are already hearers in that we already so listen to the 
logos, that we can be said to belong (gehoren) to logos. Only then can 
we hear (horen) words and sounds. Otherwise we turn a deaf ear, 
even though the sounds penetrate to us physically. Forgetfulness of 
ontological being is often simply not harkening to being. Thus the 
essence of language is not taken just from physical sound. In order to 
say anything and in order to listen, the recollection or the ingathering 
of logos is a prerequisite. Thus the logos mousikos, which makes any 
physical sound and hearing possible. 
Secondly, Smith argues that listening, hearing, and harkening are so 
basic to the primordial situation that it is perhaps more correct to speak in 
terms of akumena (things heard) rather than phenomena (things seen). His 
reasoning (1979, p. 28) is straightforward enough: sight distances things, 
putting them under our control, while sounds reach inwards and touch our 
very being. To recognize this, all one need do is acknowledge that, in the 
dark, vision is of no use to us; it is listening, hearing that guides us through 
the gloom. In order to come to an understanding of phenomena, then, it is, 
perhaps not sufficient to simply intuit their eidos (looked essence), as 
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Husserl would say. Since most things possess an acoustical dimension, 
Smith reasons, the echos (sonorous essence) of akumena, too, is central to 
Logos. In order to achieve a more comprehensive phenomenology of bodily 
understanding, the whole human experience of the world as it is lived, 
then, the phenomenological reduction should aim at revealing both the 
eidos of phenomena and the echos of akumena. For musical aesthetics, in 
common with all other totalizing, abstract theoretical pursuits, has nothing 
to say about pure sound, the music itself that only reveals itself when it is 
not forced to comply with logically derived, intellectual preconceptions of its 
import. Simply put, music should be allowed to sing in its infinite 
modalities; in fact, as mod€rn composers such as John Cage and R. Murray 
Schafer (1974) have argued, all sounds are material for musical 
compositions. We should, consequently, attempt to conjure the echos of 
akumena, revealed in their carnal resonance, rather than force soundings to 
cohere within some previously conceived, scholastic schematization of 
musical meaning. (It should be mentioned, however, that there are far less 
constricted conceptions of vision as a distancing mechanism than that 
provided by Smith. As we shall see on page 201, Barry Lopez, for one, offers 
a far more synaesthetic viewpoint). 
In discussing the epiphany in Chapter Two, I employed Levin's analogy 
of the lightning bolt to elucidate the ecart, the moment in which the other 
reveals itself, emerges out of the darkness of concealment in order to set ek-
static conversation into motion. It was, therefore, made clear that the notion 
of contrast is central to capturing the dynamic, dialectic exchange between 
the transcendent self and the other viewed as, paradoxically, a "being-in-
itself-for-us". The obvious musical analogue of the visual chiaroscuro of 
lightning and darkness is sounding and silence. Where the visual and 
auditory part company, however, is that the darkness of visual concealment 
can be more definitely treated as a moment of closedness than can silence, 
the rest in music. Though both visual and auditory perception unfold by 
means of temporal Gestalts, it would seem justifiable to claim that, in the 
case of music, the rhythmic, dynamic nature of contrasting Gestalts is more 
pronounced. (It should be stated here that, along with Schafer and others, I 
assume that any sound can be incorporated into a musical soundscape). 
Hence, silence is not a moment of closedness, but as equally an integral part 
of the musical experience as the sounding of tones is. As Merleau-Ponty 
c1aims"(1962, p. 328): 
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sounds... belong to a sensory field, because sounds once perceived can 
be followed only by other sounds, or by silence, which is not an 
auditory nothingness, but the absence of sounds, and which, 
therefore, keeps us in contact with the being of sound. If, during the 
process of reflection, I cease to hear sounds, and then suddenly 
become receptive to them again, they appear to me already there, and 
I pick up a thread which I had dropped but which is unbroken. 
In the case of music, specifically, we are certainly aware that the rest is 
intentionally employed with the result that we carry the pulse of the piece 
through the silence in full anticipation of its resolution. The ecart, the 
muting of soundings, then, is grasped in its full gestural significance as a 
momentary pause, much like taking a breath in speech, which anticipates 
re-sounding. We are assured that a new Gestalt will emerge, and so, are 
intensely, palpably aware of the rhythmic nature of the ek-stase of time. By 
extension, we are also made aware of the dynamism of the dialectical 
relation that we, not just as engaged listeners, but as embodied, transcendent 
selves, have at all times with communicative others. In short, the musical 
experience immediately transports us into the primordial situation of 
invitation and response through its contrasting, rhythmic patterns of 
tension and resolution, consonance and dissonance, sounding and silence. 
As I hear it: out of the sonorously diffuse, resonating world, Logos harkens; 
a tone is struck: an invitation; another is struck in reply: a harmony; an 
interrelation is established, and a communication is set into ek-static 
motion. 
At this juncture, it would seem prudent to clearly delineate the 
distinction between ek-static/existential time and objective/scientific time. 
The fundamental difference is that, while the latter is quantitative, views 
time as the serial unfolding of now-points arranged along a linear scale with 
absolute mathematical precision, the former views time as a qualitative 
unfolding of significant "happenings". In ek-static time, there is a relaxation 
of the traditional Western trichotomy of time into past, present and future 
in that the present always gathers up the past and projects it into the 
horizonal future. Phenomenologically, then, time is not an objective, 
universal truth, an eternity (which, ironically, makes time static), but a 
constant becoming. 
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As was noted in Chapter Two, phenomenological, experiential time may 
be viewed, not as a series of now-points forming a line, but as significant 
situational encounters which not only exist in the immediate present, but 
which have been structured in the past as retentions and exist as potential 
structures in the future as protensions. This is nowhere more evident that 
in the case of music, as Husserl noted. Husserl modelled his conception of 
time on the "protensive" character of a musical melody, extending in 
sequence from past through present into the future, and leaving a 
"retensive" trail in memory. Rejecting the mathematical conceptions of 
music stemming from Greek philosophy, he preferred not to employ 
objective conceptualizations of time, but to encounter time as it is directly 
experienced, subjectively, in the temporal sequence of a musical 
composition as it builds toward musical form in successive moments 
(Smith, 1979, p. 100). As Smith puts it: "The music is like a comet 
plummeting through subjective space, leaving a trail of after-echoes, a 
musical tail (Zeitschwanz) that is retained in memory" (1979, p. 101). 
Memory, though, is not to be taken as an "electronic storehouse for sense 
data," but as a "form of elemental awareness" (1979, p. 102). Furthermore, 
the evanescent musical moment is not to be cognized as a discrete, atomistic 
unit. Rather: 
The forward thrust of musical time builds a horizon of expectations 
and possibilities for the composer and for the listener; and, as the 
musical tone unfolds in its forward movement of "protension" it 
leaves in its wake a whole series of tonal shadows (Abschattungen), 
that spread out in ever diminishing diagonal lines behind it (1979, p. 
102). 
There are some quite interesting corollaries to this phenomenological 
treatment of time-consciousness which, when spelled out, transcend the 
difficulties encountered by formalist and expressionist accounts of musical 
meaning. The first is that, no tone can ever be encountered in isolation as 
even a single note always occurs as a focal point against retensive and 
protensive musical structure, horizon. As a building block of musical 
structure, harmony and melody, a tone always implies a sequence of tones 
which gradually come together to establish musical meaning. Every tone, 
therefore, has significance, but only in its interrelation with other tones in 
the whole. Moreover, "tonally moving forms" as Hanslick might say, 
unfold in a realm of pure duration, not linearly and objectively. That is, 
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music moves in phenomenological, virtual time, time as it appears-in-
experience which is by means of sensibilities, tensions and releases, making 
music solely qualitative, rather than quantitative. ("Virtual", then, is not to 
be taken in terms of its current bastardization as meaning "fake" or 
"electronic", but in its true sense as "essential nature" as opposed to 
"scientific", "formal" or "objective" conceptualization). As Langer states it 
(1953, pp. 110-111): 
It [music] creates an image of time measured by the motion of forms 
that seem to give it substance that consists entirely of sound, so it is 
transitoriness itself. Music makes time audible, and its form and 
continuity sensible... music uses time as an element of its expression; 
duration is its essence. The beginning and end of a musical 
composition are only one if the music has possessed itself of the 
interval between them and wholly filled it. 
Music, therefore, might be seen to demand the highest degree of qualitative 
appreciation, felt significance, since, in order to establish its significance we 
must immediately experience its dynamic, eventful unfolding in time, 
while banishing any thought of its being objective or having a conceptual 
content. As David Rothenberg says (1997, pp. 1-3): 
Music is so amazing precisely because we do not need to comprehend 
it to be moved by it... sound speaks to us yet has nothing exact to tell. 
The melodies of the world are what they are. Nothing less, nothing 
more. 
It is only in accepting the musical invitation that we can develop any sense 
of a musical work's import. Tones, then, are neither emotive triggers, nor 
are they pure particulars that are cognized or re-cognized by a transcendent 
consciousness. They exist solely in an interrelational perceptual situation 
unfolding in virtual time. As Smith states it (1979, p.103): 
we hear globally, synthetically, not as the mind actively turns toward 
phenomena conceived in linear terms, but passively as the melody 
takes shape in audial perception. 
What Smith means by "passively" should be clarified. As we recall from 
Chapter Three, true aesthetic appreciation would seem to occur on some 
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middle ground which exists as a tension between subjective and objective, 
expressionist and formalist accounts, of beauty, the sensuous component 
and the thought component, as Hepburn characterizes it. The perceiving 
subject, consequently, is made to provide a reasoned, non-trivial, objective 
account of his positive evaluation of an aesthetic object, yet only up to the 
point that it does not overwhelm his subjective experience of it. What 
Smith is claiming, then, is that musical phenomena, akumena, seem to be 
objective insofar as they appear to constitute themselves, come together in 
and of themselves prior to any mental act or receptivity. They, consequently, 
seem to be objectively given and that the subject is passive in relation to this 
synthesis. On pages 109-110, he-gives an account of this "passivity": 
Musical sounds fall together or pull themselves together (sich 
zusammenschliessen) for me in synthetic patterns in the experience 
of listening to a sonata or to the sonata-allegro movement of a given 
symphony. I am thus "passive," in that this symphonic happening 
comes over me, though I am not overcome [italics mine]. 
Though Smith elects not to pursue this theme any further, his claim that 
he is not overcome may given weight by delving into a quote from Langer 
cited above. Langer claims that it is often the case that music contains 
subordinate melodies, indistinct "tuneless" melodies, inner voice 
movements that are not immediately grasped. Without perusing a score, 
how could one know this experientially if one were not, at times, actively 
engaged in the working out of subordinate, not immediately focal, inner 
voicings? Is this not the very reason that we can never exhaust the meaning 
of a piece of music, defuse its significance? If the work were given fully 
objectively, and that, therefore, we passively absorbed its entire intention 
upon its first hearing, why would we continue to listen to it? It would seem 
clear that the composition is forever seeking an audience, an active 
participant in the full realization of musical meaning. To paraphrase Aaron 
Copland (1984), the work always requires a "creative listener." The point is 
that there must be some subjective organizational activity occurring for the 
musical experience to be truly appreciative. If the subject were purely 
passive towards the utterly transcendent other, would it not be possible that 
the experience would result in the reception of pure cacophony by the 
subject? Surely, listening involves the contextual engagement of both 
listening self and musical other in the establishment of musical meaning? 
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The final point to be gleaned from Smith's phenomenology of musical 
sound and, thus, of music's felt significance, is that musical tones come 
together to create a new unity, have a synergistic quality much in the same 
manner as an ecosystem. Smith has this to say about the fusion of tones into 
a harmony (1979, P.  241): 
...musical tones are not merely physically merged, nor are they simply 
part of some mathematical schema in the mind, when we speak of a 
musical composition. Rather, tones fuse in the consciousness of the 
perceiving subject. A musical interval, as e.g. of a fifth, does not 
consist merely in the concuprence of two tones. Rather, in sounding 
together they fuse in consciousness into a new entity. Fusion is given 
primordially in perception itself, so that the sound, e.g., of a fifth, is 
essentially different than the sound of each of its components singly 
or merely concurrently. 
Attuned Comportment 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, we cannot truly proceed to 
establish the significance and meaning of music without rejecting purely 
subjective or objective, expressionist or formalist positions in favour of 
giving an account of how music is immediately perceived in its full ek-
static thrust. The central impediment to truly coming to terms with musical 
meaning is that, though we are all profoundly responsive to music, we are 
still constricted by the belief that musical aesthetics must be scientific and 
objective in order to be reasonable and non-trivial. As Susan McClary nicely 
sums it up: 
...it is quite clear to most listeners that music moves them, that they 
respond deeply to music in a variety of ways, even though in our 
society they are told that they cannot know anything about music 
without having absorbed the whole theoretical apparatus necessary 
for musical specialization. But to learn this apparatus is to learn to 
renounce one's responses, to discover that the musical phenomenon 
is to be understood mechanistically, mathematically. Thus non-
trained listeners are prevented from talking about social and 
expressive dimensions of music (for they lack the vocabulary to refer 
to its parts) and so are trained musicians (for they have been taught, 
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in learning the proper vocabulary,,..that music is strictly self-contained 
structure) (cited in Bogue, 1991, p. 85). 
The only seeming recourse to overcoming this objective-scientific bias is, 
arguably, to foster an appreciation of music which is more in keeping with 
the immediate encounter with music in perceptual situations, to attend to 
musical Logos. Perhaps, the solution may reside in nurturing what I call 
"attuned comportment" or what David Michael Levin refers to as 
"Hearkening." The central theme of Levin's book, The Listening Self (1989), 
is that our hearing is a gift of nature which is "the gift of an unfulfilled 
capacity, an unrealized potential, an unfinished task" (1989, P.  2) which, 
ultimately, means that we must foster response-ability. We have ears so that 
we can listen, as Heidegger would put it. The purpose of his book, then, is to 
effect a radical change in the way we listen to Being, and, thus, to indicate 
how we can achieve appropriate worldly comportment. As he states it (1989, 
p. 5): 
...first, we will be considering a diagnosis that brings out our 
experiential, auditory closure to the dimensionality of Being as a 
whole; then we will initiate a recollection of Being in a process 
through which we make contact with this dimension and retrieve for 
present living the as yet unrealized potential that lies in our renewed 
belonging to, and being once again attuned by, the dimensionality, 
meaning, and wholeness of Being. 
The launching point for Levin's argument is that, in the twentieth century, 
the egoism, patriarchy, the dominance of the masculine gender and 
character, the instrumentalization of Reason, the domination of nature, the 
domination of people, and the will to power have resulted in a deeply-
ingrained societal narcissism and nihilism symptomatic of a negation of any 
sense of transcendent meaningfulness, a deafness to the call of Being. The 
question, then, is whether or not we can re-open ourselves to, recollect, 
Being through the adoption of the listening stance. His assumption, 
obviously,,is in the affirmative. He argues that: 
...our hearing is in fact an ontological organ: an organ always already 
inherent in, belonging to, and attuned by, the openness of the 
dimensionality of Being as a whole, presencing for our hearing as an 
auditory field, a sonorous field (1989, p. 16). 
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Following Heidegger, he identifies objective-scientific thought, even 
metaphysics, as the source of our alienation from Being, and our attendant 
narcissism and nihilism. In order to overcome these tendencies, then, we 
must cease to totalize and reify Being, the "real presence." And to this end, 
we must first draw the distinction between wholeness and totality 
(wholeness is a sound, organic, mutuality between the roles of beings within 
an entirety, while a totality is both absolutely inclusive and absolutely 
exclusive, in a quite real sense), otherwise we will not appreciate the non-
totalizable wholeness of presence. We must come to an understand of how 
Being is (the way Being manifests, appears, shows itself): 
...for a thinker [to be] able to relate to "it", able to be with "it", in a 
non-grasping, non-enframing, non-representational way, i.e. neither 
relating to it instrumentally nor relating to it theoretically, according 
to the methods of speculative metaphysics (1989, p. 26). 
How, then, could this be achieved? In his previous book, The Opening 
of Vision (1988), Levin contended that our reliance on vision, or more 
exactly, the gaze, must be overcome as it is the most totalizing and reifying 
of the senses. Since scientific-objective thought assumes the absolute 
intelligibility and transparency of the world, its ontology, its paradigm of 
knowledge and truth is vision. "Seeing is believing", or as my father would 
say, "believing is seeing" (Livingston, 1994, p. 70). The latter is a particularly 
good phrase as it underscores that vision is, by no means neutral or 
objective and that there is simply no form of knowledge that is 
disinterested. Levin identifies two types of Gaze: 
the one practical and aggressively active, the other theoretical and 
contemplative, panoramic, stationary, unmoved, dispassionate, 
disembodied outside time and space... The capacity of the gaze to turn 
away from the entities it has seen and yet retain an image of them in 
isolation, abstracted from their situational assignments, i.e. as 
present-at-hand, as vorhanden, enables and encourages our vision to 
assume a theoretical power that in turn amplifies its practical power 
over entities (1989 p. 30). 
Hence, we have resourcism, rather than compliance, interrelation, 
reciprocity, care and concern, any sense of belonging with others. And as 
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long as we rely solely on vision as the ground of our metaphysical 
speculating, we will forever be spectators, not participants. 
Hearing, however, lacks these ontological and epistemological evils. The 
very transitoriness of sound "never lets us forget impermanence and never 
allows us a total grasp and possession" of it (Levin, 1989, P.  28). As I 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, when we are in the dark, we are, really 
and truly faced with the concealment, closure of Being; hence, it easy to be 
forgetful of Being. Moreover, we can open and close our eyes at will, so we 
can effectively shut ourselves off from, remain untouched and unmoved 
by, Being whenever we choose. This, however, does not obtain for hearing 
since sounds always penetrate our egological boundaries. As Levin says 
(1989, p. 32): 
Hearing is intimate, participatory, communicative; we are always 
affected by what we are given to hear. Vision, by contrast, is 
endistancing, detached, spatially separate from what gives itself to be 
seen. 
Sound possesses a very unique ontological status: it exists somewhere 
between a thing and nothing. It is something, yet we cannot bring it fully 
under our control; but neither it is a no-thing as it is resolutely there as a 
palpable resonance. Though - immaterial, sound does "ring true." And in 
that it has this mediating character, enjoys a middle ground between thing 
and no-thing, Levin suggests that, perhaps, it might fulfil a role in: 
...balancing and integrating the metaphysical privileging of focus over 
diffusion and dissemination, centre over periphery, figure over 
ground, object over context, substance over process. 'Overcoming 
metaphysics' means ending its privileging of permanence over 
perishing, totality over whole, and cognitive control over letting-be; it 
means changing our epistemological and ontological commitments 
(1989, p. 44). 
Levin's attempt to develop response-ability, the listening self involves four 
stages of self-development. The first stage describes what I have been 
referring to as the prepersonal, preontological realm which we acquire in 
infancy. It may be characterized as a fundamental openness to the sum total 
of sonorous energy which we are immersed in, belong to, and are attuned 
by. At this level, there is very little figure-ground articulation, and little 
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differentiation of "the positional being of the listener from the 
encompassing being (the sonorous topology of Being) as a whole" (1989, p. 
45). And since there is as yet no distinction between self and other, subject 
and object, no fixed ego-logical boundaries, hearing may be deemed to be 
global, holistic, and ek-static. It might be said that our hearing, then, is still 
that of a biological, ecological being which belongs. Unfortunately, however: 
In this process of socialization, we inevitably lose touch with this pre-
ontological relationship to and understanding of, Being; and as we 
mature, the utterly open dimensionality of our hearing is 
increasingly repressed - sometimes getting psychotically split off. This 
'renunciation' of our primordial ecstasy is in fact a necessary 
condition for the further development of our auditory capacity. What 
is unfortunate is not its Aufhebung, its sublimation, in stage II, but 
our continued abandonment of Being, and our unwillingness to 
retrieve it, later in life, in the time of our maturity (1989, p. 46). 
Clearly, then, the second stage, which we acquire somewhere between 
about the age of one and adolescence involves, first, the imitation of sounds 
heard, culminating in speech and a sense of individuality, selfhood. The 
subject/object dichotomy is firmly in place, and what "normally" would be 
part of the developmental process - Gestalt structuring - perverted by the 
"wilful and oppositional" (1989, p. 47) nature of our present historical 
situation, becomes Ges tell, enframing, which successfully obliterates the 
ontological dimensionality of the auditory field. 
In adulthood, we have reached the third stage wherein we must take 
responsibility for our hearing. Beyond the normal constraints of 
socialization, we are "committed to further training, a practice of self-
discipline" (1989, p. 47). It is at this stage that we are faced with what I 
referred to earlier, in Chapter Two as a choice between the invitational hand 
or the gauntlet: we can perpetuate adolescence or we can attempt to develop 
beyond the ego-logical and attempt Naess' Self-realization!. Levin argues 
that the distinction between the ego and the self is crucial for maturity (1989, 
pp. 47-48): 
Whereas the ego is a defensively adaptive structure identified with an 
essentially fixed, socially conforming content, the identity which 
begins to form in the work of stage III, the way of living I am calling 
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the 'Self', is an ongoing process of self-development, a structure of 
individuation creatively open to change, a structure organized by, and 
identified with, processes that carry forward learning and growth... we 
are essentially involved in developing our listening as a practice of 
compassion, increasing our capacity, as listeners, to be aware of, and 
responsive to, the interrelatedness and commonality of all sonorous 
beings. (Although distinct from this compassion practice, the 
development of hearing as an aesthetic skill both contributes to, and 
is in turn advanced by, the development of hearing as an organ of 
compassion. For the aesthetic is precisely the cultivation of sensibility, 
a deepening of our capacity for sensuous and affective appreciation.) 
It is at the fourth stage that we have the capacity for "attuned 
comportment" or "hearkening" which Levin lauds as a spiritual 
accomplishment. In very Heideggerian terms, he describes what the fourth 
stage should strive to realize: 
Hearkening requires the disciplined practice of Gelassenheit, i.e. 
letting-go and letting-be, as a mode or style of listening. In learning 
Gelassenheit, the art of 'just listening', listening without getting 
entangled in the ego's stories and preoccupations, one learns a 
different way of channelling, focusing, attending. There is a 
restructuring of the figure-ground difference, with an awareness that 
it manifests the appropriation of the auditory field by the double 
tonality of the ontological difference. Hearkening makes, or lets, this 
ontological difference - the difference between beings and Being 
[between the ontic and the ontological as we saw in Chapter Two] - be 
manifest, be audible, within the Gestalt of the auditory situation 
(1989, p. 48). 
As we recall, the ontological difference is, basically, a difference that makes a 
difference. In everyday thinking and speech, our preoccupation is with the 
ontic: all the individual entities that we encounter and deal with. With a 
shift to the ontological, however, we discover a world of significance, an 
embracing, participatory world, a communicative other: Being. I can think 
of no example that is simpler than, nor superior to, R.D. Laing's 
• encapsulation (1968, pp. 35-36): 
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'The sky is blue' suggests that there is a substantive 'sky' that is 
'blue'. This sequence of subject verb object, in which 'is' acts as a 
copula uniting sky and blue, is a nexus of sounds, and syntax, signs 
and symbols, in which we are fairly completely entangled and which 
separates us from at the same time as it refers us to that ineffable sky-
blue-sky. The sky is blue is not sky, sky is not blue. But in saying 'the 
sky is blue' we say 'the sky"is'. The sky exists and it is blue. 'Is' serves 
to unite everything and at the same time 'is' is not any of the things 
that it unites. 
None of things that are united by 'is' can themselves qualify 'is'. 
'Is' is not this, that, or the next, or anything. Yet 'is' is the condition of 
the possibility of all things. 'Is' is that no-thing whereby all things are. 
'Is' as no-thing, is that whereby all things are. And the condition of 
the possibility of anything being at all, is that it is in relation to that 
which it is not. 
That is to say, the ground of the being of all beings is the relation 
between them. This relationship is the 'is', the being of all things, and 
the being of all things is itself no-thing. Man creates in transcending 
himself in revealing himself. But what creates, wherefrom and 
whereto, the clay, the pot and the potter, are all not-me. I am the 
witness, the medium, the occasion of a happening that the created 
thing makes evident. 
Man, most fundamentally, is not engaged in the discovery of what 
is there, nor in production, nor even in communication, nor in 
invention. He is enabling being to emerge from nonbeing. 
In short, the ontological difference may be interpreted as the Logos of the 
primordial situation which weds ontic beings, by initiating the conversation 
in which ontological Being emerges. In letting other beings go, be, in 
hearkening to the rhythm of sonorous Being, we not only become attuned 
to the ontological difference, but become true worldly participants. Upon 
accepting the invitation from engaging other, the embodied self, the ek-
static movement of the dialectical ontological discourse, is set free into 
dynamic motion. 
As a disciplined practice, stage four involves the attempt to recapture 
what Freud referred to as the "oceanic feeling" (1961, p. 20), the pre-
ontological relationship and understanding of our earliest infancy wherein 
there were no dichotomies, no polarization of self and other, subject and 
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object. It is to reclaim the basic experience of Being that we had prior to its 
perversion through the process of socialization and the erection of 
defensive ego-logical boundaries. Clearly though, for adults, the attempt to 
meaningfully rediscover the dimensionality of sonorous Being is 
thoroughly conscious, thoughtful, and articulate; it is Naess' Self-
realization!. Unlike stage two: 
...[where] the auditory Gestalt is enframing, is a Gestell, here the 
structure becomes a gathering of sonorous Being: a gathering mindful 
of its utterly open dimensionality, attentive to the primordial 
difference by grace of which all auditory structures are possible, and 
respectful of the incommensurability of the Being of sonorous beings, 
letting the inaudible be audible (Levin, 1989, p. 49). 
Levin, however issues a caveat: the development from the first to the 
fourth stage is not to be taken as a straightforwardly linear process. That is, 
in the evolution of the Self, there is never a complete transcendence or 
transformation of the preceding stage. As there is change, then, so is there 
preservation. Each stage remains as a sedimented existential structure even 
though it may seemingly have been transcended, "overcome". 
Consequently, socialization and the development of the ego never erase the 
vestiges of belonging stemming from our infancy. We can, therefore, 
through conscious exertion, retrieve the primordial experience of the 
dimensionality of resonant Being. The recollection of being is: 
...a hermeneutical movement: we must first go back' to 
Zugehorigkeit [the first stage], 'back', as it were, to 'the beginning', in 
order to develop beyond the ego-logical stage of ontological 
forgetfulness in listening. Or rather, to state this point more 
accurately, since in truth this 'beginning', this 'origin', can never be 
retrieved now as it actually was then, we must first generate within 
ourselves a presently felt sense of our 'pre-ontological beginning'. 
This movement forward, this growth, requires a hermeneutical 
movement backward: a movement, however, that must not be 
confused with an infantile or psychotic regression. It is essential to 
understand the difference between this hermeneutical 'return' and a 
pathological regression. Regression is a movement in one direction 
only; it repeats what came earlier instead of redeeming it; and it is 
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always a movement, therefore, that closes the process of personal 
growth (Levin, 1989, pp. 55-56). 
The Self that both Levin and Naess, taken together, suggest one seek is a 
Self that realizes itself as constantly moving forward through a dual 
movement of identification with other selves, conceived as processes, and a 
hermeneutical return to, and retrieval of, one's primordial experience of 
resonant, carnal Being as an embracing and communicative totality which 
presences itself through the ek-static movement of time. To fulfil our 
capacity, realize our potential, and complete our task of becoming true 
listening selves we must recollect our gift of nature: hearing. To develop 
answer-ability, response-ability, at-tuned worldly comportment, Levin 
claims, one of the central tasks is to foster a sense of Self that is non-
patriarchal, and more in keeping in with the conception of Self developed 
in feminist critique. As he characterizes the different conceptions' of the Self, 
the patriarchal tradition embraces a conception of "Self", stemming from 
Cartesian metaphysics, which is: 
(1) disembodied, (2) self-contained, (3) monadic, i.e. essentially 
isolated and self-contained, (4) essentially and ideally purely 
cognitive, purely intellectual, (5) identified with its inner states and 
their 'contents', and (6) defined in structural, i.e. static, terms. By 
contrast, the Self toward which the feminist critique is pointing is (1) 
essentially embodied, (2) contextually situated, (3) relational and 
interactional from the very beginning, (4) essentially affective, 
motivational, libidinal, and aesthetic, (5) identified to a large extent 
with the character of its relationships, and (6) defined in terms of 
process, that is to say, essentially in terms of the dynamics of change 
and growth (1989, p. 222). 
Ultimately, then, for Levin, the task is to overcome Cartesian 
metaphysics, and recollect Being which is set free in the very act of returning 
to it. One must bear in mind, however, that Being will withdraw if there is 
any attempt to totalize, cognize or re-cognize it. The recollection of Being, 
beginning with self-disciplined listening, though a transcendence of 
forgetfulness, is not aimed at something that is already present; rather, the 
experience constructs itself through our acknowledgement of Being's opacity 
and transcendence, through the process of our "letting go, letting be" in the 
primordial situational encounter. To force Being into any sort of conceptual, 
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intellectual schema, to form a representation of its essence, or to 
inauthentically attempt some sort of historical revision of the originating 
moment of engagement and reciprocity is to foreclose the possibility of 
encounter and disclosure. Being is not something to which we may 
neutrally affix "correct" concepts. As Levin says (1989, p. 244): 
Before it can be a question of correctness, something must be, must 
appear, must disclose itself, must sound forth. But this 
unconcealment of beings can happen only when, and only where, 
there is a hermeneutical opening, a clearing silence, a field of tonality 
laid out for the disclosure. This essentially prior event of openness 
and clearing, of ontological difference, is the primordial moment of 
truth, the hermeneutical aletheia without which there can be no 
experience of truth in the sense of 'correctness' or 'correspondence'. 
Before we can hear the truth, we must be open to listening. 
Though in total agreement with Levin's position, I believe that it can be 
strengthened by attempting to particularize, concretize, the listening stance, 
attuned comportment, by reference to the way in which we perceive music, 
i.e. the way that we "hearken" to music that makes it meaningful and 
significant. In a most interesting article, entitled 
"Rhizomusicosmology"(1991), Ronald Bogue describes how the 
musicosmological ruminations of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are 
represented in the works of the French composer, Olivier Messiaen.. 
Purposefully eschewing the language of musical aesthetics and cognition, 
Deleuze and Guattari centre on the complex rhythms and melodic-
harmonic structures of Messiaen's music, which were profoundly 
influenced by natural sound, particularly bird song; in effect to create a new 
vocabulary for musical analysis that would treat "music as an open structure 
that permeates and is permeated by world" (Bogue, 1991, p. 85). It is well 
known that Pythagoras, through Plato explicitly and St. Thomas Aquinas 
implicitly, severed the link between music and its engaging, felt presence by 
insisting that music is a self-contained totality possessing form, order, 
proportion and radiance to the exclusion of its more invitational, holistic, 
and sensuous significance. In limiting "good" or "true" music to its self-
contained arithmetical and geometrical properties, and ranking its harmony 
as greatly inferior to the harmony of an ideal of societal behaviour, they 
established the ontological and moral "ladder of perfection". Music was a 
threat to appropriate deportment as it might just be a little too distracting for 
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the plebeians (Grube, 1974, pp. 90, and 150). The successful realization of 
their allotted societal duties might be unduly derailed by listening to music. 
To this end, Plato (in reference more to poetry than music, though he held 
both in contempt) declared that he would: 
...tolerate no resonance, no play of sound, no ambiguity, no shades of 
meaning, no hints and forebodings, no movement of sense or sound, 
no polyphonic perversity, no polyphonic or symphonic 
subversiveness, no anarchy of sounds, no indeterminate though 
determinable complexity, no ungraspable richness and 
dimensionality. Plato, who disliked shadows and adumbrations, and 
wanted them excluded, along with images, from his utopian republic, 
also recommended very strict control over musical modes and 
registers. Unlike the discourse of poetizing, the discourse of assertion, 
propositions and statements must be a discourse of univocity, 
without any surprising or unregulated fluctuations in sound (Levin, 
1988, p. 435). 
Against the Greek tradition, then, Deleuze and Guattari reject such a 
delimited and determinate view of music: music is not a vehicle for leading 
listeners to subversive acts of moral turpitude, away from the path of virtue. 
Rather, it is profoundly uplifting for its very openendedness, for its very 
nuances and adumbrations; music "is not a circumscribed totality but an 
open whole, whose dimensions can never be given as such" (Bogue, 1991, p. 
87). In its cosmological, transcendent nature lies its true import. What, 
exactly however, does this mean and what are its implications for a 
redefinition of musical meaning? 
Deleuze and Guattari describe music as "the active, creative operation 
which consists of deterritorializing the refrain" (1980, p. 369). The refrain is, 
to simplify their complex argumentation, a "rhythmic pattern that stakes 
out a territory". The process may be interpreted, first, as a means to 
establishing a point of stability, a point of reference amidst "chaos"; or, 
secondly, it may be a demarcation of possession: for example, a cat spraying; 
or, thirdly, it may be an opening to other territories or the cosmos at large: 
for example, a bird making contact with other beings and Being itself 
through its improvized vocalizations at dawn. Hence, the three aspects of 
territory that the refrain delineates: "a point of stability, a circle of property, 
and an opening to the outside" (Bogue, 1991, p. 88). 
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The territory, then, is a rhythmic boundary, created otirof "chaos", and 
periodically repeated to ensure continued contact between beings or between 
beings and Being. Consequently, it has both an ontical and ontological 
dimensionality. Thus, rhythm is to be understood both as establishing 
difference or relation, the "in-between whereby milieus communicate with 
one other" (Bogue, 1991, p. 88); and, since it cannot be mathematically 
quantified, but rather is qualitative and virtual/existential, something 
which hearkens, it is something that anticipates resolution through the 
renewal of contact and communion. The "in-between", the situational 
contact established by the communion of self and other in the primordial 
situation, is the Logos of music which has as its essence "rhythm in its 
broadest sense, that is, anticipated recurrence. Rhythm creates an 
atmosphere, a mood, that has potential for renewal, but in a fully open-
ended manner" (Hall, 1968, p. 106). Ultimately, because rhythm cannot be 
measured and predicted, it is not a mere repetition of pulses of precise 
repetition, but the means by which one Gestalt merges with another 
through the ek-static movement of time, which blends territories and 
emphasizes their qualitative differences. 
In espousing a theoretical reclamation of musical meaning, though, 
Deleuze and Guattari still need to demonstrate that their ontological and 
epistemological, ultimately metaphysical, speculations can be given 
credence; hence the need for a particular compositional approach which 
justifies and exemplifies their position: the works of Olivier Messiaen. 
Messiaen's compositions are so appealing to Deleuze and Guattari 
because, in common with all great composers, he intentionally breaks free 
from traditional expectations of musical propriety through his rhythmic, 
harmonic and melodic innovations. 
Deleuze and Guattari employ the analogy of a rhizome (as opposed to a 
tree) to describe his music. This is a thoroughly appropriate metaphor as it 
both elucidates their philosophical endeavour and acknowledges Messiaen's 
great love of, and the inspiration he received from, the natural world, 
especially in its soundings. A tree stands vertically and immobile, save for 
its continual branching; a rhizome, however, moves horizontally, 
insinuating its way towards an environment, a milieu, where it may 
develop and flourish. The image is particularly convincing as it mirrors 
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musical notation: a chord is like a tree in that it provides a structural 
orientation, avails itself of a sedimented structure, and is vertically 
represented as such on a stave; a melody, though, is, like a rhizome in that, 
in the melody's visual representation in a score, it moves sinuously across - 
bar lines, territories, so to speak, as it seeks a favourable environment, an 
appropriate musical context, just as a rhizome weaves between trees in its 
appropriate ecological context. 
What ultimately grounds the music, though, is the rhythm that conjoins 
harmonic structures and melodic innovations. Rhythm establishes 
expectation: we are listening, through our embodiment, our electrified 
participation, for some resolution. It is very easy to seek and understand the 
resolution which occurs in a Strauss waltz, as it is straightforwardly, 
predictably, in 3/4 time. But what can one make of the final movement of 
StraYinsky's Rite of Spring? The time signature shifts continually, thwarting 
our expectations. The temporal designations of 3/16, 2/16, 5/16, 2/8, 3/8, 4/8 
which open "Sacrificial Dance (The Chosen One)" (1947, p. 67ff) lend a very 
disjointed and disturbing movement to the music which entirely thwarts 
any attempt to predict or anticipate its resolution. Moreover, as if the 
rhythm itself is not sufficient to disorient, there is also the matter of the 
"illegal" superimposition of inamicable chordal structures, and the use of 
exotic eastern modes, rather than the musical scales central to Western 
diatonic harmony. In 1917, listeners steeped in the niceties of the classical 
musical tradition must have been appalled by Stravinsky's musical 
"perversions". It is no wonder that riots ensued from the work's premiere: it 
would have shaken people to their quicks to have to defend themselves 
against this seemingly gratuitous and monstrous assault upon their musical 
sensibilities. 
To understand the rhizome metaphor is to come to terms with many of 
the concepts lying at the heart of Messiaen's sense of musical meaning. One 
is that Messiaen's music unfolds in ek-static time as it is experienced 
through moments of pure duration that hermeneutically retrieve 
retensions and thrust them into the future as protensions. Janus-faced, 
moving circularly, his music seemingly has no purpose or direction, as his 
many critics have noted. Strictly avoiding arithmetrical time, Messiaen's 
intention is: 
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...to engage the incommensurable rhythms of the cosmos, whose 
varying time-scales range from the infinitesimal vibration of atoms 
to the endless movement of the stars. His object, in short, is to 
articulate a "timeless time" - ametrical, - nonteleologic al, reversible 
and unlimited.., which has neither beginning nor end, neither origin 
nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, 
but only of lines. It is a rhizome (Bogue, 1991, P.  95). 
Conclusion: Creative Expression and Ontological Discourse 
In the course of researching this dissertation, I have been - struck by the 
number of authors representing seemingly disparate academic positions 
who have shown a convergence of opinion on the matter of the "middle-
ground": a situational encounter between an invitational, engaging other 
and an embodied self that forges meaning, that weds the ontic and 
ontological, beings and Being. That an invitational hand is extended and 
warmly clasped seems to be ontologically and epistemologically central to 
any exchange, conversational, artistic or musical, wherein a meaningful 
synergism is achieved, concretized and projected into an anticipated future: 
an improvisational retrieval and renewal of communion which is at once 
aesthetic and ethical. The self-involved monologue is wilfully indifferent to 
the true significance of dialectical exchange with all of its metalinguistic 
gestural nuances. The scientific obsession with totalizing, providing an 
objectively irrefutable theory, precludes the possibility of eventful, 
reciprocally meaningful encounters. This appears to be the conclusion of 
any historian, aesthetician, psychologist, or musicologist who attempts the 
phenomenological reduction. Truth and appropriate behavior are not 
simply a matter of reaching a convincing theoretical end-point, a tree 
fulfilling its function in a "climax" community. What we should strive for 
is to assume the nature of its roots, tendrils, as they tentatively seek a new 
environment, a milieu in which the decaying thing or concept may achieve 
rebirth. Everything, live or abstract, requires its setting in order to grow and 
blossom. 
As we have seen, the ek-static movement of time forces us, as sincere, 
embodied interlocutors with engaging others, to continually move forward, 
to become truly transpersonal beings through the attempt to 
improvisationally forge the meaning of any concrete situation. Yet, this is 
true not just of conversation, but of any moment of meaningful exchange. 
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Hence, though music is fundamentally ineffable, this is not to say that the . 	- 
intention of the composer brings all truth to the moment of musical 
epiphany. The audience, the attuned, listening self must . respond 
responsibly for true hearkening to be achieved. There must be a 
commitment to reciprocity between mutually trusting selves and other 
beings. 
In the concert hall there is no place for egos: neither virtuosos, nor the 
false enthusiasts, snobs, who only attend a performance so they may 
•applaud the great conductor. We must hear music, in fact encounter any 
soundscape in the full realization that we are being afforded a -tremendous 
opportunity for insight and existential communion. We are not to be 
daunted by the fact that we may lack the appropriate technical vocabulary. 
The artist needs his audience for the fulfilment of his communication. As 
Stravinsky has written: 
A work of art cannot contain itself. Once the creator has completed 
his work, he necessarily feels the need to share his joy. He quite 
naturally seeks to establish contact with his fellow man, who in• this 
case becomes his listener. The listener reacts and becomes a partner in 
the game initiated by the creator. Nothing less, nothing more. The 
fact that the partner is free to accept or refuse participation in the 
game does not automatically invest him with the authority of a 
judge... [but if response-ability is seriously entertained by an audience} 
the listener's task becomes especially harrowing when a first hearing 
is concerned; for the listener in this case has no point of reference and 
possesses no basis for comparison. And so it comes about that the first 
impression, the first contact with the new-born work with the public, 
•is completely dependent upon the validity of a presentation that 
eludes all controls (1942, p.137-139). 
Herein lies the moral gauntlet in its musical form. If we are to be truly 
responsible, we must hear music in its opacity and transcendence, must 
hearken to the invitational profferment of an experiential gift that is 
tendered in an atmosphere of complete trust. It is only then that we can 
begin to continually develop our potential for Self-realization! through on-
going dialogue. To truly "become" we must always both recollect, 
hermeneutically retrieve these moments of initial contact, and 
improvisationally project them towards a meaningful horizon, a future 
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grounded by the anticipation of renewal and rejuvenation. We no more 
have meaning as isolated egos than tones have significance in is'o. lation. 
Reciprocity and community are always there as long as we can feel 
significance, achieve true worldly at-tuned comportment and selflessly 
maintain open-ended trust and communion in a thoroughly selfless 
intertwining of interests, cares and concerns, curiosity and wonder. 
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5 PHENOMENOLOGY, MUSIC, NATURE 
In the foregoing chapters, I have explored the possibility of developing a 
more appropriate, appreciative attitude towards the non-human world than 
the one that has promoted its resourcist commodification. In Chapter One, it 
was argued that the reification of living beings, the culturally ingrained 
imperative to treat them as nothing more than objects with extrinsic, 
utilitarian value, is offensive on the grounds that such a• stance is ecologically 
unsound, ethically objectionable and ontologically deceitful. The question 
then posed was how a position seemingly so at odds with our direct 
experience of being-in-the-world could have arisen. Cartesian metaphysics 
was identified as the culprit, not for the reason that it instituted such 
conceptual alienation, but that through its systemization of mind/body, 
subject/object dichotomies that have been around since Plato, it concretized a 
view of the world wherein disembodied, alienated subjects inhabit a neutral, 
value-free realm seemingly replete with discrete objects to be manipulated 
and controlled. Defined solely in scientific/objective terms, and thereby 
destined to serve the aggrandizement of the human purpose, worldly 
beings/subjects were transformed into mere things in the blink of an eye. 
Arguing that such an arrogant attitude and philosophical position is 
indefensible, I sought an alternative mode of argumentation that would 
reflect a more compliant and reciprocal sense of the human/non-human 
relationship. I found it in the works of Arne Naess and Warwick Fox. 
Central to Fox's Transpersonal Ecology is Naess' ideal of appropriate 
environmental conduct, Self-realization!: 
the this-worldly realization of expansive a sense of self as possible in a 
world in which selves and things-in-the-world are conceived as 
processes... [and] involves the realization of a sense of self that extends 
beyond [or that is trans-] one's egoic, biographical, or personal sense of 
self...(Fox, 1990, p.197). 
The process-based ontology and epistemology outlined by Naess and Fox 
offers an agreeable alternative to Cartesian metaphysics. For, while objective 
science is steadfastly quantitative, transpersonal ecology is thoroughly 
grounded in the qualitative experience of the world. Nonetheless, I 
contended that Transpersonal Ecology might be given an additional 
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philosophical dimension through the exploration of its fundamental 
agreement with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. In Chapters Two through 
Four, consequently, I maintained that the phenomenological description of 
the meaning and significance of encounters between selves and beings-in-
the-world, especially as they are revealed in linguistic utterance and musical 
sounding, nicely mesh with, and exemplify, the ideals of the transpersonal 
process of Self-realization! It is the purpose of this concluding chapter to 
hermeneutically retrieve some of those themes in order to improvize upon 
them in the context of our direct situational encounter with nature. In 
short, my aim is to recollect and revitalize our transpersonal belongingness. 
Throughout, I have maintained that there is an analogy between the 
perception of music and the perception of nature, and that we positively 
evaluate them in a similar, perhaps even identical manner. I have not, 
however, sufficiently elucidated what is meant by the slippery notion of 
"value'. For heuristic reasons at the moment, I will propose that value 
works as a mnemonic talisman that, though abstract, reacquaints us with 
moments of significant encounter with others and, thus, the Logos of the 
primordial situation. It is a means, in other words, of recollecting the initial 
appreciation of contact and communion with Being. 
In Chapter Three, I explored the relationship that exists between natural 
and art objects, and their beauty and appreciation. It is to this theme that I 
now return. Two authors in particular, Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant, 
seem to provide an appropriate anchor for a more detailed discussion of the 
appreciation and value of the aesthetic experience of nature. I select these 
two as I find that, though their ruminations would appear to represent 
radically polarized positions, the former embracing a "thought-component" 
theory and the latter a "sensuous-component" theory, they may be seen to 
hold quite similar views on a phenomenological level. To recall Carlson, he 
believes that it is necessary for a perceiver to assume an - at least partially - 
disinterested standpoint, to possess a frame of reference in the guise of some 
relevant information about his aesthetic object in order for his experience to 
be non-trivial, and therefore truly appreciative. For Carlson, then, the 
aesthetic appreciation of natural objects is predicated on the perceiver's 
having a familiarity with the basics of evolutionary and ecological theory. 
He does, however, carefully delimit the role which such knowledge should 
play in the determination of appreciation: 1) it does not weaken or destroy 
aesthetic attention to the object - i.e. does not fixate the object and stagnate 
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the eventful quality of the aesthetic encounter in order to make it conform 
to some preconceived theory; 2) it is faithful to the object's own meaning 
and expressiveness, is respectful of its "otherness"; and 3) it enhances the 
quality and significance of one's immediate aesthetic response to the object 
(1995, p. 203). 
Berleant says much the same thing, but in his own mode of expression. I 
do not know if it is his intention, but his aesthetic theorizing seems to call 
for a phenomenological reduction in that his central concern is somatic 
engagement. To distill his argument, three elements are essential for 
aesthetic perception: 1) there must be a continuity to the experience; - '2) there 
must be assimilation, a perceptual integration which fully allows for the 
transcendence of the appreciated "object"; and 3) the experience must be 
both challenging and participatory. 
To my mind, the theories of Carlson and Berleant are compatible: both 
stress that there must be an acknowledgment of the "otherness" of what is 
perceived which may be achieved by means of the recollection of the self's 
capacity to at-tune, to be answerable; it is a matter of responsibly hearkening 
to the call of response-ability. With the appropriate attitude, the self can 
reach out and discover a world of significance, and a sense of place. These 
are the conditions under which environmentally appropriate valuation can 
take place. 
Such valuation is a singular, immediate, and specific act; it has nothing 
to do with totalization and generalization through the activity of a distanced 
Cartesian ego. This fact appears to be lost on some people in the field of 
environmental management: for example, practitioners of Environmental 
Impact Assessment. Nowhere can one locate a more definitive source of 
ecological insensitivity and aesthetic hubris. In Combining Facts and Values 
in Environmental Impact Assessment (1988), the authors attempt to provide 
an exhaustive compilation of the elements which people seek in natural 
settings and which, therefore, should guide the preservation of natural 
communities. Hence it is explicitly reasoned that popular conceptions of the 
value of natural communities - often couched in the form of shallow, 
aesthetically trivial expectations - should be given more weight in the 
selection of an area for protection than informed ecological knowledge. The 
end result is that the interests of ecologically important species, species that 
are integral to the healthy functioning of their ecosystem, such as alligators 
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or scarab beetles, tend to be marginalized in the selection process because' 
they are "hideous": they bask in mud or make their living forming spheres 
out of faeces. The resourcist view which quantifies and ranks all of nature in 
terms of its potential as aesthetic spectacle should be immediately apparent 
in the following itemization of preferred natural environments. There 
must be (1988, p. 118): 
1) Presence of water unless grossly polluted 
2) Dominance of undisturbed land forms and contrast 
3) Uniformity of scale and character between near, intermediate, and 
'distant zones 
4) Distinct area of forest cover 
- 5) Framing elements of composed or panoramic. quality 
6) Diversity of land use 
7) Integration of buildings and other man-made elements 
8) Absence of incongruities or distracting elements 
9) Presence of flowers 
10) Varied or rolling topography 
11) Clean air and high visibility 
Save for point ten, this is a suburban shopping mall. This is the gauge by 
which we are to decide the fate of every other species on the planet? It does 
not stop here. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has a "Visual Assessment 
Procedure" which can even more precisely determine our response to 
things non-human (1988, pp. 123-124): 
1) Selection of viewpoints to represent typical viewer location, viewer 
activities and expectations, and potential project visibility; 
2) Selection of the analysts; 
3) Collection of data; 
4) Inventory of water (resources, movement, and scale), landform 
type, vegetation (cover, diversity, and seasonal change), land and 
water uses (intensity and type, access type, user activity (degree and 
frequency) [parentheses sic], amount of pollution and litter, similarity 
of adjacent scenery, sounds (presence and type), smells (presence and 
type), and visibility (amount and position); 
5) Forecast of without plan conditions; 
6) Forecast of with plan conditions; 
7) Identification of effects; 
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8), Professional assessment of the magnitude and significance of 
impacts; 
9) Public assessment of the magnitude and significance of impacts; 
10) Reconciliation of the professional and public assessment to 
appraise the net impacts. 
It is comforting to know that our tastes are so assiduously maintained and 
managed. 
At this juncture, I would like to introduce a schema for penetrating the 
recalcitrant shell of our perception of beauty and significance in a natural 
setting. Deceptively simple, it looks like this: 
A 
Point A represents complete subjectivity, while point E represents 
complete objectivity. The aesthetic position occupied by point A is what I 
would designate as that of a tourist. Told where and when to look and listen 
by a travel brochure, the tourist leaps out of the car and takes the mandatory 
snapshot of the partner facing the camera, not the spectacle itself. The 
experience is essentially mute as no acknowledgement of the potential 
significance of the experience through encounter is pursued. Position E is 
that of the Environmental Impact Assessment. Everything of salience in the 
landscape is identified, and correctly quantified; it is the source of the 
measured spectacle enjoyed by the inhabitants of position A. As experience, 
it is totalizing, theoretical and steadfastly value-neutral. There is no room 
for the unnecessary impediment of enjoyment and belonging. Position E is 
stentorian. It is informational, rather than engaging and invitational. If the 
view associated with position A, in its utter passivity, may be deemed 
infantile, the E position is that of full "maturity"- available solely through 
the complete codification of environmental value. What might be inchoate 
interest is thus eclipsed by the tyranny of the ultimate explanation of the 
spectacle and the exhaustion of its moral and aesthetic dimensionality. 
Position C, however, is grey. It is neither wholly subjective or objective. 
It is the middle-ground, the Logos that situates and balances subjective and 
objective viewpoints. It is the position of Carlson and Berleant together. 
Positions B and D are similar in that both are attracted to the middle-
ground, C. Where they differ is in the weight they give, respectively, to 
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objective and subjective bias. Position B I would associate with Aldo 
Leopold. Though he tables the aesthetic view of nature as a potential source 
of moral behaviour, his ethical theorizing reflects the period when he was 
writing. His views partake of too much subjectivity to have much 
intellectual merit. 
Position D, although very similar to Position B, is a little more 
ecologically informed, less trivial. It moves towards C as a somewhat, but 
not fully objective, "storied" encapsulation of the dynamic 
meeting/agreement of "self" and "others". I believe that J. Baird Callicott 
(1983) represents this viewpoint. With many years of subsequent ecological 
theorizing and of improvisation on the meaning of place and belonging 
since Leopold, Callicott can understand the working of an ecosystem while 
maintaining a clear perspective on the nuisance of mosquitoes, black flies 
and deer flies. He understands why they are there, what their ecological 
functioning is. He is a true participant, not just an observer. Though I hold 
Callicott's thinking in high regard, I cannot place myself with him in 
Position D for the reason that it is just a little too objective and non-
phenomenological for my taste. Like Hepburn and Carlson, I believe that 
ecological knowledge is relevant for appreciation, yet it should never 
overwhelm the direct experience of phenomena themselves and must 
always enhance appreciation, rather than distract or detract from it. I find 
Position C to be the most agreeable, then, as it offers a distinct balance 
between disinterest in the present situation and its wholesale appropriation. 
As Berleant suggested earlier, there must always be: 1) continuity to the 
experience (no attempt at reification, isolating beings as discrete, atomistic 
units with fixed essences); 2) perceptual integration of the experience into 
one rhythmically shifting yet continuous process of inter-relation; and 3) 
participation, a firm commitment to the acknowledgement of qualitative 
place and belonging. This is Position C. 
Ecological Knowledge: The Concepts of Niche and Territory 
This brings us to the notion of what ecological functioning is. Do non-
humans fulfil a fully determinate, mechanistic/reductionistic role that is 
easy to encapsulate as function? Is the idea of function merely a matter of 
human conceptualization, or does it describe something that actually exists? 
Are there really territories that non-humans claim as their property through 
song or spray? Or might our ecological story-telling be just a fanciful 
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projection? Barry Lopez, for one, believes that we must bracket theoretical 
impositions on Nature; "to gain intimacy" we must rid ourselves of 
"assumption" (1996, p. 12). As he suggests (1996, pp. 11-12): 
Put aside the bird book, an analytic frame of mind, and compulsion to 
identify, and sit still. Concentrate instead on feeling a place, on using 
the sense of proprioception. Where in this volume of space are you 
situated? What is spread out behind you is as important as what you 
see before you. What lies beneath you is as relevant as what stands on 
the horizon. Actively use your ears to imagine the acoustical space 
you occupy. How does birdsong ramify here? Through what air is it 
moving? Concentrate on smells in the belief that you can smell water 
and stone. Use your hands to get the heft and texture of a place - the 
tensile strength in a willow branch, the moisture in a pinch of soil, 
the different nap of leaves. Open the vertical line of this place by 
consciously referring the color and form of sky to what you see across 
the ground. Look away from what you want to scrutinize to gain a 
sense of its scale and proportion. Be wary of any explanation for the 
existence of color, a movement. Cultivate a sense of complexity, the 
sense that another landscape exists beyond the one you can subject to 
analysis. 
Though sympathetic to Lopez's view, I would argue that any non-trivial 
story-telling in an environmental context can enhance appreciation. I 
believe in heterogeneity, a plurality of voices and interpretations, and, 
therefore, like Hepburn and Carlson, that a modicum of familiarity with 
evolutionary and ecologicaltheory actually can enhance appreciation. For 
example, ecological theory holds that inter-specific communication is 
dominated by a couple of fundamental concepts: niche and territory. Let us 
look at these in turn. John A. Livingston argues that the niche of a species: 
...is not merely spatial; it is also described by what the species does - 
how it makes its living, how it fits into the larger community, how it 
affects other species. 
There is something tautological about the concept of niche. This is 
because a niche exists only when it is occupied. We postulate a niche 
for every plant and animal we see in any community. If a given 
situation is apparently undisturbed and "natural," and a given type of 
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organism is absent, then we conclude that there is no niche for 
it.. ;(1994, pp. 66-67). 
It is easy, he argues, to assume that the presence of an introduced species 
that has no ecological role in a certain context, yet flourishes in its new 
setting, must be occupying a niche ready-for-the-taking. Goats in the 
Galapagos and rabbits in Australia are examples that are well documented: 
the determined policy of humans to eliminate both should suggest that 
neither have a "place" in their new-found "home"; so why the ecological 
preoccupation with the concept of "niche"? 
...This is a truly vexatious question. In the context of exotic 
introductions, whether rabbit or mongoose or goat or rogue primate, 
or indeed ideology, niche theory becomes exceedingly problematical. 
Such is the case because, when a transplant fails to "take," we infer 
the absence of a niche for it. When it does catch on, we infer a pre-
existing niche. Yet few if any wildlife ecologists, one would think, 
would see any feral domesticate as "belonging" in the sense of 
contributory integration - of properly occupying either a spatial or a 
functional [emphasis mine] space in any natural community (1994, 
pp. 67-68). 
"Function" enjoys a very different usage in the ecological interpretation 
of natural communities and in music theory. In the brand of ecological 
theorizing that culminates in Environmental Impact Assessment, this word 
is definitive and absolute - not to mention ethically prescriptive. In musical 
theory, by contrast, it captures, or attempts to capture, the sounding of 
chordal changes (theoretically, after the fact) in order to convey the 
significance of improvisation over sedimented harmonic structures. 
There are tonic, sub-dominant and dominant "functions" in a musical 
setting. One orchestrates a score in full awareness of this and of the physical 
limitations of the instruments, their niches, when one is arranging. An 
•upright, acoustic bass can simply not do what a soprano sax does anymore 
than a pangolin can do what a tree hyrax does. Nor can a cello fully annex 
the tonality of a viola, nor a Black-and-White Colobus monkey that of a Red 
Colobus monkey, though they are of the same family. There are appropriate 
roles for everyone in the symphonic realization: the same claim that can be 
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made of the musical intonations of a symphony can be appropriately applied 
to the non-human soundings of a rainforest. 
Anyone versed in musical theory understands what S.A.T.B. means: 
voicings from the (S) soprano (highest register) descending through the (A) 
alto, then the (T) tenor, to the ultimate ground of harmonic situational 
location: the (B) bass; they are visually arranged vertically in a score. This 
visual and auditory configuration is not a moment of collective decision-
making to try to make musical notation comprehensible: it is real and it 
exists in Nature. 
In his years of work studying neo-tropical birds, Steven Hilty (1994, pp. 
256-265) transcended his pure enjoyment of bird song in order to speculate 
on why birds occupying different positions in their community - from the 
canopy to the forest floor - uttered such qualitatively different vocalizations 
in order to communicate with their brethren. It all came down to the 
acoustical properties of their environment. Significant information, such as 
the presence of a predator above, or worse, in the sub-canopy, causes some 
species to issue an alarm call that does not seem to be intended for any 
species in particular, but as a general alert to all mixed-flocks of different 
intra-specific affiliations that might be passing through at the moment of 
impending predation. But what was especially interesting is that the tonal 
quality of the alarm, though uttered by different species, even species from 
different families, was almost identical. 
This discovery led him to theorize about what sort of generalizations one 
could make about the vocalizations of some terrestrial birds - tinamous, 
quail-doves, and antpittas, for example - vis-a-vis the similarity between 
their registrations at a certain hertz level. They all appeared to form a bass 
section, as I would describe it, and this made perfect sense as low-pitched, 
continuous tones can penetrate foliage much more easily than high-pitched, 
complex songs. 
One group of bassists, the tinamous, arguably, have the most beautiful 
and penetrating calls of any group of bird species in the neo-tropics. Rising 
through a haunting series of tremulous invitations, they announce their 
presence at the beginning and the close of day. But they choose their time 
carefully. There is no competitive utterance at the same moment since their 
congeners are inactive. The musical improvisation carries through the 
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underbrush and is received, assumedly, by other tinamous. When looking 
at their physical environment, one can understand why visual displays are - 
of no importance. The density of verdure disallows for far-ranging visual 
communication. Hence, the necessity of vocally introducing oneself by 
means of clear, low tones, volume increases and occasional drops or rises in 
pitch to reach an audience. 
Birds that inhabit the canopy of a forest do not face the same difficulties. 
Since their medium is so rarefied, their twinkling and twittering, combined 
with usually resplendent plumage, attracts the attention of a prospective 
partner or friend. As Hilly puts it (1994, p. 259): 
In the openness of the canopy, there are few reverberations and 
echoes because the vegetation is not so dense. Consequently, canopy 
birds are able to sing songs of higher frequency than their neighbours 
in the understorey because there is less attenuation or loss of high-
pitched sounds. Rapidly modulated notes - notes that change in 
frequency (pitch) and amplitude (loudness) - are commonly used by 
canopy birds. These notes permit more variation in songs, and they 
still can be heard easily at some distance. 
These are our sopranos. They are physically located both in the canopy of the 
forest and at the top of the score due to the high-pitched quality of their 
complex melodic inventions. In the canopy, low tones are not required as 
the voices of canopy species do not need to penetrate thick vegetation. 
Canopy species must, however, overcome one problem; their voices have to 
transmit under windy conditions. Hence, they must perform complex 
vocalizations that, though high-pitched, must cover as great a range of 
frequency as possible, so that something of what they are saying may be 
heard. To give an example, the voice of the skylark is so complex because,_ 
though it is grassland bird and not a canopy species, it, too, must compete 
with wind; moreover, it lacks the communicative aid of a colourful 
plumage which would be grossly inappropriate in its open habitat as it 
would invite the attention of a predator. 
Descending through the canopy to the sub-canopy, we encounter our alto 
section. To my ears, some of the greatest songsters in the avian world occupy 
this space and this, perhaps, may be due to the fact that alto vocalizations 
tend to be much slower and clearer and, therefore, more easily perceived 
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and appreciated in their entirety by humans than the songs of canopy 
Species. The songs, moreover, can be quite loud as in the sub-canopy the 
vegetation is at its thinnest, and so voices . can carry over long distances 
without dissipating quickly through their arboreal absorption. The paucity 
of leaf-cover makes the area an ideal setting for inhabitation by large species 
as it is easier for them both to get around and to display their illustrious 
plumages and virtuoso performances. The Resplendent Quetzal Of Meso-
America, and the Great Blue Turaco, Chocolate-Backed Kingfisher and Red-
Billed Dwarf Hornbill of the West African rainforest are cases in point. Not 
only are these among the most beautiful birds in the world, but the first, 
third and fourth show a remarkable similarity in the quality and acoustic 
shape of their musical invitations. 
Descending again through the forest and the score, prior to encountering 
our bassists, we pass through our tenor section. Due to the very dense 
nature of this shrub layer, we perceive a remarkable symmetry in the 
solution to the problem of communicating self and place under such 
auditorily limiting and musically challenging conditions. What is of 
particular interest is that the bird species occupying this range of niches 
cannot be of large physical stature - coucals and other large cuckoos 
represent an odd exception to this "rule"- must, given the limitations of 
their environment, somehow produce "pure whistled tones within a 
narrow and rather low to moderate frequency range" (Hilty, 1994, p. 263). 
Those humans that occupy a northern or southern temperate climate would 
identify tenors in the form of such-well known birds,as thrushes -robins in 
North America, blackbirds in Europe and southern Australia. People in the 
tropics, though, hear tenors - antbirds, puffbirds or woodcreepers, for 
example - as the potent musical and non-visual source of their morning 
wake-up call and crepuscular shutting-down; they can hear the invitations, 
but these birds are so difficult to see in the dense foliage that they may often 
just be considered disembodied voices. Yet tenors affect deeply, provide 
acoustic dimension in our lives, without our, perhaps, being fully aware of 
it. 
Having encapsulated the basic analogy of ecological and musical 
experience within the confines of a soprano, alto, tenor, and bass experience, 
I present the following schema, faithful to both musical and ecological 
interpretations of role and functionings, understandings and interpretations 
of Nature. The fundamental claim is that species and tones do occupy a 
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niche in a loose sense and that both may be seen to represent the present 
manifestation of evolutionary process; as palpable immediate presences, 
auditory and visual invitations, they are only momentary contextual 
Gestalts that gather up their evolutionary origins and project them into the 
future through the dynamic, dialectical movement of virtual ek-static time. 
Musical South America Africa Australasia Ecological 
Function Function 
Soprano Hummingbird Sunbird Honeyeater Canopy Nectarivore 
Alto Toucan Hornbill Kookaburra Sub-Canopy 
Omnivore 
Tenor.  Antbird Greenbul Scrubwren Mid-level Insectivore 
Bass Tinamou Guinea- Megapode Terrestrial Fructivore 
Fowl 
What is particularly interesting about this schema is not only that the 
voicings from each group - soprano, alto, tenor, and bass - show such a 
consistency in musical pitch and phrasing among totally unrelated families 
across three continents, but that there is such physiological, anatomical 
symmetry between each of the families representative of each S.A.T.B. 
grouping. This phenomenon, known as convergent evolution, shows that 
bird families on different continents, which have never come into contact, 
have assumed startlingly similar guises in response to similar 
environmental pressures and that each is perfectly shaped for its ecological 
role. 
But what of territoriality? There is, perhaps, no ecological theory more 
sacred or more hotly debated. To again cite Livingston: 
In its simplest sense, the notion suggests that many non-human 
animals seek proprietorship over a foraging or breeding area, that 
they actively compete for such physical plots or spaces, and that they 
aggressively assert their proprietorship against others of their 
species...The more attractive the territory in terms of resources, the 
greater is the likelihood of its owner attracting a mate and raising a 
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brood which will inherit those desirable competitive qualities. The 
, defended area is seen as the bird's freehold property (1994, pp. 92-93). - 
Perhaps it is not surprising that members of a culture devoted to the idea of 
private property and fierce competition for scarce resources should be 
inclined to perceive similar devotion elsewhere. There may, however, be 
other ways of looking at territoriality. 
Neil Evernden offers a plausible alternative to the traditional 
characterization of territory as a resource-rich, quantitatively designated 
property that is defended at all cost from the opportunistic plundering 
activities of interlopers. Using the example of a small fish called a cichlid to 
illustrate a more qualitative interpretation of territorial behaviour he 
ponders what it feels like to have a territory: 
Normally, size is of considerable importance - the big guy usually gets 
his way. But when the breeding season comes along, strange things 
start to happen; size does not necessarily prevail. It appears that once a 
small fish has established himself in a territory, he goes quite mad. 
That is to say, he does not appear to behave rationally. He does not 
seem to respect size at all. He even seems to forget what an 
insignificant specimen he is, and will attack a much larger intruder. 
In short, it's as if his boundary of what he considers to be 
"himself" has expanded to the dimensions of the territory itself. The 
fish is no longer an organism bounded by skin - it is an organism-
plus-environment bounded by an imaginary integument. The 
boundary isn't a sharp one, but rather is a gradient. The further you 
get from its center, the less willing is the fish to attack. It's as if there is 
a kind of field in the territory, with the "self" present throughout but 
more concentrated toward the center (1996, pp. 97-98). 
As a naturalist, I have always been struck by the distinction between the 
quantitative and the qualitative. Why does a hummingbird go after a Red-
Tailed Hawk? The size difference would seem to make such behaviour 
insane. Quantitatively, the hummingbird would seem to have no 
opportunity of repelling its much larger interloper; its speed and agility, 
however, ensures that it can drive away its family's potential predator. So 
the hawk moves on. The hummingbird would not provide for much of a 
meal, anyway. 
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What is particularly strange is that I have also witnessed large birds 
attacking small birds even when these are not potential prey. Why does a 
crow assail a Northern Pygmy-Owl? Moreover, this little (6-inch) owl, in 
common with other members of its genus in West Africa and Cuba, will call 
all day long, even though such self-promotion would appear to represent 
the height of foolishness by unnecessarily attracting the attention of 
predators. Why on earth would a small owl identify its presence so 
blatantly? Certainly, in North America, big owls, like the Great Horned, the 
Barred, and the Long-Eared assume a position which is cryptic and intended 
to make them invisible. They attempt to make themselves as unobtrusive 
as possible - the Long-Eared Owl truly looks like a piece of shaggy bark. And 
if they are discovered by marauding crows, will rarely stand their ground; 
they simply fly away to the next stand of conifers if only to get away from the 
cacophony in order to resume their snooze. 
Why, then, should such a little bird provoke such pandemonium? It is 
clearly not a case of the bird posing a threat to a crow. The only answer that I 
have come up with is that the quantitative dimensions of the little owl are 
meaningless; what matters is that in his configuration, his 
phenomenological, qualitative aspect, he is the same as his much larger 
relatives: he has large eyes in the front of his head and is, thus, an owl: a 
significant potential threat. (As an aside, I once enjoyed watching for quite 
some time, a Swamp Harrier quartering over a paddock in Tasmania. She 
was magnificent, effortlessly graceful and bristling with intensity. When I 
saw her the next day, killed by a car, she was so small in death. The calipers 
were duly applied and quantitatively there was not much to her; she was 
not the significant presence she was the day before. She had become an 
empirical thing, devoid of quality, ready for the autopsy.) 
Conclusion: The Appreciation of Nature's Music 
Though I am a naturalist and, therefore, derive great satisfaction in 
improvising upon the sedimented meanings stemming from natural 
history as they apply to the natural spectacle that surrounds me, I also 
believe that it is time to recapture some of the nineteenth-century wisdom 
accruing to Nature's aesthetic dimension for, like Evernden, I believe that: 
"Environmentalism without aesthetics is merely regional planning" (1996, 
p. 103). 
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In the remainder - of-the chapter, then, I seek to provide my creative story • 
by means of a sketch of my interpretation of Nature's music. I think that the 
major stumbling-block to Nature's serious consideration as music is that 
natural sound is so complex, so seemingly haphazard, so improvisational, 
that there is rarely an attempt on the part of the perceiver to pare it down to 
its essentials. Yet, what allows for all music to fall under the rubric of 
"music" are but three essential items: melody, harmony and rhythm. That 
natural sound is melodic seems to be obvious enough. We enjoy the easily 
perceived low pitched, relatively slow phrases of thrushes and the pleasant 
warbling and twittering of canaries. Yet in being so easily ingested, because 
they are so reminiscent of instrumental timbres and phrasings with which 
we are familiar, is it not perhaps possible that all we are at-tuned to is the 
merely melodious? Is it possible that we do not take non-human melodic 
inventions seriously because we cannot understand their significance and, 
therefore, choose to pejoratively characterize them as imperfect attempts at 
music much in the way we politely applaud at a child's first violin recital? 
To invoke an extreme, yet apposite analogy, there are few who would 
have the hubris to claim that they understand the blistering, full bore 
screechings of Ornette Coleman, perhaps not even Ornette himself. Yet, it is 
undeniably melodic expression, music. A musical pedant might claim that 
the distinction rests with the fact that Ornette's endeavours are intentional, 
yet this cannot always be maintained. One of the central things about 
improvisation at high speeds is that one "goes for the sound" on a wing and 
a prayer by moving into areas of tonal significance that just feel right, that 
have been pre-figured by years of practicing appropriate hand positionings 
(Sudnow, 1978). (It is fascinating to note that early Greek musical notation 
did not visually depict notes on a score, but only hand positions appropriate 
for improvisation.) 
What ramifications might this have for our perception of natural sound, 
birdsong in particular? Iconoclastically, Charles Hartshorne has claimed that 
not only is birdsong musical, but that it is empirically possible to prove that 
is intentionally so: 
...bird song illustrates the truth that animals tend to avoid the twin 
evils of monotony and chaos, the merely expected and orderly and 
the merely unexpected and disorderly. It is a statistical fact that in 
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singing birds either pause between utterances, thus achieving 
"immediate variety" as between singing and nonauditory 
experiences, or they vary the utterances themselves. In this and many 
other ways birds behave somewhat as human musicians do; they 
have a genuine though primitive aesthetic sense. ,Singing, for them 
as for us, tends to be self-reenforcing [sic], the more so the more 
developed the capacity to sing (1976, p. 299). 
I defy anyone who has heard David Lumsdaine's recordings of Pied 
Butcherbirds to claim that these birds are not musicians freely and 
significantly communicating with each other through their melodic and 
harmonic improvisations. Traditional wisdom would have it that birds are 
pre-programmed with a limited repertoire of songs that are given solely in 
response to external stimuli such as a perceived threat, a perceived rival or a 
potential mate. To claim that mere birds are intentionally and musically 
improvising upon set pieces is to encroach on sacred ground, to besmirch an 
activity that is a singularly human achievement and activity. In a somewhat 
roundabout way, though, the opposite might be true. To truly appreciate 
music, one has to be good listener; but to be a good listener, one has to at-
tune oneself to the possibility of encountering new musical invitations, to 
not just almost deafly receive the same old, hackneyed Schubert and 
Brahms. Surely it is to debase musical meaning and significance to stagnate 
its power by so artificially limiting its scope. As Lumsdaine says in defence of 
his musical soundscapes: 
...to speak of anything as "a piece of music" is to indulge in a 
convenient fiction. Music is not a score on a library shelf; it's not the 
sound produced by a piano or an orchestra or a computer. Music is an 
activity, a-particularly creative way of listening. The words composer, 
performer, audience enable us to distinguish different roles or 
perspectives within the context of this activity, but they must never 
distract us from the essentially creative contribution of each 
participant (cited in Rothenberg 1997, p. 122). 
Here, too, he offends human sensibilities: not only are birds musical but 
they are creatively communicative. The purist might yield some ground 
with reference to the first by claiming that what we take to be intentional 
form is only a human projection since we can so easily grasp the 
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Modulations and phrasings of the tune and, therefore, infer 
- meaningfulness. But surely; the second claim is an utter fabrication? 
Sadly for the purist, it is not because Lumsdaine's work, like 
Hartshorne's cited above, is empirically demonstrable. With very strong 
parallels with my own discussion in Chapter Two of the relation of 
sedimented meanings and authentic, creative expression in language, he 
explains that: 
Pied butcherbirds live in family groups. Both sexes sing, and their 
music is fundamental to communication and bonding between 
members of the group. The most consistent clues to recognizing the 
song of a pied butcherbird are the quality of the voice and the style, or 
character, of its singing. The members of any group will have a 
number of calls that they share with other pied butcherbirds, but the 
musical content of the songs varies from one area to another, even 
between neighbouring territories. Essentially, their territory seems to 
be defined by the family songs that they learn from their parents and 
siblings, that is, by means of a musical tradition that each generation 
may take over and use in its own way... The pied butcherbird is a 
virtuoso of composition and improvisation: The long solo develops 
like a mosaic, through the varied repetition of its phrases. In the 
course of the song, some elements remain constant, and some 
transform through addition and elimination. The bird is a virtuoso 
of decoration: There is an extraordinary delicacy in the way it 
articulates the harmonic course of its song with microtonal 
inflections or places in cadences with a bird's equivalent of 
tremolandi and flutter-tonguing (cited in Rothenberg, 1997, p. 123). 
Within the schema presented above, butcherbirds would fit into the 
(T)tenor range and this is evident on both musical and ecological fronts: 
their voicings are pure, slow and deeply moving to us while being 
appropriate to their environmental context in the shrub layer. What is of 
particular interest is that, though pied butcherbirds sing antiphonally, often 
even in trios, it is a solo that accompanies the crepuscular break and close of 
day. If the soloist is not communicating with the immediate family, then, 
with who? Clearly, the solo vocalizations are not merely functionally aimed 
at maintaining the cohesiveness of the group. Nor can they be a Matter of 
the self-promotion of an individual that is so intra-specifically social. 
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Suspend judgment long enough to entertain that the solo might actually be 
inter-specifically invitational; Is there any chance that the tenor with his 
accompanying bass is entreating the musical participation of the altos and 
sopranos that exist and belong within his extended field of self? Remember 
that inter-specific clashes are rare and usually predicated on perceptions of 
qualitative difference; attacks are initiated when an interloper gets too close 
to the center of one's place, one's very being. Also re-cognize that species in a 
shared habitat have evolved, "grown up together". Is the thought of inter-
specific, not just intra-specific, compliance and community, re-acquaintance 
tftrough improvized musical conduct each morning a ludicrously naive 
interpretation of that interpenetration? Livingston (1994, p. 96) suggests that 
this may be entirely possible if we "remove our culturally conditioned 
eyeglasses for a moment" and hear the vocalization as an expression of 
"place" and "belonging". Consider the bird's position: 
the shrubs and trees and herbaceous plants. and all the animals 
within that space are in the most real and literal sense built into his 
existence.. .In singing and displaying around the periphery of his 
greater self, the bird may be seen as celebrating, not his proprietorship 
but his presence, the phenomenon of his being. Extended as it is, his 
existence... includes very many other plant and animal existences - 
thousands of them. What is being celebrated, then, is community. 
The next time you hear a bird song, think of it as a conscious (and 
subjective) celebration of multispecies community participation. 
Is it not just possible that the human appreciation of music is a 
recollection of this interspecific auditory community of reciprocity and 
communion? Perhaps the force fit of natural sound into music may actually 
represent its obverse: that our belonging in the natural world makes us 
musical? 
Coda 
Nature does make us musical. What I have argued is that 
phenomenologically, we already, always have had access to a mode of 
perception and comportment (the Listening stance) that is thoroughly 
musical. What is more, I have maintained that there is a definite analogy 
between the perception of tones and species unfolding in virtual and 
experiential time which can be enhanced (though not necessarily) by a 
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familiarity with basic theoretical Musical and ecological constructs which 
delimit the experience to some degree; in banishing the trivial experience of 
the tourist position, such familiarity allows for fuller appreciation. 
Concepts, species and chords are just frames of reference that provide the 
grounding for hermeneutical" retrieval and improvisational exchange. 
Hermeneutical return to sedimented structures is an interpretation of a 
species' evolutionary past, while the direct contextual experience of a living 
species is an on-going reciprocal exchange that gathers in, recollects and 
reacquaints us with evolutionary history and its past manifestations in the 
here and now. We move through subtle nuances of meaning, micro-
habitats, as we move through the forest, the symphony anticipating 
momentary focal clearings of soundings which reach silence at the end of 
the whole Gestalt. We reach the clearing: we are suddenly in the savanna 
without knowing how we got there and without intentionally seeking it. 
But this is not an end. It is the beginning of a new evolutionary thrust, 
musical movement. As listeners, we must hearken to its unfolding; hear it 
for the first time. 
Moving through the forest, we perceive musically. We "anticipate" the 
"climax" community while on the way encountering a series of temporary 
micro-climatic, micro-habitat resolutions. Certainly it is easier to perceive in 
terms of resources - eschewing the nuances of significance that each context 
offers as it rhythmically emerges, "attacks" and "decays" in one seamless 
symphony. Surely too, the application of a simple, once-worked-through 
interpretation, and therefore now static thrust into the world allows us to 
side-step thorny normative implications of perceiving a forest solely in 
terms of its board-feet of timber yield. There is no doubt that we can adopt 
this way of thinking. Yet, if we can perceive phenomenologically and 
musically, maybe we can move beyond the simple identification of a 
"resource" with its "economic potential". I do believe that we can trade 
"timber" for "timbre". 
What the previous chapters have attempted is a whole-scale overhaul of 
prejudices - ontological, epistemological, moral and aesthetic - in order to 
locate such biases within an historical and psychological framework. The 
great thing about phenomenology is that it addresses immediate concerns 
and coalesces interest without the superimposition of concretizing 
preconceptions or "factual itemization" of "things" under inspection; that is, 
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the transformation of worldly beings by their conceptualization as objects 
with_nothing more than resource value. This totalizing approach has been 
rejected, not because it represents an inconsistent logical syllogism, but 
because it is an affront to ethical sensibilities and thwarts appropriate 
worldly comportment. Ecologically speaking, beings do have a "place"; they 
"belong" where they are contextually situated. They simply perceive their 
"environment" as a field for activity. They have been doing so for 
millennia. To judge their activity within artificial parameters, in terms of 
some determinate, "essential" functioning is surely a case of human hubris. 
Echoing David Michael Levin, Paul Shepard argues in the conclusion of 
Nature and Madness (1982, pp. 129-130): 
Adults, weaned to the wrong music, cut short from their own 
potential, are not the best of mentors. The problem may be more 
difficult to understand than to solve. Beneath the veneer of 
civilization, to paraphrase the trite phrase of humanism, lies not the 
barbarian and the animal, but the human in us who knows the 
rightness of birth in gentle surroundings, the necessity of a rich 
human environment, play at being animals, the discipline of natural 
history... 
Infants have no need of theoretical constructs to establish their place in the 
world. No more does any other natural being. Non-humans do not require 
stultifying abstractions to establish their significance in a setting. They do 
not need to read a text on appropriate conduct. They belong. We do too, if 
we truly seek to become transpersonal beings. It is, therefore, crucial to 
develop our capacity for wonder, curiosity, care and concern through the 
practice of Self-realization!. In attempting and possibly achieving truly at-
tuned worldly comportment - understanding ourselves as processes forever 
in contact with all other process-based beings - we will have recaptured our 
musical place, our musical transpersonality. 
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